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Traditional approaches to revenue management assume that a seller has a large
degree of certainty about the market environment in which he operates. This
dissertation focuses on the practice of revenue management in uncertain market
environments, and describes strategies by which a seller can intelligently gather
information about the demand for his products, to effectively price and distribute
his goods. We describe theoretically sound policies for both pricing and distribu-
tion of goods under demand uncertainty, and establish insights into the structure
of effective strategies, and the inherent challenges in such problems.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
This dissertation focuses on two fundamental problems faced by any revenue man-
ager: how should I set prices for my products, and how should I distribute my
products for sale? The answers to both of these questions depend intrinsically on
the demand for the product, and accordingly, traditional studies in the revenue
management literature assume that the seller has prior knowledge of the demand
for his goods. Our concern here will be to understand how the seller can answer
the above questions without prior knowledge of the demand for his products. Thus,
our focus will be on a learning approach to revenue management, and we will seek
to understand how the seller can effectively price and allocate his goods in the face
of demand uncertainty.
The first two chapters are devoted to the question of pricing under demand
uncertainty, and are based on the observation that to make intelligent pricing
decisions, the seller must have some knowledge of the demand curve for his prod-
uct. Thus, when the seller has imperfect information about the demand for the
good, finding optimal pricing strategies becomes a challenging problem. We in-
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vestigate strategies for price experimentation, and establish fundamental limits on
the performance of pricing policies under demand uncertainty. We also consider
the challenge of price experimentation with limited price adjustments, and derive
insights into the structure and performance of price experimentation strategies in
the presence of adjustment constraints.
In the final chapter, we address the question of how a seller should distribute
his goods for sale, by studying a general resource allocation problem with uncertain
demand. In this problem, a seller must decide how to allocate units of his products
across multiple selling venues, with the goal of maximizing his total sales. We
design policies that learn near-optimal allocations over a sequence of time periods,
without prior knowledge of the demand at each venue. The policies developed here
advance the state of the art for the online resource allocation problem, and our
analysis highlights the ways in which effective allocation strategies should balance
venue exploration with best-guess optimal allocation.
1.1. Pricing Under Demand Uncertainty
In Chapter 2, we consider the problem of a retailer choosing a price at which to
sell a new product, with the objective of maximizing his total expected revenue.
If the retailer had perfect information about the demand for the product d(p)
as a function of the price level p, then determining the revenue-maximizing price
for the good would in principle be a straightforward optimization problem: the
seller would simply compute arg max
p
{pd(p)}. However, perfect information about
the demand curve is typically not available in practice, because the relationship
between price and customer purchase probability is generally not known to the
seller in advance. To address this problem, we consider dynamic pricing strategies,
2
in which a seller adjusts the price of the good to gain information about the demand
curve, and then exploits this information to offer a near-optimal selling price.
In this chapter, we consider two fundamental questions that apply to virtually
any dynamic pricing formulation. First, what is the value of knowing the demand
curve; in other words, what is the magnitude of the revenue lost due to uncer-
tainty about the relationship between price and demand? Secondly, how should
good pricing strategies balance price experimentation (exploration) and best-guess
optimal pricing (exploitation)? We will see that the answers to both of these
questions depend intrinsically on the nature of the demand uncertainty facing the
seller.
To investigate these questions, we consider dynamic pricing under a general
parametric model of demand uncertainty. We measure the performance of a pricing
strategy in this model in terms of the regret : the difference between the expected
revenue gained by the pricing strategy, and the revenue gained by an omniscient
strategy that has full information about the demand curve in advance. We classify
the order of regret of optimal pricing strategies, by describing policies that achieve
provable worst-case performance guarantees, and by proving lower bounds on the
minimum regret achievable by an arbitrary pricing strategy, which match our upper
bounds to within a constant factor. In the course of this analysis, we illustrate
important principles for the design of optimal pricing heuristics, and relate the
best achievable performance for this problem to characteristics of the underlying
demand model.
3
1.2. Pricing with Minimal Adjustments
In the previous chapter, we considered the problem of pricing under demand un-
certainty, with the goal of maximizing total revenue. Implicit in our problem, and
in nearly all dynamic pricing formulations, is the need for the seller to adjust the
offer price as he gains information about the demand curve over time. Indeed, if
the seller is constrained to offer a single fixed price throughout the entire selling
season, then he will likely sacrifice a large amount of potential revenue, because
without knowledge of the demand curve, the chosen price will almost certainly be
sub-optimal. Accordingly, virtually all existing dynamic pricing policies place no
constraints on the number of price adjustments, allowing the seller to change prices
as many times as is necessary to perform demand learning and price exploitation.
This lack of restriction on price adjustments stands in contrast to a large body of
evidence suggesting that frequent price changes are inherently undesirable. From
the standpoint of the seller, there is a significant amount of evidence (see, for
example, Levy et al. (1997), Levy et al. (1998), Zbaracki et al. (2004)) showing
that the costs of implementing frequent price changes in a traditional retail setting
can amount to a considerable portion of the seller’s net margins. Even in an
online retail setting, where price adjustments may be less costly (Brynjolfsson and
Smith (2000)), there is evidence to suggest that frequent fluctuations in price may
be undesirable to the customer. For example, Amazon.com was involved in a
controversy after frequent price experiments lead to accusations of discrimination
and negative press coverage regarding its pricing practices (Weiss and Mehrotra
(2001)).
Motivated by these concerns, this chapter seeks to understand the fundamental
4
limit on the minimum number of price adjustments needed for optimal dynamic
pricing. Perhaps the most straightforward means of understanding the relationship
between adjustment constraints and regret would be to establish bounds on the re-
gret of a policy in terms of the time horizon and a hard switching constraint. Such
an absolute measure of performance, however, would make it difficult to distin-
guish between the loss in revenue due to demand uncertainty, and the revenue loss
due to switching constraints. Thus, we consider a relative performance measure,
by using the performance of the optimal unconstrained pricing policy as a natural
benchmark. Specifically, we will consider the minimal switching rate of a problem
instance, which we define to be the minimum number of price changes necessary for
a switching-constrained policy to match the regret of the optimal unconstrained
policy. We derive lower bounds on the minimum number of price adjustments
needed for an online pricing policy to achieve the performance guarantees estab-
lished in Chapter 2, and we describing online pricing strategies that achieve the
optimal rate of performance, while adjusting pricing the minimal number of times.
This analysis classifies the minimal switching rate for the online pricing problem,
and gives a number of insights into the design of policies that jointly maximize
revenue, while minimizing price adjustments.
1.3. Dynamic Resource Allocation
In Chapters 2 and 3, we considered a monopolist selling an unlimited supply of
a product from a single venue, and considered optimization over the set of all
online pricing strategies. In Chapter 4, we depart from this line of investigation to
consider an alternative problem in the area of revenue management under demand
uncertainty. In this chapter, we consider the problem of a retailer selling a fixed
stock of inventory from multiple venues, with the goal of maximizing the total
5
number of sales across all venues. In contrast to the previous two chapters, the
decision variable for the seller in this problem is no longer which price to charge,
but rather which allocation of inventory to venues will result in the largest number
of expected sales. As in the previous two chapters, we note that if the seller had
perfect information about the demand at each venue, then determining the optimal
allocation would be a straightforward optimization problem. Thus, we consider the
natural extension in which the seller has no prior information about the demand
at each venue, and must offer a sequence of allocations to maximize total overall
sales.
In this chapter, we describe policies for the online resource allocation problem
with stochastic demand. The primary difficulty for a retailer operating in this
setting is the censored natured of the feedback that he receives. For example,
if the retailer decides to allocate n units of his product to a given venue at the
beginning of a selling period, and then observes at the end of the selling period
that all n units of the product were sold, then it is impossible for him to determine
whether the demand for the product was exactly n, or whether the demand for
the product exceeded n by a large margin. This issue leads to a natural exchange
between estimating the demand for products, and allocating goods to maximize
consumption. On the one hand, since demand observations are censored, a policy
must periodically over-allocate to each venue, to maintain an accurate estimate of
the demand. On the other hand, excessive over-allocation comes at a cost in regret,
because in so doing, a policy is most likely performing a suboptimal allocation.
We describe a natural class of policies for the online resource allocation prob-
lem, which carefully balance the exploration / exploitation tradeoff described above
to achieve worst-case regret that is nearly optimal. These policies represent an ad-
6
vance in the state of the art for this problem; to our knowledge, these policies have
the best-known performance guarantees for the online resource allocation problem
with stochastic demand, and are the first policies whose regret guarantees match
known lower bounds for this problem, up to sub-logarithmic factors in the number
of time periods, and polynomial factors in the number of venues and units of re-
source. In addition to these theoretical results, we show that our policies perform
well empirically, by evaluating them on both synthetic demand data, and demand
data calibrated to a set of usage data from a local vehicle-sharing operation.
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Chapter 2
Dynamic Pricing
2.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we consider the problem of a retailer choosing a price at which
to sell a new product, with the objective of maximizing his expected revenue.
If the retailer had full information about the demand at every price level, then
he could determine the revenue-maximizing price for the good. However, perfect
information about the demand curve is rarely available practice, and so we address
the natural question of how a seller should set his prices to maximize his overall
revenue in the face of demand uncertainty.
We will concern ourselves with two primary questions. First, how much revenue
will be lost by the seller due to lack of information about the demand curve for
the product, and secondly, how should we design pricing strategies to balance
price experimentation for demand learning, and best-guess optimal pricing for
revenue maximization? We investigate these questions under a general parametric
8
model of demand uncertainty. To measure the performance of a pricing strategy
in this model, we compare the revenue generated by that strategy against the
revenue generated by the optimal pricing strategy, which always offers the revenue-
maximizing price. The difference in these two revenues is called the regret, and
our goal will be to design pricing strategies which have small regret in a worst-case
sense.
We classify the order of the regret of the optimal pricing policy under two sce-
narios: a scenario in which the demand curves satisfy a set of general assumptions,
and a scenario in which the demand curves satisfy an additional “well-separated”
condition, under which the demand curve for any one parameter value stochasti-
cally dominates the demand curve for a different value.
By analyzing the performance of pricing policies under these two scenarios, we
derive a number of insights into the above questions. For the general case, we show
that the worst-case T -period regret of an arbitrary pricing policy must be Ω(
√
T ).1
To establish this result, we show that a parametric family of demand curves may
include an “uninformative” price, and that the presence of uninformative prices
makes demand learning intrinsically difficult for the seller. To complement this
lower bound, we describe a pricing policy that achieves a regret guarantee ofO(√T )
across all problem instances. To achieve the optimal order of regret, this policy
hedges against the difficulties imposed by uninformative prices, by conducting a
carefully chosen amount of dedicated exploratory pricing, during which it sacri-
fices immediate revenues to gain information about the demand curve. Thus, we
address the above questions by showing that in a general parametric setting, the
amount of revenue lost due to demand uncertainty is Θ(
√
T ), and by describing
1We use the notation O( · ) and Ω( · ) to represent upper and lower bounds, respectively, on
the performance measure of interest (see Knuth (1997) for more details).
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an explicit balance between price experimentation and best-guess optimal pricing
that achieves the optimal rate of regret.
To contrast the general case discussed above, we consider a special scenario
in which the demand curves satisfy a well-separated condition that precludes the
possibility of an uninformative price. We show that in this case, dynamic pricing
is intrinsically easier, in that the worst-case regret of the optimal pricing policy is
O(log T ). We describe a “greedy” pricing policy that achieves this rate of regret,
by simultaneously estimating the demand curve while offering the best-guess op-
timal price. Intuitively, in the absence of uninformative prices, a seller can learn
from customer responses at every price level, making simultaneous exploration and
exploitation possible, and leading to regret that is much smaller than in the gen-
eral case. Additionally, we show that the stochastic nature of demand forces the
worst-case regret of any pricing policy to be Ω(log T ), establishing that our greedy
policy achieves the optimal order of regret. Thus, our study of this case exhibits
a scenario in which the magnitude of the revenue lost due to demand uncertainty
is significantly different, and in which the optimal rate of regret is achieved by a
policy with entirely different structure.
In summary, our analysis provides a rich regret profile of dynamic pricing under
a general parametric model of demand uncertainty. Moreover, our results demon-
strate an intrinsic connection between the optimal order of regret and structural
properties of the demand model, and provide insights which guide the design of
provably effective pricing heuristics. We give a detailed outline of our results and
their organization in Section 2.1.3; below, we describe the details of our dynamic
pricing framework.
10
2.1.1 The Model
We assume that customers arrive in discrete time steps. For each t ≥ 1, when the
tth customer arrives, he is quoted a price by the seller, and then decides whether
to purchase the good at that price based on his willingness-to-pay Vt. We assume
that {Vt : t ≥ 1} are independent and identically distributed random variables
whose common distribution function belongs to some family parameterized by
z ∈ Z ⊂ Rn. Let d( · ; z) : R+ → R+ denote the complementary cumulative
distribution function of Vt, that is, for all p ≥ 0,
d(p ; z) = Prz {Vt ≥ p} . (2.1)
We assume that each customer purchases the product if and only if his willingness-
to-pay is at least as large as the product price. Thus, we will also refer to d( · ; z)
as the demand curve because it determines the probability that the customer will
purchase a product at a given price. For any p ≥ 0, the expected revenue r(p ; z)
under the price p is given by
r(p ; z) = p d(p ; z) . (2.2)
We will restrict our attention to families of demand curves for which the corre-
sponding revenue function r( · ; z) has a unique maximizer.
We will consider a problem class C to be a tuple C = (P ,Z, d), where Z ⊂ Rn
is a compact and convex parameter set, P = [pmin, pmax] is a closed pricing interval
with pmin ≥ 0, and d : P × Z → [0, 1] is a smooth parametric family of demand
curves such that p 7→ d(p; z) is non-increasing for each z ∈ Z. Finally, we assume
that p∗(z) ∈ P for all z ∈ Z.
For any t ≥ 1, we denote by yt = (y1, . . . , yt) ∈ {0, 1}t a history of customer
purchasing decisions, where y` = 1 if the `
th customer decided to purchase the
11
product, and y` = 0 otherwise. A pricing policy ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . .) is a sequence
of functions such that ψt : {0, 1}t−1 → P sets the price in period t based on
the observed purchasing decisions in the preceding t − 1 periods. To model the
relationship between a pricing policy ψ and customer behavior, we consider the
distribution Qψ,zt on t-step customer response histories induced by the policy ψ,
which we define as follows. For any policy ψ and z ∈ Z, let Qψ,zt : {0, 1}t → [0, 1]
denote the probability distribution of the customer responses Yt = (Y1, . . . , Yt) in
the first t periods when the policy ψ is used and the underlying parameter is z;
that is, for all yt = (y1, . . . , yt) ∈ {0, 1}t,
Qψ,zt (yt) =
t∏
`=1
d(p`; z)
y`(1− d(p`; z))1−y` , (2.3)
where p` = ψ` (y`−1) denotes the price in period ` under the policy ψ. It will also
be convenient to consider the distribution on customer responses to a sequence of
fixed prices p = (p1, . . . , pk) ∈ Pk, rather than the prices set by a pricing policy.
We represent these distributions by
Qp,z(y) =
k∏
`=1
d(p`; z)
y`(1− d(p`; z))1−y` ,
where y ∈ {0, 1}k, and p` denotes the `th component of the price vector p ∈ Pk.
Finally, we formalize the performance measure used to evaluate pricing policies.
For a problem class C = (P ,Z, d), a parameter z ∈ Z, a policy ψ setting prices in
P , and a time horizon T ≥ 1, the T -period cumulative regret under ψ is defined
to be
Regret(z, C, T, ψ) =
T∑
t=1
Ez [r (p∗(z); z)− r(Pt; z)] ,
where P1, P2, . . . denotes the sequence of prices under the policy ψ, and Ez [ · ]
denotes the expectation when the underlying parameter vector of the willingness-
to-pay distribution is z. We note that when the parameter z is known, minimizing
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the T -period cumulative regret is equivalent to maximizing the total expected
revenue over T periods.
As a convention, we will denote vectors in bold, and scalars in regular font.
A random variable is denoted by an uppercase letter while its realized values are
denoted in lowercase. We denote by R+ the set of non-negative real numbers, while
R++ denotes the set of positive numbers. We use ‖ · ‖ to denote the Euclidean
norm, and for any set S ⊂ Rn and any element y ∈ Rn, we define S − y =
{x−y : x ∈ S}. We use log( · ) to denote the natural logarithm. For any symmetric
matrix A, let λmin(A) denote its smallest eigenvalue.
Before proceeding with a review of the relevant literature, we note several
assumptions about the retail environment implicit in our model. We assume that
the seller is a monopolist offering an unlimited supply of a nonperishable single
product, with no marginal cost of production. We also assume that the seller
has the ability to adjust prices and receive feedback in real time, at the level of
individual customers. Although quite stylized, this model allow us to conduct a
simple and tractable analysis of demand learning under parametric uncertainty,
and clearly illustrate some of the difficulties facing a seller in such a scenario.
Moreover, these assumptions have been adopted by previous works (e.g., Cope,
2006; Kleinberg and Leighton, 2003; Carvalho and Puterman, 2005; Besbes and
Zeevi, 2009), and provide a convenient framework in which to study dynamic
pricing. We now proceed to place this work in context with a review of the existing
literature.
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2.1.2 Literature Review
Many recent studies in the dynamic pricing literature consider heuristics for pricing
under parametric notions of demand uncertainty. Carvalho and Puterman (2005)
consider a dynamic pricing formulation in which the demand has a logistic distribu-
tion with two unknown parameters. The authors perform a numerical evaluation
of several heuristic strategies, and demonstrate that a “one-step lookahead” policy,
which sacrifices immediate revenue to compute a better estimate of the unknown
demand parameters, outperforms a myopic policy. Lobo and Boyd (2003) consider
a linear demand model with Gaussian noise, and investigate through numerical
experiments a “price-dithering” policy, which adds a random perturbation to the
myopically optimal price. Bertsimas and Perakis (2003) consider a similar demand
model, and show through numerical experiments that approximate dynamic pro-
gramming policies that balance immediate revenue rewards with long-term learning
can outperform a myopic policy. The above works provide empirical evidence that,
in a variety of settings, pricing policies that perform some sort of active exploration
will outperform myopically greedy policies, indicating that there is some intrinsic
value to price experimentation. However, none of these works establish provable
performance guarantees for the heuristics described.
More aligned with this work, several other recent papers conduct more theo-
retical investigations of the value of price experimentation. In Besbes and Zeevi
(2009), the authors consider demand learning under an uncapacitated Bernoulli
demand model, in which the seller knows the initial demand curve. At some point
in time unknown to the seller, the demand curve switches to a different (but known
in advance) function of the price. The authors show that when the two demand
curves satisfy a well-separated condition, a myopically greedy policy is optimal.
14
Additionally, they show that when the demand curves intersect, corresponding to
the presence of an uninformative price, then the magnitude of the worst-case regret
is larger, and exhibit an optimal policy that performs some forced exploration. Our
work in this chapter is thematically related to Besbes and Zeevi (2009), in that we
conduct a similar analysis of the worst-case regret under a well-separated versus
intersecting demand model, and in that we consider myopic versus forced explo-
ration policies. One may view our work as complementary to Besbes and Zeevi
(2009), in that we consider demand learning in a stationary, parameter learning
framework, while they consider a similar learning problem under a non-stationary,
two-hypothesis setting.
A second related paper is Besbes and Zeevi (2008), in which the authors con-
sider demand learning in a general parametric (as well as non-parametric) setting,
and present policies based on maximum likelihood estimation. They suggest that
the structure and performance of a rate-optimal pricing policy should be different
in the general versus the well-separated case, but they provide the same lower
bound on the performance measure for both cases. We complement the theme of
their work by exhibiting a dynamic pricing formulation in which the regret profiles
between the two cases are entirely different. Specifically, we prove in Theorem 2.3.1
that in the general case, the worst case regret under an arbitrary policy must be at
least Ω(
√
T ), and that in the well-separated case, there is a policy whose regret is
at most O(log T ) across all problem instances (Theorem 2.4.8). Aside from these
thematic similarities, several crucial features differentiate this work from ours, in-
cluding the presence of a known, finite time horizon, the presence of a known
capacity constraint, and a performance measure that is parameterized by initial
capacity and demand rate, rather than the time horizon. The aforementioned
differences make direct comparisons difficult, and lead to a significantly different
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analysis.
Pricing under parametric demand uncertainty has been considered under a va-
riety of alternative models; see, for example, Aviv and Pazgal (2002), Araman
and Caldenty (2005), and Farias and Van Roy (2007) for a recent line of inves-
tigation in a capacitated, Bayesian framework, and Harrison et al. (2010) for a
formulation that investigates “uninformative prices” in a two-hypothesis, Bayesian
model. Cope (2006) and Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) consider non-parametric
approaches, and notably, Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) derive regret bounds for
the non-parametric case that are comparable to our bounds for the general case.
However, it is worth noting that the policies considered in that work have signifi-
cantly different structure from the ones considered here: their policies operate by
experimenting with fine mesh of prices across the entire pricing interval, whereas
the policies considered here estimate the demand parameters from a relatively
small number of test prices. Thus, by focusing on the design and performance of
pricing strategies that utilize parametric information about the demand curve, we
provide complementary insights into effective dynamic pricing under an alternative
formulation of demand uncertainty. For further examples of dynamic pricing and a
comprehensive review of the subject, we refer the reader to Talluri and van Ryzin
(2004) and Bitran and Caldentey (2003).
Finally, we note that our pricing problem can be viewed as a special case
of a general stochastic optimization problem, in which one wishes to iteratively
approximate the minimizer of an unknown function, based only on noisy evaluation
of the function at points inside a (usually uncountable) feasible set. A full review
of the literature on this topic is beyond the scope of this dissertation; however,
several notable references from the stochastic approximations literature include
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Kiefer and Wolfowitz (1967), Fabian (1967), and more recently, Broadie et al.
(2009) and Cope (2009), which examine the convergence properties of stochastic
gradient-descent type schemes. Another standard approach is to apply the classical
multi-armed bandit algorithm (Lai and Robbins (1985a) and Auer et al. (2002a))
to the general stochastic optimization setting via a discretization approach; see,
for example, Agrawal (1995) and Auer et al. (2007), and Kleinberg and Leighton
(2003) for an application of these techniques in the context of dynamic pricing.
As a key distinction, we note that both of the aforementioned techniques are non-
parametric, and thus the parametric, maximum-likelihood-based policies presented
in this chapter are significantly different in both their structure and analysis.
We now proceed with a summary of our main contributions and organization.
2.1.3 Contributions and Organization
One of the main contributions of our work is a complete regret profile for the dy-
namic pricing problem under a general parametric choice model. In Section 2.3.1,
we prove in Theorem 2.3.1 that in the general case, the regret of an arbitrary pric-
ing policy is Ω(
√
T ), by exploiting the presence of “uninformative prices,” which
force a tradeoff between reducing uncertainty about the parameters of the demand
curve and exploiting the best-guess optimal price. In Section 2.3.2, we present
a pricing policy based on maximum-likelihood estimation whose regret is O(√T )
across all problem instances (Theorem 2.3.6).
In Section 2.4, we consider dynamic pricing when the family of demand curves
satisfies a “well-separated” condition, which precludes the presence of uninfor-
mative prices. We show that in this scenario, the regret of the optimal policy is
Θ(log T ). In Section 2.4.1, we establish a regret lower bound of Ω(log T ) for all poli-
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cies (Theorem 2.4.1), based on a Crame´r-Rao-type inequality. We also describe
a pricing policy based on maximum-likelihood estimates (MLE) that achieves a
matching O(log T ) upper bound (Theorem 2.4.8). The key observation is that in
the well-separated case, demand learning is easier, in that a pricing policy can
learn about the parameters of the demand curve from customer responses to any
price.
As a by product of our analysis, we also provide a novel large deviation inequal-
ity and bound on mean squared errors for a maximum-likelihood estimator based
on samples that are dependent and not identically distributed (Theorem 2.4.7).
The proof techniques used here are of independent interest because they can be
extended to other MLE-based online learning strategies.
2.2. Assumptions and Examples
Recall that a problem class C is a tuple (P ,Z, d), where P = [pmin, pmax] ⊂ R+ is
a feasible pricing interval, Z ⊂ Rn is a compact and convex feasible parameter set,
and d : P×Z → [0, 1] is a parametric family of smooth demand functions such that
p 7→ d(p; z) is non-increasing for each z ∈ Z. Throughout this work, we restrict
our attention to problem classes C satisfying the following basic assumptions.
Assumption 1 (Basic Assumptions). There exists positive constants dmin, dmax,
L, and cr such that
(a) 0 < dmin ≤ d(p; z) ≤ dmax < 1 for all p ∈ P and z ∈ Z.
(b) The revenue function p 7→ r(p; z) has a unique maximizer p∗(z) ∈ P .
(c) The function z 7→ p∗(z) is L-Lipschitz, that is, |p∗(z)− p∗(z¯)| ≤ L ‖z− z¯‖
for all z, z¯ ∈ Z.
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(d) The revenue function p 7→ r(p; z) is twice differentiable with
supp∈P,z∈Z |r′′(p; z)| ≤ cr.
Under Assumption 1(a), the demand is bounded away from zero and one on the
pricing interval; that is, we will not offer prices at which customers will either
purchase or decline to purchase with probability one. Assumption 1(b) is self-
explanatory, and Assumption 1(c) says that if we vary the parameter z by a small
amount, then the optimal price p∗(z) will not vary too much. Assumption 1(d)
imposes a smoothness condition on the demand curve p 7→ d(p; z).
In addition to these structural assumptions about the demand curve, we will
also impose the following statistical assumption about the family of distributions
{Qp,z : z ∈ Z}.
Assumption 2 (Statistical Assumption). There exists a vector of exploration
prices p¯ ∈ Pk such that the family of distributions {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z} is identifiable,
that is, Qp¯,z( · ) 6= Qp¯,z¯( · ) whenever z 6= z¯. Moreover, there exists a constant
cf > 0 depending only on the problem class C and p¯ such that λmin{I(p¯, z)} ≥ cf
for all z ∈ Z, where I(p¯, z) denotes the Fisher information matrix given by
[
I(p¯, z)
]
i,j
= Ez
[
− ∂
2
∂zi∂zj
logQp¯,z(Y)
]
=
n∑
k=1
{
∂
∂zi
d(p¯k, z)
}
×
{
∂
∂zj
d(p¯k, z)
}
d(p¯k, z)(1− d(p¯k, z)) .
Assumption 2 is a standard assumption, which guarantees that we can estimate the
demand parameter based on the purchase observations at the exploration prices p¯
(see, for example, Besbes and Zeevi (2008)). As shown in the following examples,
Assumptions 1 and 2 encompass many families of parametric demand curves (see
Talluri and van Ryzin (2004) for additional examples).
Example 2.2.1 (Logit Demand). Let P = [1/2, 2] ⊂ R, Z = [1, 2]× [−1, 1] ⊂ R2
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and let
d(p, z) =
e−z1p−z2
1 + e−z1p−z2
be the family of logit demand curves. It is straightforward to check that (P ,Z, d)
satisfies the conditions stated in Assumption 1 with dmin = e
−5/(1 + e−5), dmax =
e1/2/(1 + e1/2), L = 2 + log(2), and cr = 2e. It is also straightforward to check
that for any p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2) ∈ P2 with p¯1 6= p¯2, the associated family {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z}
is identifiable. Moreover, for any p ∈ R+ and z ∈ Z, we have that
∂
∂z1
d(p, z) = −pd(p, z)(1− d(p, z)) and ∂
∂z2
d(p, z) = −d(p, z)(1− d(p, z)) ,
which implies that the Fisher information matrix is given by
I(p¯, z) = d(p¯1, z)(1− d(p¯1, z))
 p¯21 p¯1
p¯1 1
+ d(p¯2, z)(1− d(p¯2, z))
 p¯22 p¯2
p¯2 1

By applying the trace-determinant formula, we can show that for all z ∈ Z,
λmin{I(p¯, z)} ≥ (p¯1 − p¯2)
2
p¯21 + p¯
2
2 + 2
· d2min(1− dmax)2 > 0
Example 2.2.2 (Linear Demand). Let P = [1/3, 1/2], let Z = [2/3, 3/4]×[3/4, 1],
and let
d(p; z) = z1 − z2p
be a linear demand family. Then it is straightforward to check that this family
satisfies Assumption 1 with dmin = 1/6, dmax = 1/2, L = 2, and cr = 2. Moreover,
for any p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2) ∈ P2 with p¯1 6= p¯2, the associated family {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z} is
identifiable. A similar computation shows that the Fisher information matrix is
given by
I(p¯, z) =
1
d(p¯1, z)(1− d(p¯1, z))
 1 p¯1
p¯1 p¯
2
1
+ 1
d(p¯2, z)(1− d(p¯2, z))
 1 p¯2
p¯2 p¯
2
2
 ,
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and using the same argument as above, we can show that
λmin{I(p¯, z)} ≥ (p¯1 − p¯2)
2
p¯21 + p¯
2
2 + 2
· 1
d2max(1− dmin)2
> 0 .
Example 2.2.3 (Exponential Demand). Let P = [1/2, 1], let Z = [1, 2] × [0, 1],
and let
d(p; z) = e−z1p−z2
be an exponential demand family. Then by the same techniques used in Ex-
amples 2.2.1 and 2.2.2, one may check that this problem class satisfies Assump-
tions 1 and 2, and that the associated family {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z} is identifiable for any
p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2) ∈ P2 for which p¯1 6= p¯2.
We now discuss an important observation that will motivate the design of
pricing policies in our model. Suppose that the unknown model parameter vector
is z, and let zˆ denote some estimate of z. We might consider pricing the product at
p∗(zˆ), which is optimal with respect to our estimate. When zˆ is close to the true
parameter vector, we would expect that p∗(zˆ) yields a near optimal revenue. We
make this intuition precise in the following corollary, which establishes an upper
bound on the loss in revenue from inaccurate estimation.
Corollary 2.2.4 (Revenue Loss from Inaccurate Estimation). For any problem
class C = (P ,Z, d) satisfying Assumption 1 and for any z, zˆ ∈ Z,
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(zˆ); z) ≤ cr L2 ‖z− zˆ‖2 .
Proof. First we will show that as a consequence of Assumption 1(b) and Assump-
tion 1(d), we have that for z ∈ Z and p ∈ P ,
0 ≤ r(p∗(z); z)− r(p; z) ≤ cr (p∗(z)− p)2 .
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The result then follows from Assumption 1(c) (the Lipschitz continuity of the
optimal price).
We will establish the quadratic inequality for p > p∗(z). The same argument
applies to the case where p < p∗(z). For any u ∈ R+, let r′(u; z) and r′′(u; z)
denote the first and second derivatives of the revenue function at u, respectively.
Since r′(p∗(z); z) = 0, it follows that
|r(p∗(z); z)− r(p; z)| =
∣∣∣∣∫ p
p∗(z)
∫ t
p∗(z)
r′′(u; z) du dt
∣∣∣∣
≤ sup
u∈P
|r′′(u; z)|
∫ p
p∗(z)
∫ t
p∗(z)
du dt =
1
2
sup
u∈P
|r′′(u; z)| (p∗(z)− p)2
≤ cr(p∗(z)− p)2
Corollary 2.2.4 suggests a method for constructing a pricing policy with low re-
gret. We construct an estimate of the underlying parameter based on the observed
purchase history, then offer the greedy optimal price according to this estimate.
If our estimate has a small mean square error, then we expect that the loss in
revenue should also be small. However, the variability of our estimates depends
on the past prices offered. As we will see, there is a nontrivial tradeoff between
pricing to form a good estimate (exploration) and pricing near the greedy optimal
(exploitation), and the optimal balance between these two will be quite different
depending on the nature of the demand uncertainty facing the seller.
2.3. The General Case
In this section, we consider dynamic pricing under the general parametric model
satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2. In Section 2.3.1, we show that the worst-case regret
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of any pricing policy must be at least Ω(
√
T ), by constructing a problem class with
an “uninformative price” that impedes demand learning. Then, in Section 2.3.2,
we describe a pricing policy based on maximum likelihood estimation whose regret
is O(√T ) across all problem instances, thus establishing that the order of regret
for the optimal pricing policy in the general case is Θ(
√
T ).
2.3.1 A Lower Bound for the General Case
In this section, we establish a lower bound on the T -period cumulative regret for
the general case. The main result is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.1 (General Regret Lower Bound). Define a problem class CGenLB =
(P ,Z, d) by letting P = [3/4, 5/4], Z = [1/3, 1], and d(p; z) = 1/2 + z − zp. Then
for any policy ψ setting prices in P , and any T ≥ 2, there exists a parameter z ∈ Z
such that
Regret(z, CGenLB, T, ψ) ≥
√
T
483
.
Using the same proof technique as in Example 2.2.2, one can show that the
problem class CGenLB satisfies Assumptions 1 and 2, with dmin = 1/4, dmax =
3/4, p∗(z) = (1 + 2z)/(4z), L = 3, and cr = 2. Before we proceed to the proof
of Theorem 2.3.1, let us discuss the intuition underlying our arguments. Fig-
ure 2.1(a) shows examples of demand curves in the family given by CGenLB. Note
that for all z ∈ Z, d(1; z) = 1/2, and thus all demand curves in this family in-
tersect at common price p = 1. Note also that this price is the optimal price for
some demand curve in this family, that is, p∗(z0) = 1 for z0 = 1/2 (see Figure
2.1(b) for examples of the revenue curves). Since the demand is the same at p∗(z0)
regardless of the underlying parameter, the price p∗(z0) is “uninformative,” in that
no policy can gain information about the value of the parameter while pricing at
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p∗(z0). To establish Theorem 2.3.1, we show that uninformative prices lead to
a tension between demand learning (exploration) and best-guess optimal pricing
(exploitation), which forces the worst-case regret of any policy to be Ω(
√
T ). This
tension is made precise in two lemmas. We show in Lemma 2.3.3 that for a policy
to reduce its uncertainty about the unknown demand parameter, it must necessar-
ily set prices away from the uninformative price p∗(z0), and thus incur large regret
when the underlying parameter is z0. Then, in Lemma 2.3.4, we show that any
policy that does not reduce its uncertainty about the demand parameter z must
also incur a cost in regret.
(a) expected demand (b) expected revenue
Figure 2.1: Family of linear demand and revenue curves under CGenLB for
z ∈ {1/3, 1/2, 2/3, 5/6, 1}. For z = 1/2, the optimal price is
p∗(1/2) = 1, which is also the common intersection points for all
demand curves in this family.
To give precise statements of Lemmas 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, we will need to quantify
the heuristic notion of “uncertainty” about the unknown demand parameter. In
our analysis, we will use a convenient quantitative measure of uncertainty, known
as the KL divergence.
Definition 2.3.2 (Definition 2.26 in Cover and Thomas (1999)). For any proba-
bility measures Q0 and Q1 on a discrete sample space Y , the KL divergence of Q0
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and Q1 is
K (Q0;Q1) =
∑
y∈Y
Q0(y) log
(
Q0(y)
Q1(y)
)
.
Intuitively, the KL divergence is a measure of distinguishability between two
distributions; if the KL divergence between Q0 and Q1 is large, then Q0 and Q1
are easily distinguishable, and if K(Q0;Q1) is small, then Q0 and Q1 are difficult
to distinguish. Thus, we say that a pricing policy ψ has a large degree of certainty
that the true underlying demand parameter is z0, rather than some counterfactual
parameter z, if the quantity K(Qψ,z0t ;Qψ,zt ) is large.
With this interpretation of the KL divergence, we now state Lemma 2.3.3.
This lemma establishes that reducing uncertainty about the underlying parameter
is costly, by establishing a lower bound on the regret incurred by an arbitrary
pricing policy in terms of the KL divergence.
Lemma 2.3.3 (Learning is Costly). For any z ∈ Z, t ≥ 1, and any policy ψ
setting prices in P ,
K
(
Qψ,z0t ;Q
ψ,z
t
)
≤ 9
16
(z0 − z)2 Regret (z0, CGenLB, t, ψ) ,
where z0 = 1/2.
The proof of Lemma 2.3.4 is deferred to Appendix A.1.1, but here we give a
high level description of the argument. Suppose the underlying demand parameter
is z0, and suppose a pricing policy ψ has the goal of reducing its uncertainty about
whether the underlying demand parameter is in fact z0, as opposed to some other
value z. We may restate this goal of “reducing uncertainty” in terms of the KL
divergence, by saying that the policy ψ wishes to offer a sequence of prices such that
the KL divergence between the induced distributions Qψ,z0t and Q
ψ,z
t of customer
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responses is large. To accomplish this, ψ must offer prices at which the customer
purchase probability will be significantly different under z0 versus z; however, for all
prices in a small neighborhood of the uninformative price p∗(z0), the probability of
a customer purchase is virtually the same under z0 and z. Thus, to distinguish the
two cases (that is, increase the KL divergence K(Qψ,z0t ;Qψ,zt )), the policy ψ must
offer prices away from p∗(z0), and thus incur large regret Regret (z0, CGenLB, t, ψ)
when the underlying parameter is in fact z0.
We have now established in Lemma 2.3.3 that reducing uncertainty about the
underlying demand curve is costly. However, this result alone is not enough to
prove a lower bound on the regret. To establish the desired lower bound on regret,
we need a complementary result, showing that any pricing policy that does not
decrease its uncertainty about the demand curve must also incur a cost in regret.
We establish this complement to Lemma 2.3.3 in the following lemma.
Lemma 2.3.4 (Uncertainty is Costly). Let ψ be any pricing policy setting prices in
P Then, for any T ≥ 2 and for demand parameters z0 = 1/2 and z1 = z0 + 14T−1/4,
we have
Regret(z0, CGenLB, T, ψ) + Regret(z1, CGenLB, T, ψ) ≥
√
T
12(482)
e−K(Q
ψ,z0
T ;Q
ψ,z1
T ) .
The intuition for Lemma 2.3.4 is the following. Let us choose the special param-
eter z0 = 1/2 such that the corresponding optimal price p
∗(z0) is the uninformative
price, and let us choose a second demand parameter z1 = z0 +
1
4
T−1/4. The pa-
rameters z0 and z1 are chosen so that the optimal prices p
∗(z0) and p∗(z1) are
not too close to each other; in other words, z0 and z1 are far enough apart (with
respect to the time horizon T ) such that a near-optimal pricing decision when the
demand parameter is z0 will be sub-optimal when the demand parameter is z1,
and vice versa. Thus, for a pricing policy ψ to price well under both z0 and z1,
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it must be able to distinguish which of the two is the true demand parameter,
based on observed responses to the past prices offered. Consequently, if ψ cannot
distinguish between the two cases z0 and z1 based on past prices offered (that is,
the KL divergence K(Qψ,z0t ;Qψ,z1t ) is small), then the worst-case regret of ψ must
necessarily be large, as seen in the inequality of Lemma 2.3.4.
The proof of Lemma 2.3.4 follows from standard results on the minimum error
probability of a two-hypothesis test, and we give a fully detailed proof in Ap-
pendix A.1.2. Equipped with Lemmas 2.3.3 and 2.3.4, we can immediately deduce
the main result.
Proof of Theorem 2.3.1. Since Regret(z1, CGenLB, T, ψ) is non-negative, and since
z1 = z0 +
1
4
T−1/4 by definition, it follows from Lemma 2.3.3 and the choice of z1
that
Regret(z0, CGenLB, T, ψ) + Regret(z1, CGenLB, T, ψ) ≥
√
T
9
K
(
Qψ,z0T ;Q
ψ,z1
T
)
.
Adding this inequality to the result of Lemma 2.3.4, and using the fact that the
KL divergence is non-negative, we have
2 {Regret(z0, CGenLB, T, ψ) + Regret(z1, CGenLB, T, ψ)}
≥
√
T
9
K
(
Qψ,z0T ;Q
ψ,z1
T
)
+
√
T
12(482)
e−K(Q
ψ,z0
T ;Q
ψ,z1
T )
≥
√
T
12(482)
·
{
K
(
Qψ,z0T ;Q
ψ,z1
T
)
+ e−K(Q
ψ,z0
T ;Q
ψ,z1
T )
}
≥
√
T
12(482)
.
To see the last inequality, note that K
(
Qψ,z0T ;Q
ψ,z1
T
)
+ e−K(Q
ψ,z0
T ;Q
ψ,z1
T ) ≥ 1, since
x + e−x ≥ 1 for all x ∈ R+. Thus, the tension between pricing optimally and
learning the parameters of the demand curve is captured explicitly by the sum
K
(
Qψ,z0T ;Q
ψ,z1
T
)
+ e−K(Q
ψ,z0
T ;Q
ψ,z1
T ). The first term in the sum captures the cost of
learning the parameters of the demand curve, while the second term in the sum
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captures the cost of uncertainty. The fact that this sum cannot be driven to zero,
regardless of the choice of the pricing policy, captures the tradeoff between learning
and exploiting in the presence of uninformative prices. The desired result follows
from the fact that
max
z∈{z0,z1}
Regret(z, CGenLB, T, ψ) ≥ Regret(z0, CGenLB, T, ψ) + Regret(z1, CGenLB, T, ψ)
2
≥
√
T
483
.
Remark 2.3.5 (Statistical Identifiability). The result of Theorem 2.3.1 leverages
the presence of an “uninformative price” p∗(z0). Note that the family of distribu-
tions {Qp∗(z0),z : z ∈ Z} is not identifiable, that is, one cannot uniquely identify
the true value of the underlying demand parameter z from observing customer re-
sponses to the single price p∗(z0). However, by the arguments of Example 2.2.2, the
family {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z} is identifiable for any p¯ = (p1, p2) ∈ P2 with p1 6= p2, that
is, one can uniquely identify the value of the underlying parameter from observing
customer responses to two distinct prices.
Before we proceed with Section 2.3.2, we briefly remark on the related litera-
ture. A very general version of the result of Theorem 2.3.1 was previously known
in the computer science literature; Kleinberg and Leighton (2003) contains eight
sufficient conditions under which a one-parameter family of demand curves yields
regret that is not o(
√
T ). It is worth noting that the family constructed in The-
orem 2.3.1 does not satisfy the sufficient conditions provided by Kleinberg and
Leighton (2003); in particular, the family presented in Theorem 2.3.1 contains an
“uninformative price,” while their lower bound proof exploits alternative proper-
ties.
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The techniques used in the proof of Theorem 2.3.1 have appeared in several
recent papers. A recent work in dynamic pricing is Besbes and Zeevi (2009),
which contains a related lower bound result in a non-stationary demand learning
framework. Examples of these techniques in the more general online learning
literature can be found in Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2008) and Goldenshluger and
Zeevi (2009), which concern optimal learning in a two-armed bandit setting.
2.3.2 A General Matching Upper Bound
In this section, we present a pricing policy called MLE-CYCLE whose regret is
O(√T ) across all problem instances, matching the order of the lower bound of
Section 2.3.1. We describe the policy MLE-CYCLE in detail below, but first we
describe the general intuition behind the policy.
Suppose we had access to a good estimate of the underlying demand parameter.
Then this would give us a good approximation of the true demand curve, and we
would be able to price near-optimally (per the result of Corollary 2.2.4). However,
any estimate of the demand parameter will depend on customer responses to the
past prices offered, and as seen in Theorem 2.3.1, observing responses to prices near
an “uninformative price” will do little to reduce uncertainty about the demand
parameter. Thus, to learn the demand curve adequately, a pricing policy should
be careful to offer prices at which a good estimate of the demand parameter can
be computed.
Motivated by this discussion, we present a policy MLE-CYCLE based on maxi-
mum likelihood parameter estimation. The policy MLE-CYCLE operates in cycles,
and each cycle consists of an exploration phase followed by an exploitation phase.
These cycles are simply a scheduling device, designed to maintain the appropriate
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balance between exploration and exploitation. During the exploration phase of a
given cycle c, we offer the product to consecutive customers at a sequence of ex-
ploration prices p ∈ Pk, and then compute a maximum likelihood estimate of the
underlying parameter based on the observed customer selections. The exploration
prices p are fixed, and are chosen so that a good estimate of the demand parameter
can be computed from the corresponding customer responses. Following the ex-
ploration phase of cycle c, there is an exploitation phase of c periods, during which
we offer the best-guess optimal price corresponding to the current estimate of the
demand parameter to c consecutive customers. Thus, the cth cycle of MLE-CYCLE
consists of (k + c) periods: k periods in which we offer each of the k exploration
prices, followed by c periods in which we offer the optimal price corresponding to
our most recent estimate of the demand parameter. The cycle-based scheduling
of MLE-CYCLE is carefully chosen to optimize the balance the amount of demand
learning (exploration) with best-guess optimal pricing (exploitation). While we
make this balance precise in the analysis of the policy, we note that the scheduling
makes intuitive sense: the ratio of exploration steps to exploitation steps in MLE-
CYCLE is high in the early time periods, when little is known about the demand
curve, and is low in the later time periods, when the demand curve is known to a
good approximation.
We now proceed with a formal description of the policy MLE-CYCLE.
We state the regret guarantee of MLE-CYCLE in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.3.6 (General Regret Upper Bound). For any problem class C =
(P ,Z, d) satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2 with corresponding exploration prices
p¯ ∈ Pk, there exists a constant C1 depending only on the exploration prices p¯ and
the problem class C such that for all z ∈ Z and T ≥ 2, the policy MLE-CYCLE
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Policy MLE-CYCLE(C,p)
Inputs: A problem class C = (P ,Z, d) and exploration prices p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯k) ∈
Pk.
Description: For each cycle c = 1, 2, . . . ,
• Exploration Phase (k periods): Offer the product at exploration prices
p¯ = (p¯1, . . . , p¯k) and let Y(c) = (Y1(c), . . . , Yk(c)) denote the correspond-
ing customer selections. Let Ẑ(c) denote the maximum likelihood estimate
(MLE) based on observed customer selections during the exploration phases
in the past c cycles, that is,
Ẑ(c) = arg max
z∈Z
c∏
s=1
Qp¯,z(Y(s)) ,
where for each 1 ≤ s ≤ c, Y(s) = (Y1(s), . . . , Yk(s)) denotes the observed
customer responses to the exploration prices offered in the exploration phase
of cycle s.
• Exploitation Phase (c periods): Offer the greedy price p∗
(
Ẑ(c)
)
based on
the estimate Ẑ(c).
satisfies
Regret(z, C, T,MLE-CYCLE) ≤ C1
√
T .
The main idea of the proof of Theorem 2.3.6 is the following. For a given
time horizon T, it is straightforward to check that the number of cycles up to
time T is O(√T ), and so to prove that the regret of MLE-CYCLE is O(√T ), it is
enough to show that the regret in each cycle is O(1). Since each cycle consists of
an exploration phase followed by an exploitation phase, it’s enough to show that
for an arbitrary cycle c, the regret incurred in the exploration phase is O(1), and
the regret incurred during the exploitation phase is O(1).
First, to show that the regret during the exploration phase of an arbitrary cycle
is O(1), note that during the exploration phase, MLE-CYCLE offers k exploration
prices, and the regret incurred from offering each of these exploration prices is
31
O(1), by the smoothness of the revenue function, and the compactness of the
pricing interval. Thus, the total regret incurred during the exploration phase is
O(1). Secondly, to show that the regret incurred during the exploitation phase of an
arbitrary cycle is O(1), recall that the price offered during the exploitation phase
of cycle c is p∗(Ẑ(c)). This price is offered to c customers, and by Corollary 2.2.4,
the instantaneous regret incurred for each customer is O
(
Ez
[
||z− Ẑ(c)||2
])
. But
since Ẑ(c) is a MLE computed from c samples, it follows from a standard result
that Ez
[
||z− Ẑ(c)||2
]
= O(1/c). Since this prices is offered to c customers, the
total regret incurred during the exploitation phase is c ·O(1/c) = O(1), as claimed.
We now proceed with a rigorous proof based on the above intuition. We begin
by stating a bound on the mean squared error of the maximum likelihood estimator
formed by MLE-CYCLE.
Lemma 2.3.7 (Mean Squared Errors for MLE based on IID Samples, Borovkov
(1998)). For any c ≥ 1, let Ẑ(c) denote the maximum likelihood estimate formed
by the MLE-GREEDY policy after c exploration cycles. Then there exists a constant
Cmle depending only on the exploration prices p and the problem class C such that
Ez
[∥∥∥Ẑ(c)− z∥∥∥2] ≤ Cmle
c
.
The proof of Lemma 2.3.7 follows from standard results on the mean-squared
error of maximum-likelihood estimators, and is given in detail in Appendix A.2.
We now give the proof of Theorem 2.3.6.
Proof. Fix a problem class C = (P ,Z, d) with corresponding exploration prices p¯,
and consider an arbitrary cycle c. First, we show that the regret incurred during
the exploration phase of cycle c is O(1). Since the revenue function is smooth by
assumption, and since the pricing interval P is compact, it follows that there exists
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a constant D¯1 depending only on the problem class C such that
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p; z) ≤ D¯1
for all z ∈ Z and all p ∈ P . Consequently, the regret during the exploration phase
of cycle c satisfies
k∑
`=1
Ez[r(p∗(z); z)− r(p¯`; z)] ≤ kD¯1.
Next, we show that the regret incurred during the exploitation phase of cycle
c is also O(1). During the exploitation phase of cycle c, we use the greed price
p∗
(
Ẑ(c)
)
, and we offer this price for c periods. It follows from Corollary 2.2.4 and
Lemma 2.3.7 that the instantaneous regret during the exploitation phase satisfies
Ez
[
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(Ẑ(c)); z)
]
≤ cr L2 Ez
[∥∥∥z− Ẑ(c)∥∥∥2] ≤ crL2Cmle
c
,
and since the price p∗(Ẑ(c)) is offered for c periods during the exploitation phase
of cycle c, we have that the total regret incurred during the exploitation phase
of cycle c is bounded above by crL
2Cmle. Putting everything together, we have
that the cumulative regret over K cycles (corresponding to 2K +
∑K
c=1 c periods)
satisfies
Regret(z, C, 2K +
K∑
c=1
c,MLE-CYCLE) ≤ (kD¯1 + crL2Cmle)K .
Now, consider an arbitrary time period T ≥ 2 and let K0 = d
√
2T e. Note that the
total number of time periods after K0 cycles is at least T because 2K0 +
∑K0
c=1 c ≥∑K0
c=1 c = K0(K0 + 1)/2 ≥ T . The desired result follows from the fact that
Regret(z, C, T,MLE-CYCLE) ≤ Regret(z, C, 2K0 +
K0∑
c=1
c,MLE-CYCLE).
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2.4. The Well-Separated Case
In the general case studied in Section 2.3.1, there are two major obstacles to pricing
that force any policy to have Ω(
√
T ) worst-case regret. The first obstacle is the
stochastic nature of the demand. A pricing policy never observes a noise-free value
of the demand curve at a given price; it observes only a random variable whose
expected value is the demand at that price. The second and more prominent
obstacle is that of “uninformative prices,” at which no pricing policy can reduce
its uncertainty about demand.
Given this observation, a natural question is the following: how much does
each of the two obstacles contribute to the difficulty of dynamic pricing? More
specifically, are uninformative prices so difficult to deal with that they force a
minimum regret of Ω(
√
T ), or is it simply the stochastic nature of the demand that
forces this lower bound? In this section, we shed light on this issue by considering
demand curves that satisfy a “well-separated” condition (Assumption 3), which
precludes the possibility of uninformative prices. Under this assumption, we show
in Section 2.4.1 a lower bound of Ω(log T ) on the T -period cumulative regret under
an arbitrary policy. Then, in Section 2.4.2, we show that a greedy policy achieves
regret matching the order of the lower bound.
We now state Assumption 3, which guarantees that it is possible to estimate
demand from customer responses at any price in P .
Assumption 3 (Well Separated Assumption). The problem class C = (P ,Z, d)
has a parameter set Z ⊂ R, and for all prices p ∈ P ,
(a) The family of distributions {Qp,z : z ∈ Z} is identifiable.
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(b) There exists a constant cf > 0 depending only on the problem class C such
that the Fisher information I(p, z), given by
I(p, z) = Ez
[
− ∂
2
∂z2
logQp,z(Y )
]
satisfies I(p, z) ≥ cf for all z ∈ Z.
Remark 2.4.1 (Geometric Interpretation of Assumption 3). To make the notion of
well separated more concrete, one may show that any problem class C = (P ,Z, d)
satisfying Assumption 3 also has the following property: there exists some constant
cd > 0 depending only on C such that
|d(p; z)− d(p; zˆ)| ≥ cd |z − zˆ|
for any price p ∈ P , and any z, zˆ ∈ Z⊂ R. We defer the details of this derivation
to Appendix A.5.1. Thus, for any fixed price p ∈ P , if we vary the demand
parameter z to some other value zˆ, then the demand at price p will vary by an
amount proportional to |z − zˆ| . An obvious consequence of this property and the
smoothness of the demand curves is that for any two demand parameters z 6= zˆ, it
must be the case that either d(p; z) > d(p; zˆ) for all p ∈ P , or d(p; z) < d(p; zˆ) for
all p ∈ P . Thus, we refer to this condition as a “well-separated” condition, since
it implies that for any two demand parameters z 6= zˆ, the corresponding demand
curves do not intersect with each other.
Since we will use the maximum likelihood estimator in our pricing model and
this estimator is the minimizer of the function z 7→ − log Qp,zt (Yt), we now state
Assumption 4, which gives a convenient property of the likelihood function that
allows for a simple analysis of the likelihood process. As shown in Examples 2.4.2,
2.4.3, and 2.4.4, Assumptions 3 and 4 are satisfied by many demand families of
interest, including the linear, logistic, and exponential.
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Assumption 4 (Likelihood Assumptions). For any sequence of prices p =
(p1, . . . , pt) ∈ P t, the function
z 7→ − logQp,zt (Yt)
is convex on Z ⊂ R.
We now state some examples of problem classes satisfying Assumptions 3 and 4.
Example 2.4.2 (One-Parameter Logit Family). Let P = [1/2, 2] and let Z =
[1, 2]. Define a family of logistic demand curves by
d(p, z) =
e−zp
1 + e−zp
.
Then by Example 2.2.1, we know that this problem instances satisfies the condi-
tions of Assumption 1. It is also straightforward to check that for any p¯ ∈ P ,
the associated family {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z} is identifiable. Moreover, for any p¯ ∈ P and
z ∈ Z, we have that
d
dz
d(p¯; z) = −p¯ d(p¯; z)(1− d(p¯; z)) ,
and so by the formula given in Assumption 2, we have that the Fisher information
is given by
I(p¯, z) = p¯2 d(p¯; z)(1− d(p¯; z)) ≥ p2min dmin(1− dmax) .
Finally, it is a standard result (see, for example, Ben-Akiva and Lerman (1985))
that for the logit model, the negative log-likelihood function is globally convex,
and so Assumption 4 is satisfied.
Example 2.4.3 (One-Parameter Linear Family). Let P = [1/3, 1/2], let Z =
[3/4, 1], and let b = 2/3 be a fixed constant. Define a linear family of demand
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(a) expected demand (b) expected revenue
Figure 2.2: Family of well separated logit demand and revenue curves from
Example 2.4.2 for z ∈ {1, 5/4, 6/4, 7/4, 2}.
curves by d(p; z) = b− zp. By Example 2.2.2, we know that this problem instances
satisfies the conditions of Assumption 1. It is also straightforward to check that
for any p¯ ∈ P , the associated family {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z} is identifiable. Moreover, for
any p¯ ∈ P and z ∈ Z, we have that
d
dz
d(p¯; z) = −p¯ ,
and we have that the Fisher information is given by
I(p¯, z) =
p¯2
d(p¯; z)(1− d(p¯; z)) ≥
p2min
dmax(1− dmin) .
Finally, to verify Assumption 4, we have that for any vector of prices p =
(p1, . . . , pt) ∈ P t,
Qp,zt (yt) =
t∏
`=1
(b− zp`)y`(1− b+ zp`)1−y` ,
so that
− logQp,zt (yt) = −
t∑
`=1
{y` log(b− zp`) + (1− y`) log(1− b+ zp`)} .
Taking derivatives twice, we have
d2
dz2
{− logQp,zt (yt)} =
t∑
`=1
y`p
2
`
(b− zp`)2 +
(1− y`)p2`
(1− b+ zp`)2 > 0 ,
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which implies that the negative log-likelihood function is globally convex, as de-
sired.
Example 2.4.4 (One-Parameter Exponential Family). Let P = [1/2, 1] and let
Z = [1, 2]. Define an exponential family of demand curves by
d(p; z) = e−zp.
By the same techniques used in Examples 2.4.2 and 2.4.3, one can check that this
problem class satisfies all the conditions of Assumptions 1 and 3. Moreover, to
verify Assumption 4, one can check that for any vector of prices p = (p1, . . . , pt) ∈
P t,
d2
dz2
{− logQp,zt (yt)} =
t∑
`=1
(1− y`)p2`e−z`p
(1− e−z`p)2 > 0 ,
which implies that the negative log-likelihood function is globally convex, as de-
sired.
2.4.1 A Lower Bound
In this section we establish a lower bound of Ω(log T ) for the well-separated case.
The main result of this section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 2.4.5 (Well-Separated Lower Bound). Define a problem class
CWellSepLB = (P ,Z, d) by letting P = [1/3, 1/2], Z = [2, 3], and letting d(p; z) =
1− (pz)/2. Then for any policy ψ setting prices in P and any T ≥ 1, there exists
a constant z ∈ Z such that
Regret(z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ) ≥ 1
405pi2
log T .
There are two key observations that lead to the proof of Theorem 2.4.5. First,
recall that in our model, the price offered by a pricing policy ψ to the tth customer
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is given by Pt = ψt(Yt−1), where ψt : {0, 1}t−1 → P is any function and Yt−1 is a
vector of observed customer responses. Thus, we may think of Pt as an “estimator,”
since Pt is just a function ψt of the observed data Yt−1. Consequently, we may apply
standard results on the minimum mean squared error of an estimator to show that
E[(p∗(Z) − Pt)2] = Ω(1/t). We make this precise in Lemma 2.4.6 whose proof is
given in Appendix A.3.
Secondly, as a converse to Corollary 2.2.4, we will see that it is easy to construct
problem classes under which the instantaneous regret in time t is bounded below
by the mean squared error of the price Pt with respect to the optimal price p
∗(z)
(times some constant factors). Combining this result with the above estimate on
the minimum mean squared error of Pt established the theorem.
Our proof technique follows that of Goldenshluger and Zeevi (2009), who have
used van Trees’ inequality to prove lower bounds on the performance of sequential
decision policies.
Lemma 2.4.6 (Instantaneous Risk Lower Bound). Let CWellSepLB = (P ,Z, d) be
the problem class defined in Theorem 2.4.5, and let Z be a random variable taking
values in Z, with density λ : Z → R+ given by λ(z) = 2{cos(pi(z − 5/2))}2. Then
for any pricing policy ψ setting prices in P , and for any t ≥ 1,
E
[
(p∗(Z)− Pt+1)2
] ≥ 1
405pi2
· 1
t
,
where Pt+1 is the price offered by ψ at time t+ 1, and E[ · ] denotes the expectation
with respect to the joint distribution of Pt and the prior density λ of the parameter
Z ∈ Z = [2, 3].
Here is the proof of Theorem 2.4.5.
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Proof of Theorem 2.4.5. By checking first and second order optimality conditions,
it is straightforward to check that p∗(z) = 1/z. By noting that r′(p∗(z); z) = 0
and r′′(p; z) = −z ≤ −2, it follows from a standard result that for any z ∈ Z and
p ∈ P ,
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p; z) ≥ (p∗(z)− p)2 .
Applying this fact and Lemma 2.4.6, we have
sup
z∈Z
Regret(z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ) ≥ sup
z∈Z
Ez
[
T−1∑
t=1
[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt+1;Z)]
]
≥ E
[
T−1∑
t=1
r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt+1;Z)
]
≥ 1
405pi2
T−1∑
t=1
1
t
≥ 1
405pi2
log T
where the last line follows from the fact that
∑T−1
t=1
1
t
≥ ∫ T
1
dx
x
= log T .
2.4.2 A Matching Upper Bound for Well Separated Problem Class
In this section, we present a simple greedy pricing strategy called MLE-GREEDY
whose regret is O(log T ) across all well separated problem instances, matching the
order of the lower bound established in Section 2.4.1. We describe MLE-GREEDY
in detail below, but here we sketch the intuition behind the policy.
Intuitively, we know that if we form a good estimate of the underlying demand
parameter, then the optimal price corresponding to this estimate will be close to
the true optimal price. More specifically, Corollary 2.2.4 establishes that if we
compute an estimator whose mean squared error is O(1/t) in each time period t,
then by offering the optimal prices corresponding to these estimates, we will incur
instantaneous regret O(1/t) in each time period t, and thus incur regret that is
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O(log T ) up to time T. Thus, a natural approach is to compute an estimate of
the demand parameter based on the observed customer responses to past prices
offered, and then offer the best-guess optimal price corresponding to this estimate.
Although this intuition is essentially correct, there is a wrinkle to the analysis.
Suppose that in time periods 1, . . . , t, we could observe the actual willingness-to-
pay of each customer; that is, if we could observe the realized values (v1, . . . , vt)
of the i.i.d. willingness-to-pay random variables (V1, . . . , Vt). Then by standard
results on maximum likelihood estimation (e.g. Theorem A.2.1), we could com-
pute an estimator whose mean squared error was O(1/t), and by Corollary 2.2.4,
incur regret O(1/t) by offering the optimal price corresponding to our estima-
tor. However, in our model, a pricing policy does not have access to the actual
willingness-to-pay of each customer. Rather, the policy observes a Bernoulli ran-
dom variable Yt = 1 {Vt ≥ Pt} specifying whether the willingness-to-pay Vt of cus-
tomer t exceeded the price offered Pt. Consequently, the observations Y1, Y2, . . . , Yt
are dependent random variables, because for any `, Y` is a function of the price P`
in period `, which depends on the customer responses Y1, . . . , Y`−1 in the preceding
`−1 periods. Thus, a pricing policy must form an estimate based on samples that
are dependent and not identically distributed, and the standard bound for MLE
estimates (Theorem A.2.1) does not apply. Thus, to establish an upper bound on
the regret of MLE-GREEDY using the approach described above, it is enough to
establish that the mean squared error of the estimate formed by MLE-GREEDY
from t samples is in fact O(1/t).
With this intuition, we proceed with our analysis of the greedy pricing policy.
For brevity in the following analysis, we denote by G = (G1,G2, . . .) the pricing
policy MLE-GREEDY described below.
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Policy MLE-GREEDY(C, p1)
Inputs: A problem class C = (P ,Z, d), and an initial price p1 ∈ P .
Initialization: At time t = 1, offer the initial price p1, and observe the corre-
sponding customer decision Y1 = 1 {V1 ≥ p1} .
Description: For time t = 2, 3, . . .,
• Compute the maximum likelihood estimate Ẑ(t− 1) given by
Ẑ(t− 1) = arg max
z∈Z
QG,zt−1(Yt−1) ,
where Yt−1 = (Y1, . . . , Yt−1) denotes the observed customer responses in the
first t− 1 periods.
• Offer the greedy price p∗
(
Ẑ(t− 1)
)
based on the estimate Ẑ(t− 1).
We now state the main result on the mean squared error on the maximum-
likelihood estimator computed by MLE-GREEDY, which we prove in Appendix A.4.
Theorem 2.4.7 (MLE Deviation Inequality for Dependent Samples). Let Ẑ(t) =
arg maxz∈Z Q
G,z
t (Yt) be the maximum-likelihood estimate formed by the MLE-
GREEDY policy. Then for any t ≥ 1, z ∈ Z, and  ≥ 0,
Prz{|Ẑ(t)− z| > } ≤ 2 e−tcH2/2 and Ez[(Ẑ(t)− z)2] ≤ 4
cH
· 1
t
The above theorem immediately yields the upper bound the regret, which is
the main result of this section.
Theorem 2.4.8 (Well-separated Regret Upper Bound). For any problem class
C = (P ,Z, d) satisfying Assumptions 1, 3, and 4, and any initial price p1 ∈ P,
there exists a constant C2 depending only C and p1 such that for all z ∈ Z and
T ≥ 2, the MLE-GREEDY policy satisfies
Regret(z, C, T,MLE-GREEDY) ≤ C2 · log T .
Proof. To bound the regret incurred by MLE-GREEDY in the first period, note
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that since the revenue function is a smooth on the compact set P ×Z, there exists
a constant D¯2 depending only on C such that r(p∗(z); z) − r(p1; z) ≤ D¯2 for any
choice of p1 and any z ∈ Z.
To bound the regret in the subsequent periods, we apply Corollary 2.2.4 and
Theorem 2.4.7 to see that
Ez
[
T−1∑
t=1
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(Ẑ(t)); z)
]
≤ crL2
T−1∑
t=1
Ez
[
(Ẑ(t)− z)2
]
≤ 4crL
2
cH
T−1∑
t=1
1
t
.
Taking C2 = D¯2 + 4crL
2cH/(4 log 2) proves the claim.
2.5. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we evaluate the empirical performance of the MLE-CYCLE and MLE-
GREEDY policies described in Sections 2.3.2 and 2.4.2. We investigate their rates
of regret, and compare their performance to the performance of several alternative
policies, over a variety of problem instances. For all of our simulations, we focus
on a logistic demand problem class given by P = [1/2, 8], Z = [0.2, 2]× [−1, 1] and
d(p; z) =
e−z1p−z2
1 + e−z1p−z2
.
2.5.1 First Simulation: Rates of Regret
For our first simulation, we investigate the rates of regret of MLE-CYCLE and
MLE-GREEDY on a specific problem instance from the problem class described
above. We compute the average regret of both policies over 50 independent trials
for parameter values z1 = 1 and z2 = −1, normalizing the regret by the maximum
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possible per-period revenue for this instance. For MLE-CYCLE, we fix the explo-
ration prices to be p¯1 = 1/2 and p¯2 = 4.25, corresponding to the left endpoint and
midpoint of the pricing interval, and we fix the time horizon to be T = 105. For
MLE-GREEDY, we fix the initial price to be p¯1 = 4.25, and we fix the time horizon
to be T = 104.
(a) Average Regret of MLE-CYCLE (b) Average Regret of MLE-GREEDY
Figure 2.3: An illustration of the rates of regret of MLE-CYCLE and MLE-
GREEDY. In Figure 2.3 (a), the line of best fit in the log-log plot of
expected regret versus T has slope 0.49, indicating that the rate of
regret of MLE-CYCLE is approximately Θ(
√
T ). In Figure 2.3 (b),
the expected regret of MLE-GREEDY versus log(T ) is approxi-
mately linear, indicating that the rate of regret is Θ(log T ).
In Figure 2.3 (a), we plot the logarithm of the average regret of MLE-CYCLE
versus log(t). We note that the line of best fit to the mean regret values has a
slope of 0.49, which is consistent with the Θ(
√
T ) rate of regret established in
Section 2.3. In Figure 2.3 (b), we plot the average regret of MLE-GREEDY versus
log(t). The linear trend of the mean regret values is consistent with the Θ(log T )
rate of regret established in Section 2.4. These results provide a simple empirical
example of the rates of regret of the two policies.
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2.5.2 Second Simulation: The General Case
For our second simulation, we compare the performance of MLE-CYCLE with sev-
eral alternative heuristics. We describe these alternative heuristics below.
1. FP: As a baseline for comparison, we consider a fixed-price policy FP that
chooses a price uniformly at random from the pricing interval, and offers this
price for all time periods. Note that this policy will have regret that is linear
in T.
2. MLE-CYCLE-S: The MLE-CYCLE-S policy is a variant of MLE-CYCLE that
uses samples from both the exploration and exploitation phases to compute
its estimates of the unknown parameters (recall that the MLE-CYCLE policy
computes estimates only from its explorations periods).
3. MLE-CYCLE-SU: The MLE-CYCLE-SU policy is a further refinement of MLE-
CYCLE, in which all samples are used for computing the estimates, and in
addition, the exploration prices are updated at each step to be close to the
estimated optimal price. Specifically, at the beginning of each cycle, we
choose the first exploration price P1 to be equal to the current estimated
optimal price, and we set the second exploration price P2 to be P1 + t
−1/4,
where t is the current time period. This scheme balances the competing
objectives of having the exploration prices close to the optimal price, and
having them far enough apart to provide good estimates of the demand
parameters. We note that this scheme is closely related to the Controlled
Variance Pricing idea introduced in den Boer and Zwart (2010a).
4. KW: To compare our policies with general stochastic optimization tech-
niques, we will consider a Kiefer-Wolfowitz-type stochastic optimization pol-
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icy. Given a current price Pt, the KW policy sets
Pt+1 = Pt + cn Pt+2 = Pt − cn Pt+3 = Pt + atYt+1Pt+1 − Yt+2Pt+2
2ct
,
where Yt+1 = 1 {Vt+1 ≥ Pt+1} and Yt+2 = 1 {Vt+2 ≥ Pt+2} . This is a stochas-
tic gradient-ascent optimization scheme, and we implement this scheme with
at = t
−1 and ct = t−1/4.
Recall that in Section 2.3.2, we were concerned with describing a pricing policy
whose regret matched the order of the Ω(
√
T ) lower bound established in Sec-
tion 2.3.1. The MLE-CYCLE policy proposed in Section 2.3.2 was sufficient to
achieve this goal, and its simple structure facilitated a straightforward analysis
of its regret, which was desirable for the theoretical development of Section 2.3.
However, although MLE-CYCLE achieves the optimal O(√T ) regret, there are a
number of natural modifications of this policy that one might suspect would im-
prove its performance – specifically, the use of all samples to compute estimates
of the demand parameters, and the updating of exploration prices as information
is gained. We empirically investigate both of these modifications is this section by
studying the performance of MLE-CYCLE-S and MLE-CYCLE-SU.
We investigate the performance of all pricing policies on an ensemble of problem
instances drawn from a Gaussian distribution over the parameter set. We generate
500 independent random samples (z1, . . . , z500), by drawing independent random
values zi1 in the interval [0.2, 2] according to a Gaussian distribution with mean
(2+0.2)/2 and variance (2−0.2)/4, truncating so that all samples lie in the interval.
We then generate 500 independent random samples zi2 for the interval [−1, 1] in a
similar fashion, and set zi = (zi1, z
i
2).
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To evaluate the performance of each policy, we consider the Percentage Rev-
enue Loss, which is defined to be the average over the random sample of problem
instances of the cumulative regret divided by the total optimal revenue. Thus, if
z1, . . . , zm ∈ Z is the sample of problem parameters, we have
Percentage Revenue Loss (T ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑T
s=1 r(p
∗(zi); zi)− r(P is ; zi)
T · r(p∗(zi); zi) ×100% .
Equivalently, this quantity describes the total amount of revenue lost by each policy
with respect to the optimal policy, as a percentage of the total optimal revenue.
In Table 2.1, we report the results of these experiments. For all simulations,
the exploration prices for MLE-CYCLE and its variants, and the initial price for
the KW policy, are chosen uniformly at random from the pricing interval. The
standard error of the figures reported in the Percentage Revenue Loss columns
is less than 0.2% for MLE-CYCLE, MLE-CYCLE-S, and MLE-CYCLE-SU, and is less
than 1.8% for FP and KW, at all reported values of T.
Table 2.1: Comparison of the Percentage Revenue Loss of the heuristics on
the Gaussian instance.
Percentage Revenue Loss
T × 103 FP KW MLE-CYCLE MLE-CYCLE-S MLE-CYCLE-SU
1 61.9 % 58.7 % 20.4 % 14.3 % 6.0 %
2 61.9 % 58.0 % 16.1 % 10.7 % 5.0 %
3 61.9 % 57.6 % 13.9 % 9.0 % 4.5 %
4 61.9 % 57.3 % 12.5 % 7.8 % 4.2 %
5 61.9 % 57.1 % 11.5 % 7.1 % 4.0 %
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First, we note that all policies lose a smaller percentage of the optimal revenues
than the FP policy, and more importantly, all policies have a percentage revenue
loss that is decreasing with the number of time steps. We note that all three vari-
ants of MLE-CYCLE lose a significantly smaller proportion of the optimal revenue
than the FP and KW policies; moreover, we see that both the use of all samples
to compute the estimates of the demand parameters, as well as the updating of
the exploration prices, lead to a significant improvement in the percentage revenue
lost.
2.5.3 Third Simulation: The Well-Separated Case
As a final simulation, we will investigate the percentage revenue loss of MLE-
GREEDY when problem parameters are drawn from two different distributions.
Recall that to prove the lower bound of Section 2.4.1 on the performance of MLE-
GREEDY, we showed that expected regret was Ω(log T ), when the problem pa-
rameters were drawn from a specially chosen distribution. A natural question is
whether this distribution is somehow pathological, or whether the expected re-
gret of MLE-GREEDY would be similar when problem parameters are drawn from
some other type of distribution. To address this question, we generate three sets
of 100 independent random problem instances for the logistic demand problem
class described at the beginning of this section. Each set is generated by fixing
z2 = 0, and drawing z1 from one of two distributions over the interval [0.2, 2]
(note that the value of z2 = 0 is known to MLE-GREEDY). The first is the distri-
bution 10
9
{
cos
(
5pi
9
(
x− 11
10
))}2
, similar to the one used in the proof of the lower
bound of Section 2.4.1, and the second is the uniform distribution on [0.2, 2]. For
all simulations, the starting price of MLE-GREEDY is chosen uniformly at random
from the pricing interval. In Table 2.2, we report the percentage revenue loss of
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MLE-GREEDY for each of the three experiments.
Table 2.2: Comparison of the Percentage Revenue Loss of MLE-GREEDY on
two distributions
Percentage Revenue Loss
Lower Bound Uniform
T × 103 FP MLE-GREEDY FP MLE-GREEDY
1 65.2 % 1.20 % 62.3 % 1.10 %
2 65.2 % 0.67 % 62.3 % 0.61 %
3 65.2 % 0.48 % 62.3 % 0.43 %
4 65.2 % 0.37 % 62.3 % 0.34 %
5 65.2 % 0.30 % 62.3 % 0.28 %
The standard error for all percentage revenue loss figures reported in Table 2.2
is less that 0.07%. We note that the percentage revenue loss of MLE-GREEDY
is much smaller than that of the fixed price policy, as well as all of the policies
tested in the simulation for the general case. Moreover, we note that when av-
eraged over 100 trials, the percentage revenue loss of MLE-GREEDY is practically
identical for both problem distributions. This suggests that the lower bound dis-
tribution used in Section 2.4.1 is not pathological, and that we should expected
similar average-case behavior for MLE-GREEDY when instances are drawn from
other natural distributions.
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2.6. Discussion
We studied a stylized dynamic pricing problem under a general parametric choice
model. For the general case, we constructed a forced-exploration policy based
on maximum likelihood estimation that achieved the optimal O(√T ) order of
regret. We also considered the special case of a “well-separated” demand family,
for which a myopic maximum likelihood policy achieved the optimal O(log T ) order
of regret. Finally, we performed an empirical investigation of the rate of regret of
our policies, and compared the performance of several variations thereof. There
are many possible extensions of this work, including extensions to account for the
sale of multiple products and for competition among sellers. Other interesting
directions would involve a more complex model of customer behavior, accounting
for strategic customer decision making, or a model in which the parameter values
varied over time.
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Chapter 3
Pricing with Minimal Adjustments
3.1. Introduction
In the previous chapter, we saw the existence of effective strategies for pricing under
demand uncertainty, which allowed a seller to generate near-optimal revenues with
limited prior knowledge of the demand curve. To facilitate revenue generation in
this scenario, we allowed our pricing strategies to adjust prices freely over time.
This lack of restriction on price adjustments is in keeping with virtually all of the
existing literature on pricing under demand uncertainty; however, this assumption
stands in contrast to a large body of evidence suggesting that frequent price changes
are inherently undesirable. As noted in Chapter 1, there is a significant amount
of evidence (see, for example, Levy et al. (1997), Levy et al. (1998), Zbaracki
et al. (2004)) showing that the costs of implementing frequent price changes in a
traditional retail setting can amount to a considerable portion of the seller’s net
margins. Even in an online retail setting, where price adjustments may be less
costly (Brynjolfsson and Smith (2000)), there is evidence to suggest that frequent
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fluctuations in price may be upsetting to customers (Weiss and Mehrotra (2001)).
In this chapter, we address these concerns by investigating the fundamental
limit on the minimum number of price adjustments needed for optimal dynamic
pricing. Specifically, we will consider the minimal switching rate of a problem
instance, which we define to be the minimum number of price changes necessary
for a switching-constrained policy to match the regret of the optimal unconstrained
policy, as determined in Chapter 2.
As the main contribution of this chapter, we study dynamic pricing under a
general parametric choice model, and show that among the class of pricing policies
that adjust prices according to an arbitrary but deterministic schedule, the worst-
case minimum number of price adjustments needed to match the performance of
the rate-optimal unconstrained policy is Ω(log T ). To prove this result, we leverage
the result proved in Chapter 2 that the worst-case rate of regret of the optimal
unconstrained pricing policy is Θ(
√
T ), and establish an intrinsic connection be-
tween this rate of regret and the minimum number of price adjustments needed
to achieve this performance. We also leverage the techniques developed in Chap-
ter 2 to provide a simple policy achieving the optimal order of regret with only
O(log T ) price adjustments, showing that the lower bound on the number of price
adjustments needed is tight up to constant factors.
We also consider pricing with minimal price adjustments in the well-separated
case studied in Chapter 2, in which the optimal rate of regret is Θ(log T ), as
opposed to Θ(
√
T ). Despite the large difference in the optimal rate of regret, we
show that in this case, at least Ω(log T ) price adjustments are still needed to
achieve the optimal Θ(log T ) regret. To establish this bound, we actually prove a
stronger result: we show that, for the well-separated case, any pricing policy that
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switches prices at most τ − 1 times in T time periods must incur regret that is
Ω(τT 1/τ ), for τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}. Thus, in this special case, we derive a more fine-
grained result which describes an explicit relationship between the exact number
of switches and the best achievable rate of regret; in particular, this result shows
how the best achievable performance of a pricing policy improves as the number of
allowed price adjustments increases. We also describe a simple heuristic achieving
the optimal rate of regret with the minimal number of price adjustments, showing
that our bounds for the well-separated case are tight up to constant factors.
To our knowledge, these bounds on the number of price adjustments are the
first results of their kind, establishing fundamental limits on the number of price
adjustments necessary for effective dynamic pricing under a general parametric
demand model. Moreover, the proofs of these results establish intrinsic connections
between the structure of the demand families, the optimal rate of regret, and the
minimal rate of price adjustments.
The Explore / Exploit Tradeoff: Ubiquitous in dynamic pricing studies of
this type is the exploration / exploitation tradeoff: How should a seller balance ex-
ploratory pricing, which may sacrifice immediate revenues for better information
about the demand curve, with exploitative pricing, which acquires the maximum
amount of short-term revenue without regard for reducing uncertainty about de-
mand? This tradeoff usually plays a central role in studies of pricing under demand
uncertainty, and so a discussion of this concept in the context of adjustment-
constrained pricing is in order. The results of this work suggest that, in our
formulation, price adjustment constraints do not impede exploration. Indeed, due
to the parametric notion of demand uncertainty considered in our model, we can
compute a good estimate of the entire demand curve by offering a relatively small
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number of “test prices,” and so frequent price adjustments are not necessary for
demand learning. In contrast, our results suggest that adjustment constraints do
impede a seller’s ability to efficiently exploit the information gained about the
demand curve, since the offered price may only be updated a limited number of
times, regardless of the amount of knowledge that may be acquired.
In this chapter, we focus on the same pricing model described in Section 2.1.1,
with the addition of the following performance measure and terminology. We will
say that a pricing policy ψ = (ψ1, ψ2, . . .) makes a price change (or price switch,
or price adjustment) in time period t if the pricing function ψt used by ψ to set
the price in period t is not equal to the pricing function ψt−1 used to set the price
in the previous period. Accordingly, the cumulative number of price switches over
T periods is defined to be
Switch(C, T, ψ) = 1 + ∣∣{ 2 ≤ t ≤ T : ψt( · ) 6= ψt−1( · )}∣∣ .
3.1.1 Contributions and Organization
In Theorem 3.2.1 of Section 3.2, we establish a stronger version Theorem 2.3.1,
giving an Ω(
√
T ) lower bound on the risk under an arbitrary policy, without any
constraint on the number of price adjustments. This lower bound represents the
smallest achievable worst-case regret for an arbitrary pricing policy, and pricing
policies that achieve this lower bound (up to constant factors) are considered to be
regret-optimal. As we will see, this stronger version of the regret lower bound will
be needed to prove the desired lower bound on the minimal switching rate of an
arbitrary pricing policy. In Section 3.3, we consider the minimum number of price
adjustments needed for effective dynamic pricing, and show in Theorem 3.3.1 that
without advance knowledge of the time horizon, any regret-optimal pricing policy
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that switches price according to an arbitrary but pre-specified schedule must adjust
is prices at least Ω(log T ) times. These results establish a fundamental lower limit
on both the amount of revenue lost by a pricing policy due to demand uncertainty,
and also on the minimum number of price adjustments needed by a policy to
achieve the optimal rate of performance. Moreover, the proof of Theorem 3.3.1
establishes an intrinsic connection between the performance of a pricing policy and
the minimum number of price adjustments necessary.
In Section 3.4, we establish that the lower bounds presented in Sec-
tions 3.2 and 3.3 are tight up to constant factors, by constructing a pricing policy
that achieves the optimal order of regret, while performing the minimum number
of price adjustments. We begin Section 3.4.1 by considering the special case of
horizon-dependent policies, in which the time horizon is fixed and known to the
seller in advance, and the seller is only concerned with the weaker benchmark of
meeting a regret guarantee at the single pre-specified time horizon. In this case,
we show that one can leverage advance knowledge of the time horizon to design a
pricing policy that performs well under this weaker benchmark with only a con-
stant number of price adjustments, independent of value of the time horizon. Such
a policy, however, is designed to perform well only at a specific time horizon, and
will not work well in settings where the time horizon is not known in advance.
In Section 3.4.2, we extend the ideas developed in the horizon-dependent case to
design policies that are truly regret-optimal, in that they operate without advance
knowledge of the time horizon, and achieve the optimal regret uniformly over time.
Specifically, we describe a regret-optimal policy that performs O(log T ) price ad-
justments while achieving the optimal O(√T ) regret, matching the lower bounds
on the regret and switching rate established in Sections 3.2 and 3.3.
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In Section 3.5, we consider the well-separated case of the dynamic pricing prob-
lem, in which the optimal rate of regret is Θ(log T ). We show that despite the large
difference in the optimal rate of regret between this case and the general case, a
pricing policy achieving the optimal rate of regret in this scenario must still switch
prices Ω(log T ) times. Additionally, we prove bounds relating the exact number of
price changes to the best achievable performance, establishing for this special case
a stronger style of result than for the general case.
3.1.2 Literature Review
The problem of dynamic pricing without price adjustment constraints has been
widely studied in the revenue management literature, under a variety of model-
ing assumptions. The related literature on this topic is discussed extensively in
Section 2.1.2. To our knowledge, none of the works discussed there explicitly con-
sider the number of price changes made by the seller. The number of dynamic
pricing studies that do consider price adjustment constraints is quite limited, and
we review a handful of notable examples here. Feng and Gallego (1995) consider
the problem of selling a fixed stock of items over a finite horizon, and analyze the
optimal timing of a single price change from a known initial price to a given sec-
ond price. Bitran and Mondschein (1997) consider a capacitated pricing problem
in which the price can only be adjusted at a set of pre-specified times. Netessine
(2006) considers a deterministic demand model, and derives structural results on
the optimal timing of price changes, and C¸elik et al. (2009) take a dynamic pro-
gramming approach to dynamic pricing under price-adjustment costs, and provide
an analysis of several heuristic policies. All of the aforementioned studies assume
that the distribution of demand at each price level is known in advance, and focus
on the problem of pricing under inventory constraints. In contrast, we consider a
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model without capacity constraints, in which the relationship between price and
demand is not known to the seller. Thus, to our knowledge, this is the first work
that considers the problem of learning the probabilistic relationship between price
and demand with minimal price adjustments, and it represents a significant de-
parture from the antecedent literature.
3.2. Minimum Regret Under Arbitrary Policies
The goal of this section is to establish an Ω(
√
T ) lower bound on the worst-case
cumulative risk under an arbitrary policy (without any constraint on the price
adjustments). This lower bound will serve as a benchmark for assessing the impact
of price adjustment constraints, and will be leveraged in Section 3.3, in which we
prove a lower bound on the number of price adjustments necessary for a policy
to have the optimal O(√T ) regret. While a similar lower bound of Ω(√T ) was
proved in Theorem 2.3.1, we now give a stronger version of this result, and in
doing so, derive intermediate results that are crucial for analyzing the minimal
switching rate of an arbitrary pricing policy. The connection between the result of
this section and Theorem 2.3.1 is discussed in detail in Remark 3.2.5.
To prove the desired lower bound on the risk of an arbitrary policy, we will
construct a problem class CGenLB = (P ,Z, d) and a density λ over Z such that for
any policy ψ,
Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, T, ψ)] = Ω(
√
T ) .
Note that this immediately implies the existence of some z ∈ Z such that
Regret(z, CGenLB, T, ψ) = Ω(
√
T ), which gives a worst-case lower bound on the
regret. To establish the desired lower bound on the risk, we will focus on the
problem class CGenLB = (P ,Z, d) with P = [
√
2/2,
√
3/2], Z = [1/3, 2/3], and
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d(p; z) =
√
z−pz. It is straightforward to check that CGenLB satisfies the conditions
of Assumption 1 and 2. The main result of this section is stated in the following
theorem.
Theorem 3.2.1 (Risk Lower Bound). For any policy ψ and T ≥ 2,
Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, T, ψ)] ≥ e−10 ·
√
T ,
where the random variable Z ∈ [1/3, 2/3] has a density function λ : [1/3, 2/3] →
R+ given by λ(x) = 6{cos(3pi(x− 1/2))}2 for all x ∈ [1/3, 2/3].
To prove Theorem 3.2.1, we prove two lemmas that establish a fundamental
tension between two competing objectives: reducing uncertainty about the de-
mand curve to minimize future revenue losses, and pricing close to the optimal to
minimize immediate losses. Specifically, Theorem 3.2.1 makes use of Lemma 3.2.2,
which provides a lower bound on the expected instantaneous risk in period t+ 1 in
terms of the expected Fisher information gained by the policy up to time t, which
is defined to be E
[(
d
dz
logQψ,Zt (Yt)
)2]
. 1 The Fisher information is a well-studied
quantity in the theory of parameter estimation, and can be thought of as quanti-
fying the amount of “certainty” one has about the parameters of a distribution,
based on a set of observed samples from that distribution. In our setting, the
Fisher information of the unknown parameter z serves as a measure of the total
amount of exploration that we have done thus far. Lemma 3.2.2 follows directly
from van Trees’ inequality (Theorem 2, Gill and Levit (1995)), and its proof is
deferred to Appendix B.1.
Lemma 3.2.2 (Little Exploration Implies Large Instantaneous Risk). For any
1For a scalar parameter z, this definition of Fisher information is equivalent to the definition
provided in Assumption 2 (see, for example, Cover and Thomas (1999), Section 11). We find it
convenient to use this alternative definition in the analysis.
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policy ψ and t ≥ 1,
E[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt+1;Z)] ≥ (1/27)
E
[(
d
dz
logQψ,Zt (Yt)
)2]
+ 36pi2
,
where E[ · ] denotes expectation with respect to the joint distribution of Yt and Z.
The result of Lemma 3.2.2 shows that to have small instantaneous risk in the
current period, we must have performed sufficient exploration of the demand curve
in the past. However, we will show in the following lemma that there is an inherent
cost to demand exploration, in that any policy that performs a sufficient amount
of exploration must also incur large cumulative risk. This intuition is made precise
in Lemma 3.2.3, which establishes a lower bound on the cumulative risk in terms of
the Fisher information. (Note that while the result of Lemma 3.2.2 would hold for
a generic problem class, the result of Lemma 3.2.3 leverages the specially chosen
demand family of the problem class CGenLB to prove the desired relationship between
the Fisher information and the cumulative risk). The proof of Lemma 3.2.3 is given
in Appendix B.2.
Lemma 3.2.3 (Large Exploration Implies Large Cumulative Risk). For any policy
ψ, any z0 ∈ [1/3, 2/3], and t ≥ 1, we have
Ez0
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Yt)
∣∣∣
z=z0
)2]
≤ 30 Regret(z0, CGenLB, t, ψ) ,
where Ez0 [ · ] denote the expectation when the underlying parameter is z0.
Lemmas 3.2.2 and 3.2.3 demonstrate the tradeoff between reducing the instan-
taneous risk in the current time period, and minimizing the total cumulative risk
incurred by performing sufficient exploration. We will exploit the tension between
these competing objectives to prove Theorem 3.2.1; however, we first need the
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following technical lemma, which gives a lower bound on the instantaneous risk in
the first period. The proof of this result is given in Appendix B.3.
Lemma 3.2.4. For any policy ψ, Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, 1, ψ)] ≥ 1/26244.
Here is the proof of Theorem 3.2.1.
Proof. Combining Lemmas 3.2.2 and 3.2.3, we have that for any t ≥ 1,
E[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt+1;Z)] ≥ (1/27)
30 Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, t, ψ)] + 36pi2 .
Since the cumulative risk is non-decreasing, it follows from Lemma 3.2.4 that
Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, t, ψ)] ≥ Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, 1, ψ)] ≥ 1
26244
.
Moreover, it is easy to verify that for any (a, b, c) ∈ R3++, abx+c ≥ ax0/(bx0+c)x for all
x ≥ x0. Let a = 1/27, b = 30, c = 36pi2, and x0 = 1/26244. It follows that
E[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt+1;Z)] ≥ c1Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, t, ψ)] (3.1)
for c1 =
(1/27)(1/26244)
(30/26244)+36pi2
≥ 1/e20.
Letting Rt = Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, t, ψ)], and noting that E[r(p∗(Z);Z) −
r(Pt+1;Z)] = Rt+1−Rt by definition, the above argument shows that for all t ≥ 1,
Rt+1 ≥ Rt + c1
Rt
.
We will now prove by induction on t that the above recursion implies that Rt ≥
√
c1 ·
√
t for all t ≥ 2, which gives the desired result because √c1 ≥ 1/e10. The case
when t = 2 is trivial because R2 ≥ R1 + c1R1 ≥
√
R21 + 2c1 ≥
√
c1
√
2 . So suppose
that the claim holds for t ≥ 2, that is, Rt ≥ √c1 ·
√
t. Then,
Rt+1 ≥ Rt+ c1
Rt
≥
√
R2t + 2c1 ≥
√
c1t+ 2c1 =
√
c1(t+ 1) + c1 ≥ √c1·
√
t+ 1 ,
which completes the induction.
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Remark 3.2.5 (Contrast Between Theorem 3.2.1 and Previous Results in the
Literature). Theorem 3.2.1 is a stronger result than the Ω(
√
T ) lower bound es-
tablished in Theorem 2.3.1. Specifically, the result of Theorem 2.3.1 states that
there exists some constant c such that, given a fixed time horizon T0, it is possible
to construct a pair of problem instances depending on T0 such that the worst-case
regret of any pricing policy on these two instances at the pre-specified time T0 must
be bounded below by c
√
T0. Note that for a fixed time horizon T0, this result does
not give any information on the regret of a pricing policy at intermediate time
steps t ∈ {1, . . . , T0− 1}. In contrast, the result of Theorem 3.2.1 states that there
exists some fixed density λ over the problem parameters, which is independent of
T, such that the expected regret with respect to λ grows uniformly like
√
t. As
we will see in Section 3.3, the new result of Theorem 3.2.1 will be crucial in our
analysis of the minimal switching rate.
3.3. Minimum Number of Price Adjustments
In this section, we establish a lower bound on the minimum number of price changes
needed for optimal dynamic pricing, by showing that among regret-optimal policies
that switch prices according to an arbitrary but pre-specified schedule, the mini-
mum number of price-adjustments is Ω(log T ). Let ΨF denote the class of pricing
policies that change the price at fixed pre-specified time points, independent of
the observed customer responses. In the next theorem, we show that any pricing
policy in ΨF whose regret is O(
√
T ) across all problem instances must necessarily
adjust its pricing function at least Ω(log T ) times in the worst case. Later, in
Section 3.4.2, we will introduce a pricing policy in the class ΨF called the Dou-
bling policy, which achieves the optimal order of regret while switching prices
only O(log T ) times, demonstrating that Θ(log T ) is in fact the minimal switching
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rate.
Theorem 3.3.1 (Minimum Price Changes). Let CGenLB = (P ,Z, d) be the problem
class used in Theorem 3.2.1 with P = [√2/2,√3/2], Z = [1/3, 2/3], and d(p; z) =
√
z − p z. If ψ is a policy in ΨF such that for all T ≥ 1 and z ∈ Z,
Regret(z, CGenLB, T, ψ) ≤ C
√
T ,
for some constant C depending only on CGenLB, then for all T ≥ 1,
Switch(CGenLB, T, ψ) ≥ log T
2 log(1 + C2e20)
.
Geometric Intuition: Consider a switching-constrained pricing policy operat-
ing on the problem instance of Theorem 3.2.1, and suppose that this policy offers
a fixed price P for some fixed number of time steps. The cumulative risk in-
curred by such a policy during this period is a linear function of the number of
time steps, with slope given by the instantaneous risk E[r(p∗(z); z) − r(P ; z)] in-
curred from offering price P. Thus, if we graph the cumulative risk of any policy
in ΨF as a function of the number of time steps, then this graph will be a contin-
uous piecewise-linear curve, whose individual segments correspond to the phases
in which the different fixed prices were offered. In addition to the piecewise lin-
ear structure of the cumulative risk, we also know from Theorem 3.2.1 that the
cumulative risk of any regret-optimal pricing policy in ΨF must be Θ(
√
T ). In
light of these facts, we may regard Figure 3.1 as a schematic representation of the
cumulative risk of a hypothetical pricing policy in ΨF .
Under this interpretation, we see that the smallest number of price changes
necessary for a switching-constrained policy to be regret-optimal is equivalent to
the minimum number of segments necessary for a continuous piecewise-linear curve
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Figure 3.1: Cumulative risk of a switching constrained policy. During peri-
ods where the policy offers a fixed price, the cumulative regret
increases linearly.
to stay bounded between two curves of the form t 7→ c√t. Clearly, the number of
segments needed must tend to infinity as t → ∞, and in fact, the number is
Ω(log t). Based on this intuition, we now give a rigorous proof of Theorem 3.3.1.
Proof of Theorem 3.3.1. Consider an arbitrary policy ψ ∈ ΨF . Let
{sk ∈ Z+ : k = 1, 2, . . .} denote the deterministic sequence of time periods in which
the policy ψ makes its price adjustments, where we set s1 = 1. Note that if
P1, P2, . . . denotes the sequence of prices under the policy ψ, then for all k ∈ Z+,
we have
Psk = Psk+1 = · · · = Psk+1−1 ,
with probability one. From Equation (3.1) in the proof of Theorem 3.2.1, we have
that for all k ∈ Z+,
E[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Psk ;Z)] ≥
c1
Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, sk − 1, ψ)] ≥
c1
C
√
sk − 1
≥ c1
C
√
sk
,
63
where c1 =
(1/27)(1/26244)
(30/26244)+36pi2
≥ 1/e20, and where the second inequality follows from
our hypothesis that ψ is regret-optimal. Since the policy ψ uses the same price
between periods sk and sk+1 − 1, it follows that
sk+1−1∑
t=sk
E[r(p∗(Z);Z)−r(Pt;Z)] = (sk+1−sk)E[r(p∗(Z);Z)−r(Psk ;Z)] ≥ (sk+1−sk)
c1
C
√
sk
.
On the other hand, we also have the following upper bound on the expected cu-
mulative regret during periods sk and sk+1 − 1 :
sk+1−1∑
t=sk
E[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt;Z)] ≤ Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, sk+1 − 1, ψ)]
≤ Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, sk+1, ψ)]
≤ C√sk+1 ,
where the last inequality follows from our hypothesis that ψ is regret optimal.
Combining the above two inequalities, we have that
(sk+1 − sk) c1
C
√
sk
≤
sk+1−1∑
t=sk
E[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt;Z)] ≤ C√sk+1 ,
which implies that
C2
c1
≥ sk+1 − sk√
sksk+1
=
√
sk+1
sk
−
√
sk
sk+1
≥
√
sk+1
sk
− 1 ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that sk ≤ sk+1. Let α = (1+C2/c1)2.
It follows from the above inequality that sk+1 ≤ αsk for all k. Since s1 = 1, we
have that sk+1 ≤ αk, which implies k ≥ logα sk+1 for all k ≥ 1.
Now, consider an arbitrary time period T . Suppose that sk ≤ T < sk+1 for
some k. Then,
Switch(CGenLB, T, ψ) = k ≥ logα sk+1 ≥ logα T =
log T
logα
,
and the desired result follows from the fact that logα = 2 log(1 + C2/c1) and
1/c1 ≤ e20.
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3.4. Matching Upper Bounds
In this section, we construct a pricing policy that achieves O(√T ) regret uniformly
over time, while switching prices at most O(log T ) times, matching the upper
bounds presented in Sections 3.2 and 3.3. We begin by our analysis by consider
the special case of a known time horizon.
3.4.1 A Motivating Example: The Horizon-Dependent Case
In this section, we consider a special case in which the time horizon is fixed to be
some value T0 which is known to the pricing policy in advance, and we consider
the goal of achieving a regret guarantee at the pre-specified time T0. We will see
that when the time horizon is known in advance, there is a simple regret-optimal
policy that adjusts the offer price only a constant number of times, independent of
the time horizon T0. While this section illustrates the benefits of having a priori
knowledge of the time horizon, the primary goal is to highlight important design
principles that will be used in the next section, when we develop pricing policies
for more general settings.
To motivate the design of a pricing policy, recall that in Corollary 2.2.4, we
saw that if the model parameter is z, and we price the product at p∗(zˆ) for some
estimate zˆ of z, then we have
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(zˆ); z) ≤ cr L
2
2
‖z− zˆ‖2 .
Thus, given an estimate Ẑ of the underlying parameter z, it follows from Corol-
lary 2.2.4 that the instantaneous regret is bounded above by the mean squared
error of Ẑ. Recall also that by Lemma 2.3.7, the mean-squared error of the max-
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imum likelihood estimate Ẑn based on t samples is bounded above by Cmle/t for
some constant Cmle depending only on the underlying problem instance. Together,
Corollary 2.2.4 and Lemma 2.3.7 suggest a simple pricing policy that achieves
O(√T ) regret with only a constant number of prices changes. The policy takes
advantage of the advance knowledge of the time-horizon to schedule all of its ex-
ploration “up-front,” eliminating the need for frequent price adjustments. Under
this policy, we first offer the exploration price p¯1 for b
√
T0c consecutive periods,
followed by p¯2 for another b
√
T0c consecutive periods, followed by p¯3 for b
√
T0c
periods, and so on, continuing in this fashion until we have offered the last ex-
ploration price p¯n. Note that during this exploration phase, we only change the
price at most n times, independent of the time horizon T0. Moreover, since the
instantaneous regret in each time period is bounded by some constant C0, the total
cumulative regret during the exploration phase is O(nC0
√
T0).
After concluding the exploration phase, we compute a maximum likelihood
estimate Ẑ from the nb√T0c exploration samples. We then use a single fixed
price, correspond to the myopic price p∗(Ẑ), for the remaining time periods. It
follows from Lemma 2.3.7 that the mean squared error of Ẑ is O(1/√T0), and
thus the expected instantaneous regret in each period is also O(1/√T0) by Corol-
lary 2.2.4. Therefore, the cumulative regret incurred after the exploration phase
will be O(√T0) because there are at most T0 time periods remaining. This gives
us the desired regret bound. It is clear that the total number of price changes is
at most n+ 1.
The above policy takes advantage of the known time horizon T0, and it is
designed specifically to yield small regret over T0 periods. Clearly, this policy
will perform poorly when we have a longer time horizon because of insufficient
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exploration. In the next section, we will design a pricing policy that is truly
regret-optimal, in that it satisfies a regret guarantee of O(√T ) uniformly for all
time horizons T. Although we cannot hope that such a policy would change prices
a constant number of times, it turns out, surprisingly, that the number of required
price adjustments is still relatively small compared to the overall time horizon,
matching the Ω(log T ) bound on price adjustments proved in Section 3.3.
3.4.2 A Regret-Optimal Policy with Minimum Price Adjustments
In this section, we describe a regret-optimal pricing policy – which we refer to as
the Doubling policy – whose regret is bounded above by O(√T ) uniformly for all
time horizon T . Using a standard doubling argument (Section 2.3, Cesa-Bianchi
and Lugosi (2006)), the Doubling policy changes its offer price at pre-specified
time periods that are (exponentially) far apart. To describe the exact time periods
where the price changes occur, it is conceptually helpful to think of the Doubling
policy as operating in cycles of (exponentially) increasing lengths, where each cycle
consists of an exploration phase followed by an exploitation phase. Within each
cycle, the policy changes the offer price only a constant a number of times, leading
to a total number of price adjustments of O(log T ). A formal description of the
policy is given below.
The following theorem establishes an upper bound on the cumulative regret
and the expected number of price adjustments for the Doubling policy.
Theorem 3.4.1. For any problem class C satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2, there
exists a positive constant C1 depending only on C such that for every T ≥ n2,
Regret(z, C, T,Doubling(C)) ≤ C1
√
T and Switch(C, T,Doubling(C)) ≤ (n+1) log2 T.
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Policy Doubling(C)
Inputs: A problem class C = (P ,Z, d) and exploration prices p¯ = (p¯1, p¯2, . . . , p¯n)
satisfying Assumptions 1 and 2.
Description: For cycles c = 1, 2, . . .
Exploration phase of cycle c: For i = 1, 2, . . . , n, offer the exploration price
p¯i to 2
bc/2c consecutive customers. For m = 1, 2, . . . , 2bc/2c, let Yi(m) denote the
response of the mth customer when the exploration price p¯i is offered, and let Y(m) =
(Y1(m), . . . , Yn(m)) ∈ {0, 1}n.
At the end of the exploration phase, let Ẑ(c) denote the maximum likelihood estimate
based on the customer selections Y(1),Y(2), . . . ,Y(2bc/2c) from cycle c, that is,
Ẑ(c) = arg max
z∈Z
2bc/2c∏
m=1
Qp¯,z(Y(m)) .
Exploitation phase of cycle c: Offer the price p∗(Ẑ(c)) for an additional 2c periods.
Proof. Consider any arbitrary T ≥ 1. There are at most log2 T cycles from time one
until the time horizon T . From the definition of the Doubling policy, the number
of price changes in each cycle is at most n+1. Therefore, Switch(C, T,Double(C)) ≤
(n+ 1) log2 T . It remains to bound the regret.
Consider an arbitrary cycle c. During each period in the exploration phase,
the instantaneous regret is bounded above by some constant C0 that depends only
on C. The total regret during the exploration phase of cycle c is thus bounded by
n2bc/2cC0. We will now bound the total regret during the exploitation phase. It
follows from Corollary 2.2.4 and Lemma 2.3.7 that we have the following upper
bound on the instantaneous regret in each period of the exploitation phase of cycle
c.
Ez
[
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(Ẑ(c)); z)
]
≤ crL
2
2
Ez
[∥∥∥Ẑ(c)− z∥∥∥2] ≤ crL2Cmle
2 · 2bc/2c ≤
crL
2Cmle
2c/2
,
where the second inequality follows from the fact that each exploration price is of-
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fered to 2bc/2c customers. This implies that the total regret during the exploitation
phase is bounded above by
2c · Ez
[
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(Ẑ(c)); z)
]
≤ crL2Cmle2c/2 .
Putting everything together, we have that the total regret in cycle c is bounded
above by nC02
bc/2c + crL2Cmle2c/2 ≤ (nC0 + crL2Cmle)2c/2. Let K0 = blog2(2T )c.
Note that 2K0 ≥ 2log2(2T )/2 = T . Thus, the number of cycles is at most K0. Since
the regret is non-decreasing, we have that
Regret(z, C, T,Doubling(C)) ≤ Regret
(
z, C,
K0∑
c=1
(
n2bc/2c + 2c
)
,Doubling(C)
)
≤ (nC0 + crL2Cmle)
K0∑
c=1
2c/2
≤ (nC0 + crL2Cmle)2
(K0+1)/2
√
2− 1
≤ (nC0 + crL2Cmle) 2
√
T√
2− 1 ,
which is the desired result.
3.5. Well-Separated Demand Curves
In the previous sections, we saw that the Θ(log T ) minimal switching rate for pric-
ing policies in the general case was intrinsically linked to the optimal Θ(
√
T ) rate
of regret. This suggests the following natural question: how would the switching
behavior of a rate-optimal pricing strategy differ if we considered a model in which
the optimal rate of regret was something other than Θ(
√
T )? In this section, we
will investigate this question by considering the special class of “well-separated”
demand families, under which the optimal rate of regret is Θ(log T ), as opposed to
Θ(
√
T ) for the general case. We will see that, despite this large difference in the
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optimal rate of regret, the minimal switching rate for this scenario is still Θ(log T ).
Additionally, in this special case, we will prove bounds that are more fine-grained
than those in the previous sections, which show that any pricing policy that ad-
justs its offer price at most τ − 1 times must incur regret that is Ω(τT 1/τ ) in the
worst case, for τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}.
Recall that well-separated families of demand curves satisfy Assump-
tions 1 and 2 of Section 2.2, and have the additional property that for any two
distinct parameter values, the willingness-to-pay distribution for one value stochas-
tically dominates the willingness-to-pay distribution for the other value. This ad-
ditional structural assumption ensures that we can estimate the parameters of the
demand curve from customer responses to any price; this is in contrast to Assump-
tion 2 for the general case, in which we were only guaranteed some fixed set of
exploratory prices from which we could estimate the demand parameters. As we
saw in Chapter 2, this additional property makes dynamic pricing easier, in that
the optimal rate of regret Θ(log T ), as opposed to Θ(
√
T ) for the general case.
We now summarize our results for dynamic pricing under well-separated de-
mand curves. In Section 3.5.1, we show that any regret optimal policy for the
well-separated case must switch prices Ω(log T ) times in the worst-case. We de-
duce this lower bound on the minimal switching rate as a corollary to a more
fine-grained result, which shows that in the well-separated case, any pricing policy
that adjusts its offer price at most τ − 1 times must incur regret that is Ω(τT 1/τ )
in the worst case, for τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}. Finally, in Section 3.5.2, we construct
a pricing policy that changes prices at most O(log T ) times in T time periods,
and whose regret is O(log T ) across all problem instances. Thus, we classify that
the optimal order of regret for the well-separated case is Θ(log T ), and that the
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minimal switching rate is Θ(log T ).
3.5.1 Lower Bound on the Switching Rate
In this section, we establish that any pricing policy for the well-separated case
that switches prices a finite number of times must incur polynomial regret, which is
asymptotically worse than the optimal O(log T ) regret. As an immediate corollary,
we deduce that the minimal switching rate is Ω(log T ).
To prove the desired lower bounds on the minimal switching rate, we will
leverage the risk lower bounds for the well-separated case developed in Sec-
tion 2.4.1, so let us first recall those results. Recall that the results of that sec-
tion apply to the problem class CWellSepLB = (P ,Z, d) given by P = [1/3, 1/2],
Z = [2, 3], with d(p; z) = 1 − (pz)/2, and with a density λ : Z → R+ given by
λ(z) = 2{cos(pi(z − 5/2))}2. Recall that Theorem 2.4.5 established that for any
policy ψ setting prices in P and any T ≥ 1, if Z is a random variable taking values
in Z with density λ, we have
Eλ[Regret(Z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ)] ≥ 1
405pi2
log T .
Recall also that this theorem followed directly from Lemma 2.4.6, which states
that for any t ≥ 1,
E [r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(Pt+1;Z)] ≥ 1
405pi2
· 1
t
,
where Pt+1 is the price offered by ψ at time t+1, and E[ · ] denotes the expectation
with respect to the joint distribution of Pt and the prior density λ of the parameter
Z ∈ Z. Finally, we note that it is straightforward to check that for any initial price
p1 ∈ P , we have that
E [r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(p1;Z)] ≥ 1
405pi2
.
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With these results, we can proceed to prove a lower bound on the minimal switching
rate for the well-separated case. Let ΨF (τ, T ) denote the set of pricing policies that
switch prices at most τ − 1 times according to a predetermined schedule up to a
time horizon T. The main result of the section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.1 (Risk Lower Bound for Deterministic-Switching Policies). Let
CWellSepLB and λ( · ) be the well-separated problem class and density used in Theorem
2.4.5. For any T ≥ 2, any τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}, and any ψ ∈ ΨF (τ, T ),
Eλ[Regret(Z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ)] ≥ 1
3(405pi2)
· τT 1/τ .
In the following corollary, we show that worst-case minimal switching rate for
well-separated families is at least Ω(log T ).
Corollary 3.5.2 (Minimum Price Changes for Well-Separated Families). If ψ is
a policy in ΨF (τ, T ) such that for all T ≥ 2 and z ∈ Z,
Regret(z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ) ≤ C log T ,
for some constant C depending only on CWellSepLB, then for any T ≥ 2,
Switch(CWellSepLB, T, ψ) ≥ 1
6C(405pi2)
· log T .
Proof. Let c3 = 1/{3(405pi2)}. By Theorem 3.5.1, we have that for all z ∈ Z,
C log T ≥ Regret(z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ) ≥ c3 τT 1/τ = c3 τe(log T )/τ ,
which implies that
C
c3
· log T
τ
≥ e(log T )/τ ≥ 1
2
(
log T
τ
)2
,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that for any x ≥ 0, ex ≥ x2/2.
Therefore, τ ≥ (c3/(2C)) log T , which is the desired result.
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We now proceed with the proof of Theorem 3.5.1. We will consider the following
optimization problem. For any T ≥ 2 and τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}, define
Γ∗(τ, T ) = min
{
x1 +
τ∑
k=2
xk∑k−1
h=1 xh
∣∣∣∣ τ∑
k=1
xk = T and xk ∈ Z+ ∪ {0} ∀k
}
. (3.2)
We will prove Theorem 3.5.1 in two steps, by first establishing a lower bound on
the risk in terms of Γ∗(τ, T ), and then establishing a lower bound on Γ∗(τ, T ) in
terms of T and τ. The first step is addressed in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3.5.3 (Risk Lower Bound). For any T ≥ 2, any τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}, and
any ψ ∈ ΨF (τ, T ),
Eλ[Regret(Z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ)] ≥ 1
405pi2
· Γ∗(τ, T ) .
where λ is the density given by λ(z) = 2{cos(pi(z − 5/2))}2.
Proof. Consider an arbitrary policy ψ ∈ ΨF . Let {sk ∈ {1, . . . , T} : k = 1, 2, . . . τ}
denote the time periods where the price switching under ψ occurs, where we set
s1 = 1, an define a time sτ+1 = T + 1 for notational convenience. Recall that
if P1, P2, . . . , PT denotes the sequence of prices under the policy ψ, then for all
k ∈ 1, 2, . . . , τ , we have that Psk = Psk+1 = · · · = Psk+1−1 , with probability one.
Let `k = sk+1− sk denote the length of the kth phase, and for ease of notation, let
Rt(z) = r(p
∗(z); z) − r(Pt; z) denote the instantaneous regret at time t when the
underlying parameter is z. Now we have
Eλ[Regret(Z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ)] = E
[
T∑
t=1
Rt(Z)
]
= E
[
τ∑
k=1
sk+1−1∑
h=sk
Rh(Z)
]
= E
[
`1 ·Rs1(Z) +
τ∑
k=2
`k ·Rsk(Z)
]
= `1 · E[Rs1(Z)] +
τ∑
k=2
`k · E[Rsk(Z)],
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where Z is a random variable with density λ, and E[ · ] denotes the expectation
with respect to the joint distribution of Z and the distribution induced by ψ. To
relate the last line to the objective function of the minimization problem (3.2), we
must establish lower bounds on the terms E[Rsk(Z)] for k ∈ {1, . . . , τ}. To do this,
note that for the case k ≥ 2, the price Psk offered at the beginning of the kth phase
is computed from at most sk− 1 =
∑k−1
h=1 `h samples, so applying Lemma 2.4.6, we
have that for k ≥ 2,
E[Rsk(Z)] ≥
1
405pi2
· 1∑k−1
h=1 `h
. (3.3)
For the case k = 1, we know by Lemma 2.4.6 that for any arbitrary initial price
p1, we have
Eλ[r(p∗(Z);Z)− r(p1;Z)] ≥ 1
405pi2
.
Putting everything together, we have
Eλ[Regret(Z, CWellSepLB, T, ψ)] = 1
405pi2
·
(
`1 +
τ∑
k=2
`k∑k−1
h=1 `h
)
≥ 1
405pi2
· Γ∗(τ, T ) ,
which proves the claim.
Using this fact, we now establish a lower bound on Γ∗(τ, T ) in terms of T
and τ. This result is given in the following lemma whose proof follows from a
standard dynamic programming technique, and can be found in Appendix B.4.
Theorem 3.5.1 follows as an immediate corollary of Lemmas 2.4.6 and 3.5.4.
Lemma 3.5.4 (Dynamic Programming Lower Bound). For any T ≥ 2 and any
τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e},
Γ∗(τ, T ) ≥ τT
1/τ
3
.
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3.5.2 A Matching Upper Bound
In this Section, we describe a pricing policy that achieves regret that is O(τT 1/τ ),
while adjusting its offer price at most τ−1 times, matching the lower bound stated
in Section 3.5.1. Below is a description of the policy.
Policy Well-Sep(C, T, τ)
Inputs: A time horizon T ≥ 2, a well-separated problem instance C = (P ,Z, d)
satisfying Assumptions 1 and 3, and a switching constraint τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}.
Initialization: Divide the time-line {1, . . . , T} into τ consecutive phases. For
each 1 ≤ c ≤ τ − 1, let the length of phase c be `c = dT c/τe time steps, and let the
final phase τ contain the remaining time steps. For each 1 ≤ c ≤ τ, let sc denote
the first time period in phase c, and let sτ+1 = T + 1.
Description: For phases c = 1, . . . , τ,
• If c = 1, offer an arbitrary initial price P1 ∈ P for `c = dT c/τe time periods.
Let Ys2−1 = (Y1, . . . , Ys2−1) denote the vector of corresponding customer
responses.
• If c ≥ 2, compute the maximum-likelihood estimate
Ẑ(c) = arg max
z∈Z
QWell-Sep,zsc−1 (Ysc−1),
and offer p∗(Ẑ(c)) for the entirety of phase c. Let Ysc+1−1 = (Y1, . . . , Ysc+1−1)
denote the current vector of customer responses since time 1.
The main result of this section is stated in the following theorem.
Theorem 3.5.5 (Matching Upper Bound for Well Separated Demand Curves).
For any well-separated problem class C = (P ,Z, d), z ∈ Z, T ≥ 2, and τ ∈
{1, . . . dlog T e}, there exists a constant C2 depending only on the problem class C
such that
Regret(z, C, T,Well-Sep(C, T, τ)) ≤ C2 τ T 1/τ and Switch(C, T,Well-Sep(C, T, τ)) ≤ τ .
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Remark 3.5.6. The definition of the policy Well-Sep(C, T, τ), as well as the results
of Theorem 3.5.5, apply to the case of a known time horizon T and a pre-specified
number of switches τ. However, a straightforward modification of the Well-Sep
policy yields a policy that operates without foreknowledge of the time-horizon,
and achieves the optimal O(log T ) regret, while adjusting prices only O(log T )
times. Specifically, modifying the Well-Sep policy so that the length of the jth
phase is 2j yields a policy that does not require knowledge of time horizon, and
that switches prices Θ(log T ) times in T periods. Moreover, applying the regret
bound of Theorem 3.5.5 with τ = Θ(log T ) yields a regret guarantee of O(log T ),
as desired.
The proof of Theorem 3.5.5 makes use of Theorem 2.4.7, which states that if
Ẑt is a maximum-likelihood estimate computed by an online pricing policy based
on t samples, then the mean squared error of Ẑt is bounded above by Cmle/t for
some constant Cmle depending only on the underlying problem instance. With this
fact, we now give the proof of Theorem 3.5.5.
Proof. Consider a fixed T ≥ 2 and τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}. Let us assume without
loss of generality that τ ≥ 2, or else the result holds trivially. Since there are τ
phases, it is enough to show that the regret in each phase is bounded above by
C2 · T 1/τ . Denote the regret incurred in the cth phase by Rc(z), which is given by
Rc(z) =
sc+1−1∑
t=sc
Ez[r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(Ẑ(c)); z)] = `c · Ez[r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(Ẑ(c)); z)],
since the policy offers the price p∗(Ẑ(c)) during each of the `c time periods in phase
c. Recall that sτ+1 = T + 1 for notational convenience.
To bound the regret in the first phase, note that the instantaneous regret
incurred during any single time period is bounded above by some constant C0
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depending only on C. It follows that the total regret incurred during the first
phase satisfies
R1(z) ≤ C0`1 = C0dT 1/τe ≤ 2C0T 1/τ .
To bound the regret in phases 2 ≤ c ≤ τ, note that by Corollary 2.2.4, Assump-
tion 1 (c), and Theorem 2.4.7, we have
Ez[r(p∗(z); z)− r(p∗(Ẑ(c)); z)] ≤ crEz[(p∗(z)− p∗(Ẑ(c)))2]
≤ L2crEz[(z − Ẑ(c))2]
≤ L
2crCmle
sc − 1
≤ 2L
2crCmle
sc
,
where the second to last inequality follows from the fact that Ẑ(c) is computed
from sc − 1 samples, and where the last inequality follows from the fact that for
c ≥ 2 we have sc ≥ 2, and so 1/(sc − 1) ≤ 2/sc. By the definition of the Well-Sep
policy and the formula for geometric series, we have that
sc =
c−1∑
k=1
dT k/τe ≥
c−1∑
k=1
T k/τ =
T c/τ − T 1/τ
T 1/τ − 1 ≥ T
(c−1)/τ − 1 ≥ T
(c−1)/τ
3
,
where the last inequality holds because for each 2 ≤ c ≤ τ, T (c−1)/τ = e(c−1) log T/τ ≥
elog T/dlog T e ≥ e1/2. Also by the definition of the Well-Sep policy, we have `c ≤ dT c/τe
for all 1 ≤ c ≤ τ, so it follows that
Rc(z) = `c ·Ez[r(p∗(z); z)−r(p∗(Ẑ(c)); z)] ≤ dT c/τe· 6L
2crCmle
T (c−1)/τ
≤ 12L2crCmle ·T 1/τ .
Letting C2 = max{2C0, 12L2crCmle} and putting everything together, we have
Regret(z, C, T,Well-Sep(C, T, τ)) =
τ∑
c=1
Rc(z) ≤ C2 τT 1/τ .
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3.6. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we compare the empirical performance of four pricing policies
that have a wide variety of price-adjustment behavior, focusing exclusively on the
general case of dynamic pricing discussed in Sections 3.2, 3.3, and 3.4. We consider
the Doubling policy described in Section 3.4.2, and compare its performance
against three alternative policies across a range of problem instances. We describe
the alternative policies below.
1. FP: As a baseline for comparison, we consider a fixed-price policy FP that
chooses a price uniformly at random from the pricing interval, and offers this
price for the entire selling season. Note that this policy will perform zero
price adjustments, and will have regret that is linear in T.
2. MLE-C: The second policy we consider is the MLE-CYCLE policy de-
scribed in Section 2.3.2. Note that this policy is identical to the Doubling
policy, except for the scheduling of the exploration and exploitation phases.
In MLE-CYCLE, the length of the cth cycle is c+ n time periods, consist-
ing of an exploration phase in which n exploration prices are offered, and an
exploitation phase in which the greedy price is offered for c periods. Thus,
MLE-CYCLE updates its greedy price more frequently, potentially adjust-
ing its price Θ(
√
T ) times up to time T, compared with Θ(log T ) times for
the Doubling policy. Recall that MLE-CYCLE has a regret guarantee of
O(√T ).
3. CVP: The third policy we consider is the Controlled Variance Pricing policy
described in den Boer and Zwart (2010b). In time period t, the CVP policy
computes a maximum-likelihood estimate of the unknown parameters based
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on all previously observed samples, and then computes the optimal price
with respect to these estimates. The policy then offers the estimated optimal
price, with a small perturbation added in the case that this price is too close
to the average of all past prices offered. Note that this policy potentially
switches prices in every time step. The CVP policy has a regret guarantee
of O(√T log T ).
In the implementation of both the Doubling and MLE-C policies, we use samples
from both the exploration and exploitation phases to compute the estimates of the
demand parameters, as we found this to improve performance in our empirical
studies.
To summarize, the Doubling, MLE-C, and CVP policies all have a provable
regret guarantees of O(√T ) (up to logarithmic factors), but these policies perform
Θ(log T ), Θ(
√
T ), and Θ(T ) potential price adjustments, respectively. Our goal
in this section is to compare the finite-time regret and switching numbers of these
policies, to empirically investigate the relationship between price adjustments and
revenue loss, and to and provide numerical evidence to support that the Doubling
policy can maintain competitive pricing performance while making a relatively
small number of price adjustments.
3.6.1 Problem Class and Performance Measures
For our simulations, we focus on a linear demand problem class given by P =
[
√
2/3,
√
3/2], Z = [√2/2,√3/2] × [1/2, 3/4] and d(p; z) = z1 − p z2. When im-
plementing the policies on this class, both the Doubling and MLE-C policies
depend on a choice of two exploration prices, which we fix to be pmin =
√
2/3
and pmax =
√
3/2. The CVP policy depends on a parameter that determines the
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size of the price perturbation, and we set this parameter based on the suggestion
contained in den Boer and Zwart (2010b).
To evaluate the performance of each policy, we generate random samples of the
problem parameters z1, . . . , zm ∈ Z (to be described later), and we consider two
measure of average performance over this random sample of parameters. First,
we consider the Percentage Revenue Loss, which is defined to be the average
over the random sample of problem instances of the cumulative regret divided
by the total optimal revenue. Thus, if z1, . . . , zm ∈ Z is the sample of problem
parameters, we have
Percentage Revenue Loss (T ) =
1
m
m∑
i=1
∑t
s=1 r(p
∗(zi); zi)− r(P is ; zi)
t · r(p∗(zi); zi) ×100% .
Equivalently, this quantity describes the total amount of revenue lost by each policy
with respect to the optimal policy, as a percentage of the total optimal revenue.
We also consider the Price Changes performance measure, which is the average
over the m problem instances of the number of price changes made by each policy
up to time T.
3.6.2 First Simulation: The Lower Bound Distribution
For our first experiment, we investigate the performance of all four pricing policies
when problem parameters are drawn from a distribution similar to the one used
to prove the lower bound of Theorem 3.2.1. We generate 100 independent random
samples (z1, . . . , z100), by drawing independent random values zi in the interval
[1/2, 3/4] according to the density λ(z) = 8 {cos(4pi(x− 5/8))}2 , and then setting
zi = (
√
zi, zi).
In all experiments, the standard error of the figures reported in the Percentage
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Table 3.1: Comparison of the Percentage Revenue Loss of Four Policies on
the Lower Bound Instance
Percentage Revenue Loss
T × 103 FP Doubling MLE-C CVP
1 3.73 % 1.33 % 1.28 % 1.29 %
2 3.73 % 1.08 % 1.09 % 1.14 %
3 3.73 % 1.00 % 1.01 % 1.08 %
4 3.73 % 0.92 % 0.94 % 1.02 %
5 3.73 % 0.93 % 0.90 % 0.95 %
Table 3.2: Comparison of the Switching Performance of Four Policies on the
Lower Bound Instance
Price Changes
T × 103 FP Doubling MLE-C CVP
1 0.0 27.0 129.0 987.8
2 0.0 30.0 183.0 1987.8
3 0.0 33.0 226.0 2987.8
4 0.0 33.0 261.0 3986.8
5 0.0 36.0 294.0 4986.8
Revenue Loss columns is less than 0.1% for all policies at all reported values of
T. In all experiments, the standard error of the figures reported in the Price
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Changes columns is 0.0 for the Doubling and MLE-C policies, and is less than
33 for the CVP policy, for all reported values of T.
We observe that the three competing heuristics all significantly outperform the
fixed-price policy, and lose only a small percentage of the total optimal revenue.
More importantly, we see that the percentage revenue loss of the three heuristic
policies all decreases with the number of time steps, while the fixed-price policy
obviously has a percentage revenue loss that does not improve with time. We
note that the MLE-C policy and the CVP policy have average revenue loss that
essentially the same as that of the Doubling policy, even though these policies
switch many more times on average. As an extreme example, we note that at time
T = 5000, the average percentage revenue loss of the CVP policy is within 0.02%
of that of the Doubling policy, despite the CVP policy making over 4900 more
price adjustments on average. This behavior is consistent with the insights gained
in Section 3.4.2, which establish that rate-optimal pricing is possible with only
O(log T ) price adjustments.
3.6.3 Second Simulation: General Distributions
A key result of this chapter is the Ω(
√
T ) regret lower bound of Section 3.2, and
this regret lower bound utilized problem instances drawn from a specially chosen
distribution. Thus, a natural question is whether the lower bound construction of
Section 3.2 is pathological, and whether policies can perform significantly better
on a more “natural” set of problem instances. To address this issue, we simulated
the four policies on two alternative distributions of problem parameters, described
below.
82
1. Uniform: We generate 100 independent zi by drawing 100 independent sam-
ples zi1 from the uniform distribution on [
√
2/2,
√
3/2], and 100 independent
random samples zi2 from the uniform distribution on [1/2, 3/4], and setting
zi = (zi1, z
i
2).
2. Gaussian: We generate 100 independent zi by drawing 100 independent
samples zi1 from a normal distribution whose mean is the midpoint of
[
√
2/2,
√
3/2], and whose variance is the width of [
√
2/2,
√
3/2], truncating
so that all samples lie in the interval. We generate 100 independent random
samples zi2 for the interval [1/2, 3/4] in a similar fashion, and set z
i = (zi1, z
i
2).
Table 3.3: Comparison of the Percentage Revenue Loss of Four Policies on
the Uniform Instance
Percentage Revenue Loss
T × 103 FP Doubling MLE-C CVP
1 4.50 % 1.47 % 1.30 % 1.01 %
2 4.50 % 1.21 % 1.01 % 0.78 %
3 4.50 % 1.08 % 0.89 % 0.68 %
4 4.50 % 0.92 % 0.82 % 0.61 %
5 4.50 % 0.94 % 0.76 % 0.57 %
We see that in Tables 3.4 and 3.6, the performance of the four pricing policies
follows the same trend observed in Table 3.2 for the lower bound problem instance.
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Table 3.4: Comparison of the Switching Performance of Four Policies on the
Uniform Instance
Price Changes
T × 103 FP Doubling MLE-C CVP
1 0.0 27.0 129.0 929.7
2 0.0 30.0 183.0 1914.5
3 0.0 33.0 226.0 2905.9
4 0.0 33.0 261.0 3904.9
5 0.0 36.0 294.0 4904.9
Table 3.5: Comparison of the Percentage Revenue Loss of Four Policies on
the Gaussian Instance
Percentage Revenue Loss
T × 103 FP Doubling MLE-C CVP
1 4.07 % 1.23 % 1.21 % 1.16 %
2 4.07 % 0.99 % 0.98 % 0.92 %
3 4.07 % 0.88 % 0.87 % 0.81 %
4 4.07 % 0.75 % 0.80 % 0.75 %
5 4.07 % 0.79 % 0.76 % 0.70 %
This suggests that the problem distribution considered in regret lower bound of
Section 3.2 is not a pathological special case, and that for a number of natural
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Table 3.6: Comparison of the Switching Performance of Four Policies on the
Gaussian Instance
Price Changes
T × 103 FP Doubling MLE-C CVP
1 0.0 27.0 129.0 966.3
2 0.0 30.0 183.0 1957.4
3 0.0 33.0 225.0 2946.7
4 0.0 33.0 261.0 3939.5
5 0.0 36.0 294.0 4936.7
heuristic policies, we can expect to observe similar performance across a wide range
of problem distributions. Moreover, we see that the Doubling policy performs
well against the competing heuristics in both simulations, achieving comparable
pricing performance with a relatively small number of price adjustments.
3.7. Discussion
We considered the problem of pricing under demand uncertainty in the presence
of price-adjustment constraints. We established that under a general parametric
notion of demand uncertainty, the rate of regret of the optimal pricing strategy
is Θ(
√
T ), and that any policy that adjusts its prices according to a pre-specified
schedule must switch prices at least Ω(log T ) times to achieve this rate of regret.
We also considered a special “well-separated” case of the dynamic pricing problem,
in which the optimal rate of regret is Θ(log T ). We showed that in this scenario,
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Ω(log T ) price adjustments are still necessary for rate-optimal pricing. We con-
structed pricing policies to achieve these rates, and showed empirically that these
policies perform well with respect to alternative heuristics.
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Chapter 4
Dynamic Resource Allocation
4.1. Introduction
In this chapter, we depart from the question of how a seller should price his goods,
and consider the question of how a seller might best distribute his goods for sale,
among a number of possible selling venues. We address this problem in the context
of a general resource allocation problem, in which a decision maker possesses a fixed
number of identical units of a resource, and must allocate his units of resource
across a fixed number of venues, with the goal of maximizing the total units of
resource consumed. As a concrete example, consider a newspaper vendor with a
fixed stock of newspapers to sell. The vendor must sell the newspapers from a
fixed set of locations (newsstands and newspaper vending machines), and wishes
to maximize the total number of newspapers sold across all locations. At the
beginning of each day, the vendor must decide how many copies of the paper to
send to each venue. At the end of the day, the vendor may observe the number
of newspapers purchased from each venue, which represents the minimum of the
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demand for newspapers at that venue, and the number of newspapers allocated to
that venue at the beginning of the day. Then, the vendor may take this information
into account when deciding the allocation of newspapers to venues for the following
day.
In our example, if the vendor had perfect information about the demand at
each venue, then computing the optimal allocation each day would be straightfor-
ward (as we will see in detail in Section 4.5). However, if the vendor has some
degree of uncertainty about the demand at each venue, then the resource allocation
problem becomes more challenging. This will be the primary focus of our work:
an online version of the resource allocation problem, in which a decision maker
must allocate units of a product across the available venues without foreknowledge
of the demand. We consider strategies that offer a sequence of allocations over
multiple time periods, using observed consumption from previous time periods to
improve future allocation decisions. As in Chapters 2 and 3, these policies must
carefully balance exploration of the venues with best-guess optimal allocation, and
we will see that with the appropriate strategy, a policy can achieve nearly the same
long-run average performance as a policy which has fully information about the
demands in advance.
As our main contribution, we describe a policy for the online resource allocation
problem with independent and identically distributed demands, whose worst-case
regret is nearly rate-optimal. To our knowledge, ours is the first work to describe a
regret-optimal policy for the online resource allocation problem under any assump-
tions about the demands, advancing the state of the art for this problem (Agarwal
et al. (2010) and Ganchev et al. (2010)). We also demonstrate that our policy
performs well in numerical experiments, by evaluating them both on synthetic de-
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mand distributions, and on a variety of demand distributions coming from usage
data from a real-world vehicle-sharing network.
We now proceed to define our model primitives and notation for the single-
period resource allocation problem.
4.2. The Resource Allocation Problem
For some positive integer n, suppose that there are n locations (or venues), which
we denote by the integers i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Let m be a positive integer specifying the
number of available units of resource to be allocated, and suppose that associated
with each location, there is a demand random variable Di taking values in Z+
with an arbitrary distribution, and a capacity ci ∈ Z+. Consider the single period
optimization problem, which we refer to as the Resource Allocation Problem (RAP).
max
n∑
i=1
E[min{Di, xi}] (4.1)
s.t.
n∑
i=1
xi = m, xi ∈ {0, 1, . . . , ci} ∀ i ,
In the context of the RAP, the objective function of the optimization problem
(4.1) quantifies the total expected number of resources consumed across all venues,
when the demand for venue i is Di, and when the number of units allocated to
venue i is xi. We wish to optimize this objective over all allocations (x1, x2, . . . , xn),
such that the total number of units allocated is m, and such that the allocation
to each venue is a non-negative integer value which does not exceed the capacity
of that venue. With this interpretation, we list some example application of the
RAP.
Example 4.2.1 (Revenue Maximization). Suppose a retailer has m identical units
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of a product to sell across n possible venues during a fixed selling period. Assume
that the retailer charges a uniform price p for each unit of good across all venues,
and suppose that the demand at venue i during the selling period is given by Di.
Suppose further that the goods are perishable, and retain no salvage value after
the end of the selling period. Then if the retailer chooses to offer xi ≥ 0 units
of the good at each venue i, with
∑n
i=1 xi = m, then the total expected revenue
generated by the seller is p
∑n
i=1 E[min{Di, xi}]. Thus, the solution to the RAP is
the allocation of goods to locations that will maximize the sellers total expected
revenue during the selling period.
Example 4.2.2 (Vehicle-Sharing). In a vehicle-sharing operation, subscribers pay
a yearly fee to have access to a fleet of communal vehicles, usually located within a
single city or community. The vehicles are based at some number of fixed locations
around the community, and users may drive the vehicles for limited periods of time
on a first-come, first-serve basis. The goal of the manager in this scenario is to
choose an allocation of vehicles to locations which maximizes total usage. As in
the previous example, the observed usage at location i with demand Di and an
allocation of xi vehicles is min{Di, xi}, and the total usage across the systems
is
∑n
i=1 min{Di, xi}, and thus this is a natural resource allocation problem. We
discuss this scenario in greater detail in Section 4.8, in which we evaluate our
resource allocation policies using usage data obtained from a real-world vehicle
sharing operation.
4.3. Literature Review
The RAP described in this paper is a special case of the well-studied Simple Alloca-
tion Problem (Ibaraki and Katoh (1988)). In the general case, the reward functions
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E[min{Di, xi}] may be replaced with arbitrary functions fi(xi), and one may also
consider additional constraints on the allocations allowed. A full review of the lit-
erature on the single-period simple allocation problem is beyond the scope of this
dissertation; we refer the reader to Ibaraki and Katoh (1988), Hochbaum (1994),
and Bretthauer and Shetty (1995), and references therein for a broad overview. To
our knowledge, none of the traditional literature on the simple allocation problem
addresses the case in which the reward functions are stochastic and unknown to
the decision maker in advance, which is the primary focus of this work.
To our knowledge, the first work to analyze the ORAP is Ganchev et al. (2010).
Here, the authors consider essentially the same problem as we consider here, under
the name of “The Dark Pools Problem.” The authors describe policies based on a
modified Kaplan-Meier estimation technique, and demonstrate that with probabil-
ity 1−δ, their policy converges to an allocation whose reward is at least 1− times
the reward of the optimal allocation. The authors do not explicitly analyze the
regret of their policy; however, as noted by Agarwal et al. (2010), and as demon-
strated in our numerical section, low-regret policies such as ours can out-perform
theirs over a variety of problem instances.
Subsequent to Ganchev et al. (2010), Agarwal et al. (2010) consider this prob-
lem from a worst-case standpoint, i.e. with no distributional assumptions on the
demands. In this setting, they design algorithms that exploit the concavity of the
reward function to achieve regret that is O˜(T 2/3) with respect to the single best
fixed allocation in hindsight. The authors also present a lower bound of Ω(
√
T ),
based on arguments from Auer et al. (2003) on lower bounds for the standard
bandits problem. In this chapter, we present the IndexGreedy policy, which enjoys
a regret guarantee of O˜(√T ), nearly match the lower bound presented in Agarwal
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et al. (2010). While IndexGreedy is, to our knowledge, the first policy to achieve
such a guarantee, it is not a strict improvement upon the policy presented in Agar-
wal et al. (2010), due to the stochastic assumption that we make on the reward
functions. However, our analysis provides optimal policies for the case of inde-
pendent and identically distributed reward functions, and this is the first work to
provide matching upper and lower bounds for the ORAP under any assumptions
on the reward functions. We also demonstrate through numerical experiments
that our policies perform well with respect to those of Ganchev et al. (2010) and
Agarwal et al. (2010) over a wide range of problem instances. Finding optimal
algorithms for the worst-case version of this problem is still an open question.
Closely related to the ORAP is the stochastic multi-armed bandit problem,
studied in Lai and Robbins (1985b) and Auer et al. (2002b), and in particular,
its extension to the case of multiple plays, studied in Anantharam et al. (2002).
In fact, one may view problem of allocating m units of resource to nc possible
spaces as a variant of the problem of playing the best m of nc arms in a stochastic
multi-armed bandit problem, with the added condition that the m spaces chosen
by the policy must constitute a feasible allocation. We will discuss this connection
in detail in Section 4.5.
There is a trivial reduction from the ORAP to the standard stochastic multi-
armed bandit problem, in which each arm corresponds to a feasible allocation of
the m units of resource among the n locations. However, this would result in
a bandit problem with
(
m+n−1
n
)
arms, and ignores the structure of the reward
function. Our goal will be to design policies whose performance scales much better
with the parameters m and n.
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4.4. Model and Notation
In this section, we describe the Online Resource Allocation Problem. Recall from
Section 4.2 that for some positive integer n, there are n venues, which we denote
by the integers i = 1, 2, . . . , n. Associated with each venue is a capacity ci ∈ Z+,
which indicates the maximum number of units of resource which may be allocated
to that venue in any given time period. We let m be a positive integer denoting
the total number of available units of resource to be allocated across all venues in
a given time period.
The ORAP proceeds in time periods t = 1, 2, . . . , T, and we assume that for
each location i ∈ [n], there is a sequence of independent and identically distributed
demand random variables {Dti : t ≥ 1} taking values in Z+. We let X ti ∈ Z+
denote the number of units allocated to venue i in time period t, and we let
Xt = (X t1, . . . , X
t
n) denote the allocation in the t
th period. We say that an allocation
Xt is feasible if, with probability one,
∑n
i=1X
t
i = m, and X
t
i ≤ ci for all i ∈ [n].
For a given allocation Xt, we denote the corresponding observed rewards by Yt =
(Y t1 , . . . , Y
t
n), where Y
t
i = min{Dti , X ti}. A policy ψ for the ORAP is a sequence of
functions ψ1, ψ2, . . . such that ψt computes a feasible allocation X
t to offer in time
period t, based only on the information {(X`,Y`) : ` < t}.
For convenience of notation, for any positive integer k, we denote by [k] the set
of integers {1, . . . , k}. For i ∈ [n] and s ∈ Z+, we let F (i, s) = Pr{Di ≥ s} denote
the tail probability of the demand Di. An instance I of the ORAP is a tuple
I = (n,m, c1, . . . , cn, F (1, ·), . . . , F (n, ·)). For a location i ∈ [n] and an integer
s ∈ [ci], we will refer to the ordered pair (i, s) as a space associated with location
i. We will say that a unit of resource has been allocated to space (i, s) under
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allocation (x1, . . . , xn) if and only if xi ≥ s.
We measure the performance of a policy in terms of its regret, which is the
difference between the reward generated by the policy, and the reward generated
by an omniscient policy that knows the demand distributions in advance, and
always offers an optimal allocation. Formally, the T -period cumulative regret of a
policy ψ on a problem instance I is given by
Regret(I, ψ, T ) =
T∑
t=1
n∑
i=1
min{Dti , x∗i } −min{Dti , X ti} ,
where (x∗1, . . . , x
∗
n) denotes an optimal allocation for problem instance I, and where
(X t1, . . . , X
t
n) denotes the allocation chosen by the policy ψ at time t. Note that,
in contrast to the previous two chapters, we define the regret in this section to be
a random variable, rather than an expected value. We do this for convenience of
notation, since the results in the following sections will establish bounds on the
regret that hold with high probability. For the sake of simplicity, in the remainder
of this work, we will consider the case when ci = c for all i = 1, . . . , n; that is,
when all location can accept at most c units of resource. It is straightforward to
extend the analysis to the general case.
4.5. A Policy for the Online Resource Allocation Problem
To motive our policy for the ORAP, we will first consider the single-period, “oﬄine”
version of this problem, in which the distributions of the demands are known to
the decision maker in advance. In this case, it is known that the following greedy
policy computes an optimal allocation to the single-period problem (4.1) (see, for
example, Ganchev et al. (2010)).
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Policy Greedy(F (1, ·), . . . , F (n, ·))
Inputs: A Resource Allocation Problem Instance, and tail probabilities
F (1, ·), . . . , F (n, ·).
Initialization: Set xi = 0 for i ∈ [n].
Description: For j = 1, . . . ,m
• Set
i∗ ∈ arg max
k:xk+1≤c
{F (k, xk + 1)}
to be the index with the largest marginal increase in reward, given the cur-
rent allocations xk, and given the feasibility constraint c. (Ties are broken
arbitrarily).
• Set xi∗ ← xi∗ + 1, that is, allocate one additional unit of resource to location
i∗.
The Greedy policy is appropriately named: since we have F (k, xk + 1) =
Pr{Dk ≥ xk + 1} = E[min{Dk, xk + 1}]−E[min{Dk, xk}], the Greedy policy builds
an allocation unit-by-unit, at each step allocating a single unit of resource to the
space that will give the largest marginal increase in the objective function, given
the current allocations and feasibility constraints. Let us now note two observa-
tions about the Greedy policy that will be useful in our analysis.
Observation 1. The Greedy policy for the single-period resource allocation
problem is equivalent to the following policy: allocate one unit of resource to each
of the m spaces (i, s) with the largest tail probabilities {F (i, s) : i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c]},
This observation follows directly from the definition of the Greedy policy, and
the fact that the tail probabilities F (i, s) are non-increasing in s for all i ∈ [n].
Note that by this same fact, allocating to the m spaces (i, s) with the largest tail
probabilities {F (i, s) : i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c]} will always result in a feasible allocation.
Observation 2. If (i1, s1), . . . , (im, sm) are the indices of the m spaces with the
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largest tail probabilities {F (i, s) : i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c]}, then the reward achieved by the
Greedy policy is
∑m
j=1 F (ij, sj).
This follows from the observation that in general, if we allocate xi units to
location i, then the total reward from this location is
E[min{Di, xi}] =
∞∑
s=1
Pr{min{Di, xi} ≥ s} =
xi∑
s=1
Pr{Di ≥ s} =
xi∑
s=1
F (i, s).
To design a policy for the online version of the problem, in which the dis-
tributions of the demands are not known to the decision maker in advance, we
might consider implementing the Greedy policy at each time step, with inputs
{F̂ (i, ·) : i ∈ [n]} representing some estimates of the tail probabilities computed
from previous observations. This is in fact the approach we will take in de-
signing our policy; however, great care must be taken in choosing the estimates
{F̂ (i, ·) : i ∈ [n]}, as these values will determine the behavior of the policy.
To motivate our eventual choice of the estimates {F̂ (i, ·) : i ∈ [n]}, let us
first consider a natural choice for these values: the empirical estimates of the tail
probabilities, computed from past observations. While simple, this choice would be
poor for two primary reasons. First, such an approach would lead to the potential
under-exploration of spaces. Indeed, if the empirical estimate F̂ (i, s) of the tail
probability of a space (i, s) is computed from a small number of samples, then this
estimate could potentially be far less that the true tail probability F (i, s). Under
the greedy policy, this low estimate could prevent the space (i, s) from receiving
any further allocation, and thus the estimate F̂ (i, s) would never improve. If the
space (i, s) happened to have a large associated tail probability, then the greedy
policy would suffer large regret, due to its failure to allocate to (i, s) a sufficient
number of times.
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A second issue with this choice of the values {F̂ (i, ·) : i ∈ [n]} is that it ignores
important structural information available to the decision maker. Indeed, the fact
that the tail probabilities F (i, s) are non-increasing in s is a crucial assumption for
the optimality of the Greedy policy. Clearly, taking F̂ (i, s) to be the empirical esti-
mate of the tail probability associate with each space (i, s) will result in estimates
that are not non-increasing in s, which does not reflect the underlying structure
of the true probabilities F (i, s).
This line of reasoning suggests that the values {F̂ (i, ·) : i ∈ [n]} should posses
the following properties. First, to prevent under-exploration, the estimates F̂ (i, s)
should depend not only on the empirical tail probabilities, but also on the number
of samples used to compute the estimate. We should choose values F̂ (i, s) that
will be large if the space (i, s) is under-sampled, and will be small only if the
true value F (i, s) is small, and the space has been well-sampled. Secondly, the
values {F̂ (i, ·) : i ∈ [n]} should reflect the non-increasing structure of the true
tail probabilities. Combining these ideas leads to the IndexGreedy policy, which we
describe below.
4.5.1 The IndexGreedy Policy
Below, we present the IndexGreedy policy for the ORAP, motivated by the
discussion in the previous section. The idea of the policy is the following. In each
time period, compute an index for each space {(i, s) : i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c]}, based on
past observations, and then compute a greedy allocation based on these indices.
Our choice of the index functions is based on standard upper confidence interval
techniques (Auer et al. (2002b)), and these index functions are constructed to
exploit the non-increasing structure of the reward functions.
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Policy IndexGreedy(T )
Inputs: A Resource Allocation Problem instance, and a time horizon T.
Outputs: A sequence of feasible allocations {(X t1, . . . , X tn) : t ∈ [T ]}.
Initialization: Set F̂ (i, s) = 0 for i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c]. Define w(n, t) = 2√(log t)/n,
and let w(0, t) = 1. Description: For t = 1, 2, . . . ,
• For each (i, s) ∈ [n]× [c], define an index
Gt(i, s) = min{F̂ t(i, r) + w(N t(i, r), T ) : r ∈ [s]}.
• Perform a greedy allocation with respect to the values Gt(i, s), that is, set
(X t1, . . . , X
t
n)← Greedy(Gt(1, ·), . . . , Gt(n, ·)).
• For each i ∈ [n], observe responses Y ti = min{Dti , X ti}.
• For each (i, s) ∈ [n]× [c], update
N t(i, s) = {` ∈ [t] : X`i ≥ s} and N t(i, s) =
∣∣N t(i, s)∣∣ .
For each (i, s) ∈ [n] such that N t(i, s) > 0, set
F̂ t(i, s) =
1
N t(i, s)
∑
`∈N t(i,s)
1
{
Y `i ≥ s
}
.
In the description of the policy, the indices Gt(i, s) correspond to the values
F̂ (i, s) in the previous discussion. Note that the indices Gt(i, s) are non-increasing
in s by definition, and that they promote exploration of under-sampled spaces
using standard confidence interval techniques (Auer et al. (2002b)).
Connection to the Stochastic Bandits Problem: In light of Observa-
tions 1 and 2, one may think of our problem in terms of the classical stochastic ban-
dits problem with multiple plays (Anantharam et al. (2002)). To see this, consider
the case when c = 1, that is, when each location can hold at most one unit of re-
source. For this case, in each time period, the policy must choose a subset of m out
of n possible locations, and allocate a single unit of resource to each location in the
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chosen subset. The observed reward for allocating one unit of resource to location
i will be min{Di, 1} = 1 {Di ≥ 1} , and thus the total expected reward generated
by allocating to locations i1, . . . , im will be
∑m
`=1 E[min{Di` , 1}] =
∑m
`=1 F (i`, 1).
Thus, in this case, the problem is exactly the stochastic multi-armed bandit prob-
lem with multiple plays (Anantharam et al. (2002)), in which there are n arms
whose rewards are Bernoulli(F (i, 1)), and where in each time period, a policy
must play m distinct arms, with the goal of playing the m arms with the highest
expected rewards as frequently as possible.
Now let us consider the general case, when c ≥ 1. Given the above discussion,
we could view this problem as a stochastic bandits problem with nc arms corre-
sponding to the spaces {(i, s) : i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c]}. In this case, there is no straight-
forward reduction from the ORAP to the stochastic bandits problem with multiple
plays, because in the ORAP, the policy is not free play an arbitrary subset of m of
the nc spaces. Instead, the policy is constrained to play only those subsets of m
spaces which constitute a feasible allocation. As a consequence, the policy cannot
observe the reward associated with allocating to space (i, s) unless the policy also
allocates to all spaces {(i, r) : r ≤ s}. On the other hand, the policy has additional
information about the structure of the reward functions in the ORAP that is not
present in the standard stochastic bandits case, namely, that the mean rewards
F (i, s) are non-increasing in s for each location i ∈ [n]. Despite these differences,
this line of thinking, and the algorithms presented in Anantharam et al. (2002) for
the bandits problem with multiple plays, serve as motivation in the design of our
policies.
We now proceed to prove a regret upper bound for our policy.
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4.6. Regret Upper Bound for the Policy
The goal of this section is to prove the following theorem.
Theorem 4.6.1. For any problem instance I and any T ≥ 2, with probability at
least 1− ncT−2, we have
Regret(I, IndexGreedy(T ), T ) ≤ 8ncm
√
T log T .
Before proceeding with the proof of the theorem, we will first state three lem-
mas that will be useful in the analysis. The first lemma shows that with high
probability, the estimates F̂ t(i, s) are always close to their mean values.
Lemma 4.6.2. Let w(n, t) = 2
√
(log t)/n. With probability at least 1−ncT−2, we
have that for any T ≥ 2,∣∣∣F̂ t(i, s)− F (i, s)∣∣∣ ≤ w(N t(i, s), T ) ∀ i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c], t ∈ [T ]. (4.2)
Proof. This follows from a result of Garivier and Moulines (2008), which gives
a Hoeffding-type concentration inequality for sample means involving a random
number of summands. The proof is given in Appendix C.1.
Let us denote by E the event that condition (4.2) holds. In light of Lemma 4.6.2,
it suffices to show that the regret of the IndexGreedy policy is bounded above by
8ncm
√
T log T on the event E , and so we will restrict our attention to this event
for the remainder of the analysis. The next lemma shows that the indices Gt(i, s)
maintained by the IndexGreedy policy always exceed the true tail probabilities
F (i, s), with high probability.
Lemma 4.6.3. On the event E , we have that F (i, s) ≤ Gt(i, s) for all i ∈ [n], all
s ∈ [c], and all t ∈ [T ].
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Proof. Fix an arbitrary i, s, t. From the structure of the reward function, we have
that F (i, s) ≤ F (i, r) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ s. From Lemma 4.6.2, we have that F (i, r) ≤
F̂ t(i, r) + w(N t(i, r), T ) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ s. It follows that F (i, s) ≤ F̂ t(i, r) +
w(N t(i, r), T ) for all 1 ≤ r ≤ s, and so
F (i, s) ≤ min{F̂ t(i, r) + w(N t(i, r), T ) : r ∈ [s]} = Gt(i, s).
The last lemma is an observation about the structure of the IndexGreedy policy.
Lemma 4.6.4. The allocation of the IndexGreedy policy corresponds to allocating
the largest m spaces according to Gt(i, s).
Proof. This follows directly from the definition of the IndexGreedy policy, and the
fact that Gt(i, s) is non-increasing in s for each fixed i ∈ [n].
We now move on to bound the regret of the policy. Recall that we refer to a
pair (i, s) as a space, and the tail probability F (i, s) as the reward of that space. To
simplify notation, let us index the spaces (i1, s1), . . . , (inc, snc) in decreasing order
of their rewards. For j < k, let ∆i,k = F (ij, sj) − F (ik, sk) > 0. Let At ⊂ [nc]
denote the indices of the m spaces chosen by the IndexGreedy policy at time t; i.e.
at time t, the policy allocates to spaces {(ij, sj) : j ∈ At}. With this notation, we
know by Observation 2 that the regret of the policy is given by
T∑
t=1
(
m∑
`=1
F (i`, s`)−
∑
j∈At
F (ij, sj)
)
.
To aid in the analysis of the regret, we will now define two auxiliary quantities.
First, let It : [m]→ At be an ordering of the elements of At in decreasing order of
101
their indices Gt(i, s). In other words, It : [m]→ At is a bijection with
Gt(iIt(1), sIt(1)) ≥ Gt(iIt(2), sIt(2)) ≥ . . . ≥ Gt(iIt(m), sIt(m)).
Observe now that the regret of the policy may be written as
T∑
t=1
m∑
`=1
F (i`, s`)− F (iIt(`), sIt(`)).
Now, we define a random variable HT (`, j) in terms of the orderings It as follows:
for each ` ∈ [m] and each j ∈ [nc], let
HT (`, j) =
T∑
t=1
1 {j = It(`)} ,
Note that HT (`, j) counts the total number of time steps up to time T in which
space j was played by the policy, and in which space j had the `th highest index
among the spaces played by the policy in that time step.
The desired bound on the regret of the policy now follows from two lemmas.
In Lemma 4.6.5, we prove a bound on the regret in terms of the random vari-
ables HT (`, j). Then, in Lemma 4.6.6, we prove an upper bound on each HT (`, j).
Finally, we combine these two results to prove Theorem 4.6.1.
Lemma 4.6.5. On the event E , the regret of the IndexGreedy policy is bounded
above by
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=`+1
∆`,jH
T (`, j)
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Proof. We have for the regret
T∑
t=1
m∑
`=1
(F (i`, s`)− F (iIt(`), sIt(`))) =
T∑
t=1
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=1
(F (i`, s`)− F (ij, sj))1 {j = It(`)}
=
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=1
T∑
t=1
(F (i`, s`)− F (ij, sj))1 {j = It(`)}
=
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=1
(F (i`, s`)− F (ij, sj))HT (`, j)
≤
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=`+1
(F (i`, s`)− F (ij, sj))HT (`, j),
where the third line follows from the fact that HT (`, j) =
∑T
t=1 1 {j = It(`)} by
definition, and where the last inequality follows from the fact that F (i`, s`) −
F (ij, sj) ≤ 0 if ` ≥ j. Since we have F (i`, s`) − F (ij, sj) = ∆`,j by definition, this
proves the result.
In the following lemma, we prove an upper bound on the HT (`, j) random
variables. Combining this result with Lemma 4.6.5 will prove the theorem.
Lemma 4.6.6. Given the orderings It of the elements of At in decreasing order of
their upper confidence bounds {Gt(ij, sj) : j ∈ At}, then on the event E , we have
that
HT (`, j) ≤ min
{
64
log T
∆2`,j
, T
}
,
for any ` ∈ [m], and any j > `.
The idea of the proof is to show that if we ever have H t0(`, j) = 64 log T
∆2`,j
for some
t0 < T, then for all t ≥ t0, there will be at least ` spaces whose indices will be larger
than the index of (ij, sj) for all t ≥ t0. In this case, since the IndexGreedy policy
allocates the m spaces with the largest index, and since the ordering It orders the
spaces allocated by the policy in decreasing order of their index, we will have that
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H t(`, j) = H t0(`, j) for all t ≥ t0, i.e. that H t(`, j) will never increase beyond its
value at t0.
Proof. Suppose by way of contradiction that for all sufficiently large t, H t(ij, sj) >
64 log T/(∆2`,j). Let t0 denote the time step in which H
t0(ij, sj) = 64 log T/(∆
2
`,j).
In this case, since we have the trivial inequality N t0(ij, sj) ≥ H t0(ij, sj), we know
that N t0(ij, sj) ≥ 64 log T/(∆2`,j). By Lemma 4.6.2, we that for all t, F̂ t(ij, sj) −
F (ij, sj) ≤ w(N t(ij, sj), T ), and so it follows that F̂ t(ij, sj) + w(N t(ij, sj), T ) ≤
F (ij, sj) + 2w(N
t(ij, sj), T ). These facts together imply that for all t ≥ t0,
Gt(ij, sj) = min{F̂ t(ij, r) + w(N t(ij, r), T ) : r ∈ [sj]}
≤ F̂ t(ij, sj) + w(N t(ij, sj), T )
≤ F (ij, sj) + 2w(N t(ij, sj), T )
= F (ij, sj) + 4
√
log T
N t(ij, sj)
≤ F (ij, sj) + ∆`,j/2 ,
where the first line follows from the definition of Gt(i, s), the third line follows
from the above implication, the fourth line follows from the definition of w(n, t),
and the last line follows from the assumption that N t(ij, sj) ≥ 64 log T/(∆2`,j) for
all t ≥ t0. On the other hand, on event E , we have for all t
F (ij, sj) + ∆`,j/2 < F (ij, sj) + ∆`,j = F (i`, s`) ≤ Gt(i`, s`),
where the equality follows from the definition of ∆`,j, and where the last inequality
follows from Lemma 4.6.3. It follows from these estimates that for all t ≥ t0,
Gt(ij, sj) < G
t(i`, s`).
But note that since ` was arbitrary, and since ∆`′,j ≥ ∆`,j for `′ ≤ `, we actu-
ally have the following result: for any ` ∈ [m] and any j > `, if N t0(ij, sj) =
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64 log T/(∆2`,j), then
Gt(ij, sj) < G
t(i`′ , s`′) ∀ 1 ≤ `′ ≤ ` ∀ t ≥ t0.
But by the definition of the IndexGreedy policy, we know that if this ever occurs,
then we will have H t(`, j) = H t0(`, j) for all t ≥ t0, i.e. H t(`, j) will never increase
beyond H t0(`, j), since there will be at least ` spaces whose indices Gt(i`, s`) will
be strictly larger than the index Gt(ij, sj) of (ij, sj) for all t ≥ t0.
Now using Lemma 4.6.6 and the above analysis, we can prove the main result.
Proof of Theorem 4.6.1. Using Lemma 4.6.6 and the above analysis, we have that
on the event E , the regret of the IndexGreedy policy is bounded above by
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=`+1
(F (i`, s`)− F (ij, sj))H t(`, j) ≤
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=`+1
∆`,j min
{
64
log T
∆2`,j
, T
}
=
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=`+1
min
{
64
log T
∆`,j
,∆`,jT
}
≤
m∑
`=1
nc∑
j=`+1
√
64T log(T )
≤ 8ncm
√
T log T .
Remark 4.6.7. In Agarwal et al. (2010), the authors give a lower bound for this
problem (in the case where m = c) of Ω
(
max
{√
mnT,m
√
log(n)T
})
. The cor-
responding upper bound achieved by IndexGreedy in this case is O(m2n√T log T ),
and thus, our regret bound is tight up to a factor of m2/3n1/2
√
log T . Additionally,
IndexGreedy is the first policy to achieve a regret bound of O˜(poly(m,n, c)√T ) for
the online resource allocation problem.
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4.7. IndexGreedy-B
In this section, we describe a variant of the IndexGreedy policy, which we call
IndexGreedy-B, which shows superior performance in numerical simulations. To
motivate the design of IndexGreedy-B, let us first recall the behavior of the original
IndexGreedy policy. The IndexGreedy policy performs a greedy allocation of m units
in each time step, with respect to an index Gt. Recall that for every space (i, s), the
index Gt(i, s) contained a term that forced the index to be large in the event that
the space (i, s) had not been well-sampled. Thus, we can think of the IndexGreedy
policy as “exploring” with all m units in each time period, since all m units are
allocated with respect to the index Gt which promotes allocation to under-sampled
spaces.
The IndexGreedy-B policy operates as follows. In each time period, IndexGreedy-
B allocates m− 1 of its units according to a purely greedy index St, where St(i, s)
is simply the empirical estimate of the tail probability of space (i, s) in time period
t. Then, the policy allocates the remaining single unit of resource according to the
index Gt, which promotes allocation to under-sampled spaces. Thus, we can think
of IndexGreedy-B as “exploiting” with m−1 units of resource, and “exploring” with
only a single unit of resource, whereas the original IndexGreedy policy explores with
all m units in every time period.
A detailed description of IndexGreedy-B is given below, and we evaluate its
performance in Section .
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Policy IndexGreedyB(T )
Inputs: A Simple Allocation Problem instance, and a time horizon T.
Outputs: A sequence of feasible allocations {(X t1, . . . , X tn) : t ∈ [T ]}.
Initialization: Set F̂ (i, s) = 0 for i ∈ [n], s ∈ [c]. Define w(n, t) = 2√(log t)/n,
and let w(0, t) = 1.
Description: For t = 1, 2, . . . ,
• For each (i, s) ∈ [n]× [c], define indices
Gt(i, s) = min{F̂ t(i, r)+w(N t(i, r), T ) : r ∈ [s]} St(i, s) = min{F̂ t(i, r) : r ∈ [s]}.
• Perform a greedy allocation of m−1 units with respect to the values St(i, s),
that is, set
(X t1, . . . , X
t
n)← Greedy(St(1, ·), . . . , St(n, ·);m− 1).
• Allocate the remaining unit of resource to location i∗ satisfying
i∗ ∈ arg max
i∈[n]
Gt(i,X ti + 1).
• For each i ∈ [n], observe responses Y ti = min{Dti , X ti}.
• For each (i, s) ∈ [n]× [c], update
N t(i, s) = {` ∈ [t] : X`i ≥ s} and N t(i, s) =
∣∣N t(i, s)∣∣ .
For each (i, s) ∈ [n] such that N t(i, s) > 0, set
F̂ t(i, s) =
1
N t(i, s)
∑
`∈N t(i,s)
1
{
Y `i ≥ s
}
.
4.8. Numerical Experiments
In this section, we compare the empirical performance of the IndexGreedy policy
against that of several other heuristics, which we list below.
1. Ganchev: This is Algorithm 2 of Ganchev et al. (2010), discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1. This policy makes the same stochastic assumptions on the demand
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that are made in this paper, and is similar to the IndexGreedy policy, in that
it performs a greedy allocation in each time step with respect to some index
computed from past samples. The index used by the Ganchev policy is a
Kaplan-Meier estimator, modified to promote exploration of under-explored
venues.
2. Agarwal: This is Algorithm 2 of Agarwal et al. (2010), discussed in Sec-
tion 4.1. This policy makes no distributional assumptions on the sequence
of demand values, and instead, exploits the concavity of the reward function
to achieve a worst-case regret guarantee of O˜(T 2/3) against the best single
fixed allocation in hindsight.
3. IndexGreedyB: This is the variant of IndexGreedy described in the
previous section. IndexGreedyB maintains two indices for each space:
the upper-confidence index of IndexGreedy, and also a sample-mean based
index. At any given time period, IndexGreedyB allocates m−1 units greedily
according to the sample-mean based index, and then allocates the remaining
unit of resource according to the upper-confidence based index. Thus, at a
high level, IndexGreedyB performs less exploration than IndexGreedy,
and we will see that this modification significantly improves performance.
We compare the performance of these policies in two experiments, one involving
synthetically generated demand values, and the other involving usage data from a
vehicle-sharing network.
4.8.1 Synthetic Demand
In our first experiment, we evaluate the performance of the three policies on sim-
ulated demand random variables. For the first experiment, we set the number
108
of locations n = 5, the capacity at each location c = 10, and the total num-
ber of units of resource to be m = 10. We fix a time horizon T = 2000, and
then generate an ensemble of 100 problem instances in the following way. For
i = 1, . . . , 100, we generate a parameter vector (λi1, . . . , λ
i
n) by selecting each value
λij uniformly at random from the interval [0, 10]. We then define demand distri-
butions Di ∼ Poisson(λi), and we execute the three policies on the ensemble of
problem instances. We measure the performance of the policies in this section in
terms of the T -period percentage optimal reward, which we define to be
T 7→ 1
m
m∑
`=1
∑T
t=1
∑n
i=1 E[min{D`,ti , X ti}]
T · ∑ni=1 E[min{D`,ti , x∗i }] × 100% .
In Table 4.1, we compare the Percentage Optimal Reward for each of the policies
for several values of T. The standard error is less than 0.2% for all reported values.
Note that while the percentage optimal reward of all policies tends towards 100%,
Table 4.1: Comparison of the Percentage Optimal Reward of the heuristics
over the ensemble.
Percentage Optimal Reward
T × 102 Ganchev Agarwal IndexGreedy IndexGreedy-B
4 96.2 % 94.4 % 98.2 % 99.2 %
8 96.3 % 96.5 % 98.9 % 99.5 %
12 96.3 % 97.3 % 99.2 % 99.7 %
16 96.3 % 97.7 % 99.3 % 99.7 %
20 96.4 % 98.0 % 99.4 % 99.8 %
the IndexGreedy and IndexGreedy-B policies outperform the other two heuristics on
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this ensemble of problem instances, with IndexGreedy-B showing the best perfor-
mance out of all the heuristics. We also note that the gap in performance between
IndexGreedy and IndexGreedy-B is the largest in the earlier time periods, which
we attribute to the greater amount of exploration performed by IndexGreedy with
respect to IndexGreedy-B. Specifically, IndexGreedy uses a relatively large number
of allocations in the early time periods to explore sub-optimal but under-sampled
spaces, while IndexGreedy-B avoids this issue with a less aggressive exploration rule.
In the following section, we evaluate the performance of the heuristics using
usage data from a real-world vehicle-sharing operation.
4.8.2 Demand from a Vehicle-Sharing Network
In this section, we evaluate the empirical performance of the policies on data from
a vehicle-sharing network. We first describe the operation of the vehicle-sharing
operation in greater detail.
Vehicle-Sharing Operation: Here we summarize the logistics of the vehicle-
sharing operation from which we get our usage data. The car-sharing company
operates a fleet of 13 communal vehicles, with each vehicle assigned to a specific
physical location within the city. Users gain access to the vehicles by paying a
yearly subscription fee, plus a usage fee based on hours and milage. To use a
vehicle, customers place a reservation for a specific vehicle / location through an
online reservation system. The user must return the vehicle to its original location
at the end of their reservation period. If a total of xi vehicles are available at
location i during a given time period, and if the demand for vehicles at location i
is Di, then the vehicle sharing operation observes a total usage of min{Di, xi}. The
goal of the vehicle sharing operation is to find an allocation of vehicles to locations
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that will maximize total usage, and thus, this is naturally modeled as a resource
allocation problem.
Usage Data and Model Fitting: Since we are unable to actually implement
our policies in a real world scenario, we instead will use usage data to calibrate a
demand model, and then will simulate our policies on this model. We obtained a
year’s worth of usage data from the above vehicle-sharing operation. Each record
in the data set specifies an instance in which a given vehicle was used, and contains
the location of the vehicle, the time the reservation was placed, the time the vehicle
was checked-out, and the time the vehicle was returned.
While the logistics describe by this usage data are not fully captured by our
model, we note several observations that allow us to simplify this usage data.
First, we note that nearly all of the reservations are made within two hours of the
usage time of the vehicle. Secondly, nearly all of the trips are short in duration
(under six hours). Based on these observations, we fit a model to the vehicle-
usage data set in the following way. First, we filter the data to include only trips
with reservation lead time less than two hours, and total trip duration less the
six hours. Then, we divide the time-line into two-hour buckets, and define the
usage for a particular location and time bucket to be the number of vehicles that
were in use at that location during that time bucket. This gives us a derived data
set of censored demand information for each location, and we fit Poisson demand
random variables to this data using MLE for censored observations.
To describe the specifics of the MLE, consider a fixed location, and for a time
period t, let xt ∈ Z+ denote the number of vehicles allocated to the location during
time period t. Let U t ∈ Z+ denote the observed usage at the location during time
period t. We make the assumption that the true demand at the location during
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each time period is given by a demand random variable Dt ∼ Poisson(λ), so that
Ut = min{Dt, xt}. The likelihood of observing a sequence of usages U1, U2, . . . , UT
is given by
L(λ) =
T∏
t=1
PrP{U t;λ}1{Ut<xt}FP (xt;λ)1{Ut≥xt}.
where PrP (·;λ) denotes the Poisson probability mass function with real parameter
λ > 0, and FP (x;λ) =
∑∞
i=x PrP (i;λ). For each venue, we use numerical methods
to find a maximizer of the corresponding likelihood function over the set {λ ∈ R :
λ > 0}.
In Table 4.2, we summarize the Poisson demand model fitted to the derived
vehicle usage data. For each location, the capacity indicates the number of vehi-
cles which were made available at that location by the vehicle-sharing operation.
(In contrast to our online policies, the existing vehicle-sharing operation kept the
number of vehicles available at a given location fixed for the entire year). The
parameter λ indicates the rate of the Poisson demand random variable fitted to
the censored data, as described above. In other words, if λi is the fitted parameter
for location i, then the demand for vehicles at location i during a given time period
is given by a Poisson random variable with parameter λi.
Table 4.2: Summary of fitted demand model.
Summary of Fitted Demand Model
Location: 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9
Capacity: 3 2 2 1 1 1 1 1 1
λ: 0.349 0.358 0.518 0.159 0.157 0.163 0.221 0.088 0.125
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We execute the three policies on the Poisson demand random variables fitted
to the vehicle-sharing data. To understand how the policies will perform under an
increased load on the system, we also simulate the heuristics on Poisson demand
with parameters that are 3 times and 5 times the original fitted parameter values.
To make the simulation more realistic, we constrain the policies to adjust their
allocation only once per week, rather than once for every two-hour time block. In
the tables below, we listed the Percentage Optimal Reward of the heuristics. The
standard error in all figures reported is less than 0.2%.
Table 4.3: Comparison of the Percentage Optimal Reward of the heuristics
for the fitted values of λ.
Percentage Optimal Reward
T × 102 Ganchev Agarwal IndexGreedy IndexGreedy-B
5 87.0 % 94.6 % 85.5 % 99.2 %
10 93.2 % 94.9 % 91.6 % 99.3 %
15 95.3 % 95.0 % 94.1 % 99.4 %
20 96.3 % 95.0 % 95.5 % 99.4 %
25 96.9 % 95.1 % 96.3 % 99.4 %
30 97.4 % 95.2 % 96.9 % 99.5 %
First, we note that in all three simulations, IndexGreedy-B outperforms all other
heuristics at all time periods, which is consistent with the simulation of the previous
section. We note that on this particular problem instance, the Ganchev policy
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Table 4.4: Comparison of the Percentage Optimal Reward of the heuristics
for 3× the fitted values of λ.
Percentage Optimal Reward
T × 102 Ganchev Agarwal IndexGreedy IndexGreedy-B
5 85.3 % 89.0 % 81.1 % 98.1 %
10 92.5 % 89.6 % 90.4 % 98.8 %
15 94.5 % 89.8 % 93.6 % 99.2 %
20 96.2 % 90.1 % 95.2 % 99.4 %
25 96.9 % 90.2 % 96.2 % 99.5 %
30 97.4 % 90.3 % 96.8 % 99.6 %
slightly outperforms IndexGreedy; this is in contrast to the results on the synthetic
data, which showed that when averaged over a large number of problem instances,
the performance of IndexGreedy is better. Finally, we note that in nearly all cases,
the performance of a particular heuristic at a particular time decreases as the
load of the systems increases. Intuitively, as the demand for vehicles increases,
there is a greater difference in reward between a poor allocation and an optimal
allocation. In other words, when demand is high, there is a greater opportunity
cost for offering a sub-optimal allocation.
4.8.3 A Second Fitted Demand Model
In the previous section, we adopted a simple approach to fitting a demand model
to the vehicle-sharing usage data, which preserved the i.i.d. assumptions on the
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Table 4.5: Comparison of the Percentage Optimal Reward of the heuristics
for 5× the fitted values of λ.
Percentage Optimal Reward
T × 102 Ganchev Agarwal IndexGreedy IndexGreedy-B
5 86.1 % 86.0 % 79.3 % 98.4 %
10 93.1 % 87.2 % 89.5 % 99.0 %
15 95.4 % 87.6 % 93.0 % 99.3 %
20 96.5 % 87.9 % 94.7 % 99.5 %
25 97.2 % 88.1 % 95.8 % 99.6 %
30 97.7 % 88.4 % 96.5 % 99.6 %
demand that are made in this chapter. While the model derived from this approach
accurately reflects the amount of usage of each vehicle, it does not capture the
dependence between time periods of vehicle usage. Indeed, since vehicles are used
in contiguous blocks of time, then the usage in a given time period is dependent on
usage in previous time periods. This effect was mitigated in the previous section by
filtering out longer trips and bucketing the time periods into large blocks; however,
it leaves open the question of how the heuristics would perform on more realistic
demand sequences.
In this section, we adopt an alternative stochastic model for vehicle demand,
which does not satisfy the i.i.d. assumption on demand, and which better reflects
the usage patters of vehicles observed in the data set. During a given time period
t, at a given location i, we assume that a random number Dti of customers wish
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to begin a trip using a vehicle stationed at location i, where Dti ∼ Poisson(λi)
for some parameter λi. We assume that each of the D
t
i customers wishes to use
the vehicle for a specific length of time, and this length is also random with an
arbitrary distribution. We can easily simulate vehicle demand using this model:
in each time period, we draw a random number of customers Dti , and for each
customer, we draw a random trip duration, and these data together contribute to
the demand for vehicles at the given location from time period t, to some future
time period at which all of the trips beginning in time period t have ended.
To fit the parameters λi, we count for each time period the number of trips
started in that time period (as opposed to the number of vehicles in use during that
time period, as done in the previous section), and assume this number is a random
variable with distribution Poisson(λi). If there are no vehicles available at a given
location and time, we are unable to observe whether a customer wishes to begin
a trip, so we ignore time periods in which a location has no available vehicles for
the purposes of estimation. (The proportion of time periods in which no vehicles
are available at a given location is relatively small, and so the estimates produced
in this way still provide a reasonable approximation to the number of customer
arrivals). To generate a random trip length for a given location, we simply draw a
length from the empirical distribution of trip lengths observed in the data.
In Table 4.6, we plot the total cumulative reward of the four heuristics, averaged
over 25 demand sequences randomly generated according to the model above. Note
that in this simulation, one time period corresponds to a fifteen-minute segment,
as we do not perform the two-hour bucketing done in the previous section. Here,
one unit of reward corresponds to satisfying one unit of demand in a single time
period. As in the previous section, all policies are constrained to updated their
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allocation once per week, and the standard error in all figures reported is less that
80.
Table 4.6: Comparison of the Average Cumulative Reward of the heuristics
for the simulated demand sequence.
Average Cumulative Reward
T × 103 Ganchev Agarwal IndexGreedy IndexGreedy-B
1 1076 1577 1071 1645
3 4224 4827 3927 4965
5 7462 7997 7134 8213
7 10744 11201 10397 11492
9 14119 14482 13777 14870
We note that, although the demand in this model is not i.i.d across time periods,
the IndexGreedy-B policy still outperforms the other heuristics. We also see that
the Agarwal policy performs nearly as well as the IndexGreedy-B policy in this
simulation; this is to be expected, since the Agarwal policy is designed to perform
well on demand sequences that do not satisfy the i.i.d. assumption. These results
suggest that even for demand sequences that are not perfectly independent between
time periods, we can still expect reasonably good performance from the index-type
strategies considered in this chapter.
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4.9. Discussion
In this chapter, we considered the online resource allocation problem, and intro-
duced the IndexGreedy policy for this problem. We established a regret upper
bound for IndexGreedy that matches a known regret lower bound for this prob-
lem, demonstrating that IndexGreedy has regret which is rate-optimal. To our
knowledge, this is the first regret-optimal policy for the online resource alloca-
tion problem. We demonstrated that the IndexGreedy policy performs well in
numerical simulations, both on synthetic data, and on a demand simulator cali-
brated on a real-world data set from a vehicle-sharing operation. We also described
a variant of our policy, called IndexGreedyB, which exhibits significantly better
performance in numerical experiments by performing more judicious exploration
of venues. Designing policies with strong regret guarantees for the case of non-
stationary demand distributions is a compelling open question.
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Appendix A
Proofs from Chapter 2
A.1. Proofs from Section 2.3.1
The proof of Lemmas 2.3.3 and 2.3.4 will make use of the following properties of
the problem class C define in the statement of Theorem 2.3.1.
Lemma A.1.1 (Properties of C). For all p ∈ P and z ∈ Z,
1. p∗(z) = (1 + 2z)/(4z)
2. p∗(z0) = 1 for z0 = 1/2.
3. d(p∗(z0); z) = 1/2 for all z ∈ Z
4. r(p∗(z); z)− r(p; z) ≥ 1
3
(p∗(z)− p)2
5. |p∗(z)− p∗(z0)| ≥ 14 |z − z0|
6. |d(p; z)− d(p; z0)| ≤ |p∗(z0)− p| |z − z0|
Proof. Property 1 follows from checking first and second order optimality condi-
tions of the revenue function r(p; z) = pd(p; z). Properties 2 and 3 follow by simple
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calculations using the formulas for p∗(z) and d(p; z). Property 4 follows from the
fact that r′(p∗(z); z) = 0 and r′′(p; z) = −2z ≤ −2/3 for all (p, z) ∈ P × Z. Prop-
erty 5 follows from an application of the Mean Value Theorem, and the fact that
d
dz
p∗(z) = −1/(4z2) ≤ −1/4 for all z ∈ Z. Finally, Property 6 follows from the
calculation
|d(p; z)− d(p; z0)| = |1/2 + z − pz − 1/2− z0 + pz0| = |z − z0| · |1− p|
= |z − z0| · |p∗(z0)− p|
since p∗(z0) = 1 by construction.
The proof of Lemma 2.3.3 also makes use of the following standard results,
which gives an upper bound on the KL-divergence between two Bernoulli distri-
butions.
Lemma A.1.2 (Corollary 3.1 in Taneja and Kumar (2004)). Suppose B1 and B2
are distributions of Bernoulli random variables with parameters q1 and q2, respec-
tively, with q1, q2 ∈ (0, 1). Then
K(B1;B2) ≤ (q1 − q2)
2
q2(1− q2) .
A.1.1 Proof of Lemma 2.3.3
Consider a policy ψ setting prices in P = [3/4, 5/4] and some s ≥ 1. To prove the
lemma, we appeal to the Chain Rule for KL divergence (Theorem 2.5.3, Cover and
Thomas (1999)), which states that
K(Qψ,z0t ;Qψ,zt ) =
t∑
s=1
K(Qψ,z0s ;Qψ,zs |Ys−1),
where each term in the sum is the conditional KL divergence, defined as
K(Qψ,z0s ;Qψ,zs |Ys−1) =
∑
ys∈{0,1}s
Qψ,z0s (ys) log
(
Qψ,z0s (ys|ys−1)
Qψ,zs (ys|ys−1)
)
.
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In light of this fact, we may prove the inequality of the lemma as follows. First,
show that the conditional KL divergence in each time period is bounded above by
the instantaneous regret in that time period (times some additional terms), and
then apply the Chain Rule to show that the total KL divergence is bounded above
by the cumulative regret (times additional terms).
To proceed along these lines, let ps = ψ(ys−1). We have
K(Qψ,z0s ;Qψ,zs |Ys−1)
=
∑
ys∈{0,1}s
Qψ,z0s (ys) log
(
Qψ,z0s (ys|ys−1)
Qψ,zs (ys|ys−1)
)
=
∑
ys−1∈{0,1}s−1
Qψ,z0s−1 (ys−1)
∑
ys∈{0,1}
Qψ,z0s (ys|ys−1) log
(
Qψ,z0s (ys|ys−1)
Qψ,zs (ys|ys−1)
)
≤ 1
d(ps; z) (1− d(ps; z))
∑
ys∈{0,1}s−1
Qψ,z0s−1 (ys−1) (d(ps; z0)− d(ps; z))2 ,
≤ 3
16
∑
ys∈{0,1}s−1
Qψ,z0s−1 (ys−1) (d(ps; z0)− d(ps; z))2 .
The first line follows from the definition of conditional KL divergence. The sec-
ond line follows from an algebraic manipulation using the relation Qψ,z0s (ys) =
Qψ,z0s (ys|ys−1)Qψ,z0s (ys−1), and the fact that Qψ,z0s (ys−1) = Qψ,z0s−1 (ys−1). The third
line follows from Lemma A.1.2 and the fact that
Qψ,z0s (ys|ys−1) = d(ps; z0)ys(1− d(ps; z0))1−ys ,
and the fourth line follows from the fact that d(p; z) ∈ [1/4, 3/4] for all p ∈ P and
z ∈ Z.
By Property 6 in Lemma A.1.1, we have that (d(ps; z0)− d(ps; z))2 ≤ (z0 −
z)2 (p∗(z0)− ps)2, which implies
K(Qψ,z0s ;Qψ,zs |Ys−1) ≤
3
16
(z0 − z)2
∑
ys∈{0,1}s−1
Qψ,z0s−1 (ys−1) (p
∗(z0)− ps)2
=
3
16
(z0 − z)2 Ez0
[
(p∗(z0)− Ps)2
]
.
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Summing over all s and using the Chain Rule for KL-divergence, we have that
K(Qψ,z0t ;Qψ,zt ) =
t∑
s=1
K(Qψ,z0s ;Qψ,zs |Ys−1) ≤
3
16
(z0 − z)2
t∑
s=1
Ez0
[
(p∗(z0)− Ps)2
]
≤ 9
16
(z0 − z)2
t∑
s=1
Ez0 [r(p∗(z0); z0)− r(Ps; z0)]
≤ 9
16
(z0 − z)2 Regret(z0, C, t, ψ) ,
where the last inequality follows from Property 4 in Lemma A.1.1. This concludes
the proof.
We now proceed to the proof of Lemma 2.3.4. The proof of this lemma uses
the following standard result on the minimal error of a two-hypothesis test, which
is derived from Theorem 2.2 of Tsybakov (2009).
Lemma A.1.3 (Theorem 2.2, Tsybakov (2009)). Let Q0 and Q1 be two probability
distributions on a finite space Y , with Q0(y), Q1(y) > 0 for all y ∈ Y . Then for
any function J : Y → {0, 1},
Q0{J = 1}+Q1{J = 0} ≥ 1
2
e−K(Q0;Q1),
where K(Q0;Q1) denotes the KL divergence of Q0 and Q1.
A.1.2 Proof of Lemma 2.3.4
Let z0 = 1/2 be as in Lemma A.1.1, and fix a time horizon T ≥ 2. Let z1 =
z0 +
1
4
T−1/4, and define two intervals Cz0 ⊂ P and Cz1 ⊂ P by
Cz0 =
{
p : |p∗(z0)− p| ≤ 1
48T 1/4
}
and Cz1 =
{
p : |p∗(z1)− p| ≤ 1
48T 1/4
}
.
Note that Cz0 and Cz1 are disjoint, since Property 5 in Lemma A.1.1 gives that
|p∗(z0)− p∗(z1)| ≥ 14 |z0 − z1| = 116T 1/4 . It follows from Property 4 in Lemma A.1.1
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that for each z ∈ {z0, z1}, if p ∈ P \ Cz, then the instantaneous regret is at least
1
3(482)
√
T
because
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p; z) ≥ 1
3
(p− p∗(z))2 ≥ 1
3(48)2
√
T
=
1
3(48)2 · √T .
Let P1, P2, . . . denote the sequence of prices under the policy ψ. Then,
Regret (z0, C, T, ψ) + Regret (z1, C, T, ψ)
≥
T−1∑
t=1
Ez0 [r(p∗(z0); z0)− r(Pt+1; z0)] + Ez1 [r(p∗(z1); z1)− r(Pt+1; z1)]
≥ 1
3(48)2 · √T
T−1∑
t=1
Prz0 {Pt+1 /∈ Cz0}+ Prz1 {Pt+1 /∈ Cz1}
≥ 1
3(48)2 · √T
T−1∑
t=1
Prz0 {Jt+1 = 1}+ Prz1 {Jt+1 = 0} ,
where for all t ≥ 1, Jt+1 = 1 {Pt+1 ∈ Cz1} is a binary random variable that takes
the value of 1 when Pt+1 is in Cz1 , and zero otherwise. The second inequality
follows from the fact that when Jt+1 = 1, we have Pt+1 ∈ Cz1 ⊂ P \ Cz0 , and thus
Pt+1 /∈ Cz0 , so that Prz0 {Jt+1 = 1} ≤ Prz0 {Pt+1 /∈ Cz0}. Now a standard result
on the minimum error in a simple hypothesis test (Lemma A.1.3) implies that for
all t,
Prz0 {Jt+1 = 1}+ Prz1 {Jt+1 = 0} ≥
1
2
e
−K
(
Q
ψ,z0
t ;Q
ψ,z1
t
)
.
Now putting things together and summing over t, we have
Regret(z0, C, T, ψ) + Regret(z1, C, T, ψ) ≥ 1
3(48)2
√
T
· 1
2
T−1∑
t=1
e
−K
(
Q
ψ,z0
t ;Q
ψ,z1
t
)
≥ 1
3(48)2
√
T
· T − 1
2
e
−K
(
Q
ψ,z0
T ;Q
ψ,z1
T
)
≥
√
T
12(482)
e
−K
(
Q
ψ,z0
T ;Q
ψ,z1
T
)
.
where the second inequality follows from the standard fact that K
(
Qψ,z0t ;Q
ψ,z1
t
)
is non-decreasing in t (see, for example, Theorems 2.5.3 and 2.6.3 in Cover
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and Thomas (1999)), and the third inequality follows from the fact that (T −
1)/(2
√
T ) ≥ √T/4 for all T ≥ 2. This completes the proof.
A.2. Proof of Lemma 2.3.7
The proof of Lemma 2.3.7 is a direct application of the following standard result
on the finite-sample mean-squared error of a maximum-likelihood estimator.
Theorem A.2.1 (Tail Inequality for MLE based on IID Samples, Theorem 36.3
in Borovkov (1998)). Let Z ⊂ Rn be compact and convex, and let {Qz : z ∈ Z} be
family of distributions on a discrete sample space Y parameterized by Z. Suppose
Y is a random variable taking value in Y with distribution Qz, and the following
conditions hold.
(i) The family {Qz : z ∈ Z} is identifiable.
(ii) For some s > k, supz∈Z Ez [‖∇ logQz(Y )‖s] = γ <∞.
(iii) The function z 7→ √Qz is differentiable on Z.
(iv) The Fisher information matrix, whose (i, j)th entry is given by
Ez
[
− ∂2
∂zi∂zj
logQz(Y)
]
, is positive definite.
Let Y1, Y2, . . . be a sequence of i.i.d. random variables taking value in Y with
distribution Qz, and let Ẑ(t) = arg maxz∈Z
∏t
`=1Q
z(Y`) denote the maximum
likelihood estimate based on t i.i.d. samples. Then, there exists a constants η1 > 0
and η2 > 0 depending only on s, k, Q
z and Z such that for any t ≥ 1 and any
 ≥ 0,
Prz
{∥∥∥Ẑ(t)− z∥∥∥ ≥ } ≤ η1 e−tη2 2 .
To apply Theorem A.2.1 to our setting, we first check that the hypothesis hold
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for the family {Qp¯,z : z ∈ Z} for the exploration prices p¯ satisfying Assumption
2. For any problem class C = (P ,Z, d), the parameter set Z is compact and
convex, by assumption. Conditions (i) and (iv) hold by Assumption 2, so it is
enough to check conditions (ii) and (iii). To verify condition (ii), recall that for
any y ∈ {0, 1}k,
Qp¯,z(y) =
k∏
`=1
d(p¯`; z)
y`(1− d(p¯`; z))1−y` ,
where d : P × Z → [dmin, dmax] is smooth, with dmin, dmax ∈ (0, 1). Thus, we have
∇ logQp¯,z(y) = ∇
k∑
`=1
logQp¯`,z(y`) =
k∑
`=1
y`∇ log d(p¯`; z)+(1−y`)∇ log(1−d(p¯`; z)),
and it follows that∥∥∇ logQp¯,z(y)∥∥ ≤ k∑
`=1
‖∇ log d(p¯`; z)‖+ ‖∇ log(1− d(p¯`; z))‖ .
Now since d(p¯; ·) is a smooth function that is bounded away from zero and one,
we have that ∇ log d(p¯`; z) and ∇ log(1 − d(p¯`; z)) are smooth functions on the
compact set Z for each `, and it follows that there exists a constant D¯3 depending
only on the problem instance C such that ‖∇ logQp¯,z(y)‖ ≤ D¯3. It follows that
with probability one, we have ‖∇ logQp¯,z(y)‖s ≤ D¯s, which is the desired result.
To verify condition (iii), note that Qp,z(y) is smooth on P × Z, since Qp,z(y)
is a product of smooth functions on P ×Z. We also have that Qp,z(y) is bounded
away from zero, since Qp,z(y) ≥ (dmin)k, so it follows that z 7→
√
Qp,z(y) is
differentiable on Z for any p ∈ Pk. Thus, we also have that z 7→ √Qp¯,z(y) is
differentiable on Z.
Now the result of Lemma 2.3.7 follows from a direct application of this theorem.
Since the estimator Ẑ(c) is formed from c i.i.d. samples, we have by Theorem A.2.1
Ez
[∥∥∥Ẑ(c)− z∥∥∥2] = ∫ ∞
0
Prz
{∥∥∥Ẑ(c)− z∥∥∥2 ≥ u} du ≤ ∫ ∞
0
η1e
−cη2u du =
η1
cη2
.
Taking Cmle = η1/η2 proves the claim.
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A.3. Proof of Lemma 2.4.6
The proof of Lemma 2.4.6 depends on van Trees’ inequality, which we state below.
Lemma A.3.1 (van Trees’ Inequality, Gill and Levit (1995)). For a closed interval
Z ⊂ R, let {Qz : z ∈ Z} be a family of distributions on a discrete sample space
Y , and let Z be a random variable taking values in Z with density λ : Z → R+.
Suppose that the following conditions hold:
1. For each y ∈ Y , the function z 7→ Qz(y) is absolutely continuous on Z.
2. λ is absolutely continuous on Z, and λ→ 0 at the endpoints of Z.
3. Ez
[
d
da
logQz(Y )
]
= 0
where Ez denotes expectation of the random variable Y having the distribution Qz.
Then, for any smooth function g : Z → R and any function gˆ : Y → R,
E[(gˆ(Y )− g(Z))2] ≥ (E[
d
dz
g(Z)])2
E
[(
d
dz
logQZ(Y )
)2]
+ E
[(
d
da
log λ(Z)
)2] , (A.1)
where E[ · ] denotes the expectation with respect to the joint distribution of Qz and
λ.
To apply the above result to our setting, recall the problem class C = (P ,Z, d)
defined in Theorem 2.4.5, which has P = [1/3, 1/2], Z = [2, 3], and d(p; z) =
1−(pz)/2. For any policy ψ setting prices in P and any t ≥ 1, we define the sample
space to be Y = {0, 1}t, and we consider the family of distributions
{
Qψ,zt : z ∈ Z
}
,
where Qψ,zt : {0, 1}t → [0, 1] is the distribution of customer decisions induced by
the policy ψ up to time t. That is,
Qψ,zt =
t∏
`=1
(1− (p`z)/2)y`((p`z)/2)1−y` .
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A convenient choice of the density λ(z) : [2, 3]→ R+ is λ(z) = 2{cos(pi(z−5/2))}2.
To check that the hypotheses of Lemma A.3.1 hold under these assumptions,
note that Conditions 1 and 2 of Lemma A.3.1 follow immediately from our con-
struction. Condition 3 is also satisfied because
Ez
[
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Yt)
]
=
∑
yt∈{0,1}t
(
d
dz
Qψ,zt (yt)
Qψ,zt (yt)
)
Qψ,zt (yt) =
d
dz
∑
yt∈{0,1}t
Qψ,zt (yt)
=
d
dz
(1) = 0 .
By checking first and second order optimality conditions, it is straightforward to
check that p∗(z) = 1/z, and so p∗(z) is a smooth function of z on Z. Therefore
all of the conditions of Lemma A.3.1 are satisfied, and we can apply van Trees’
Inequality to our problem.
To complete the proof, we will now compute the values on the right-hand side
of van Trees’ inequality (Equation A.1) for our specific problem. Since p∗(z) = 1/z,
we have that d
dz
p∗(z) = 1/z2 ≥ 1/9 for all z ∈ Z. It follows that (E[ d
dz
p∗(z)])2 ≥
1/81. Recalling that λ(z) = 2{cos(pi(z − 5/2))}2, it is straightforward to compute
that
E
[(
d
dz
log λ(Z)
)]
= 8pi2
∫ 3
2
{sin(pi(z − 5/2))}2 dz = 4pi2.
Finally, for any z ∈ Z, we may compute that
Ez
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Yt)
) ∣∣∣∣Yt−1 = yt−1] = pz(2− pz) ≤ (1/2)2(2− 3/2) = 12 ,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that p ∈ P and z ∈ Z. Applying
the Chain Rule for Fisher Information (Lemma A.5.2), we have
Ez
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Yt)
)2]
≤ t
2
.
Since Pt+1 = ψt+1(Yt), we may apply Lemmas A.3.1 to get
E[(p∗(z)− Pt+1)2] ≥ (1/81)
4pi2 + t/2
≥ 1
81(4pi2 + 1/2)
· 1
t
≥ 1
405pi2
· 1
t
,
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which is the desired result.
A.4. Proof of Theorem 2.4.7
In contrast to the general case, MLE-GREEDY forms an estimate of the unknown
parameter based on samples which are not i.i.d. Thus, we need to develop a new
bound for our estimate. The proof is motivated by techniques for establishing
finite-sample deviation inequalities for maximum likelihood estimators; see, for
example, Borovkov (1998), Theorem 33.3.
The analysis depends on estimates of the Hellinger distance. For any t ≥ 1 and
yt−1 ∈ {0, 1}t−1, we define the conditional Hellinger distance
HG(z, u|yt−1) =
∑
yt∈{0,1}
(√
QG,zt (yt|yt−1)−
√
QG,z+ut (yt|yt−1)
)2
,
for all pairs z ∈ Z and u ∈ Z − z. Note that QG,zt (yt|yt−1) denotes the probability
that Yt = yt conditioned on the event that Yt−1 = yt−1, when the policy G is used
and the parameter is z.
Lemma A.4.1 (Hellinger Distance Lower Bound). There exists a constant cH
depending only on the problem class C = (P ,Z, d) such that for any t ≥ 1 and any
yt−1 ∈ {0, 1}t−1, and for all pairs z ∈ Z and u ∈ Z − z,
HG(z, u|yt−1) ≥ cH · u2.
Proof. By Corollary 4.3 of Taneja and Kumar (2004), we have the following lower
bound on the conditional Hellinger distance in terms of the KL divergence.
HG(z, u|yt−1) ≥
√
dmin
2
K(Qψ,zt ( · |yt−1);Qψ,z+ut ( · |yt−1)) =
√
dmin
2
K(Qpt,z;Qpt,z+u),
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where pt = ψt(yt−1). So, to prove the desired lower bound, it is enough to prove a
quadratic lower bound on the function u 7→ K(Qpt,z;Qpt,z+u). To do this, first note
that
∂2
∂u2
K(Qpt,z;Qpt,z+u) = ∂
2
∂u2
Ez
[
log
(
Qpt,z(Y )
Qpt,z+u(Y )
)]
= Ez
[
− ∂
2
∂u2
logQpt,z+u(Y )
]
,
and by Assumption 3, this term is bounded below by cf > 0 for all pt ∈ P and all
z ∈ Z. Also, we have that
∂
∂u
K(Qpt,z;Qpt,z+u)∣∣
u=0
= −Ez
[
∂
∂u
logQpt,z+u(Y )
∣∣
u=0
]
= 0
by a straightforward calculation. It follows from a standard result that
K(Qpt,z;Qpt,z+u) ≥ cf
2
u2
for all u ∈ Z − z. Taking cH = cf
√
dmin/4 proves the claim.
For all pairs z ∈ Z and u ∈ Z − z, let the likelihood ratio XG,zt (u) and the
conditional likelihood ratio XG,zt (u
∣∣Yt−1) be defined by
XG,zt (u) =
QG,z+ut (Yt)
QG,zt (Yt)
and XG,zt (u
∣∣Yt−1) = QG,z+ut (Yt ∣∣ Yt−1)
QG,zt (Yt
∣∣ Yt−1) .
The following lemma gives an upper bound on a moment of the likelihood ratio.
Lemma A.4.2 (Likelihood Ratio Moment Inequality). For all pairs z ∈ Z and
u ∈ Z − z, and t ≥ 1, we have
Ez
[√
XG,zt (u|Yt−1)
∣∣∣∣ Yt−1] ≤ e−cHu2/2 ,
with probability one, and
Ez
[√
XG,zt (u)
]
≤ e−cH tu2/2.
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Proof. To establish the first inequality, note that for all yt−1 ∈ {0, 1}t−1,
Ez
[√
XG,zt (u|Yt−1)
∣∣∣∣ Yt−1 = yt−1] = ∑
yt∈{0,1}
√
QG,z+ut (yt | yt−1)
QG,zt (yt | yt−1)
·QG,zt (yt | yt−1)
=
∑
yt∈{0,1}
√
QG,z+ut (yt | yt−1)
√
QG,zt (yt | yt−1)
= 1− H(z, u|yt−1)
2
≤ e−H(z,u|yt−1)/2 ≤ e−cHu2/2 ,
which gives the desired result. Note that the last equality follows from the defini-
tion of H(z, u|yt−1) which shows that
HG(z, u|yt−1) =
∑
yt∈{0,1}
(√
QG,zt (yt|yt−1)−
√
QG,z+ut (yt|yt−1)
)2
= 2
(
1−
∑
yt∈{0,1}
√
QG,zt (yt|yt−1)
√
QG,z+ut (yt|yt−1)
)
We will establish the second inequality of Lemma A.4.2 by induction on t. The
case when t = 1 follows immediately from the above calculation. So, assume the
claim holds for t− 1, that is,
Ez
[√
XG,zt−1(u)
]
≤ e−(t−1)cHu2/2
Now, by definition, we have that
Ez
[√
XG,zt (u)
]
= Ez
[√
XG,zt−1(u) ·
√
XG,zt (u|Yt−1)
]
= Ez
[√
XG,zt−1(u) · Ez
[√
XG,zt (u|Yt−1)
∣∣∣∣ Yt−1] ]
≤ e−cHu2/2 · Ez
[√
Ez[XG,zt−1(u)]
]
≤ e−tcHu2/2 ,
where the first inequality follows from the first part of Lemma A.4.2, and the final
inequality follows from the inductive hypothesis. This completes the proof.
Here is the proof of Theorem 2.4.7.
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Proof. Consider an arbitrary z ∈ Z. For all u ∈ Z−z, let LG,zt (u) = − logXG,zt (u).
By Assumption 4, LG,zt (u) is globally convex in u. Moreover, it is easy to verify
that LG,zt (0) = 0. It follows from the definition of Ẑ(t) that
Ẑ(t) = arg max
v∈Z
QG,vt (Yt) = z + arg max
u∈Z−z
XG,zt (u) = z + arg min
u∈Z−z
LG,zt (u)
Therefore, for any δ ∈ Z − z, if |Ẑ(t) − z| > |δ|, then the minimizer of LG,zt ( · )
must be outside the interval [−δ, δ], which implies that either LG,zt (δ) ≤ 0 or
LG,zt (−δ) ≤ 0. Hence, for any δ ∈ Z − z, we have that
Prz{|Ẑ(t)− z| ≥ |δ|} ≤ Prz{LG,zt (δ) ≤ 0}+ Prz{LG,zt (−δ) ≤ 0} .
By Markov’s Inequality and Lemma A.4.2, it follows that
Prz{LG,zt (δ) ≤ 0} = Prz{XG,zt (δ) ≥ 1} = Prz
{√
XG,zt (δ) ≥ 1
}
≤ Ez
[√
XG,zt (δ)
]
≤ e−tcHδ2/2 .
A similar argument shows that Prz{LG,zt (−δ) < 0} ≤ e−tcHδ2/2, which implies that
for any δ ∈ Z − z,
Prz{|Ẑ(t)− z| > |δ|} ≤ 2 e−tcHδ2/2 .
Thus, for any 0 <  ≤ max{|x| : x ∈ Z − z}, we have that
Prz{|Ẑ(t)− z| > } ≤ 2e−tcH2/2 .
On the other hand, if  > max{|x| : x ∈ Z − z}, then Prz{|Ẑ(t)− z| > } = 0 by
definition. This gives the desired result.
The upper bound on the mean squared error follows immediately because
Ez[(Ẑ(t)− z)2] =
∫ ∞
0
Prz{(Ẑ(t)− z)2 > u} du ≤ 2
∫ ∞
0
e−tcH u/2 du =
4
cH
· 1
t
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A.5. Proofs of Auxiliary Results
A.5.1 Proof of Remark 2.4.1
By Lemma A.1.2, we have that
(d(p; z)− d(p; z + u))2 ≥ dmin(1− dmax)K(Qp,z;Qp,z+u) .
Now by applying the arguments of Lemma A.4.1 and using Assumption 3, we have
that
K(Qp,z;Qp,z+u) ≥ cf
2
u2.
Choosing cd = dmin(1− dmax)cf/2 establishes the inequality.
A.5.2 Chain Rule for Fisher Information
It is a standard result (e.g. Cover and Thomas, 1999, Exercise 11.19) that for
distributions satisfying mild regularity assumptions (which are satisfied in our
model), the Fisher information may also be written as
Ez
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Yt)
)2]
= −Ez
[
d2
dz2
logQψ,zt (Yt)
]
,
So it follows that
Ez
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Yt)
)2]
= −Ez
[
d2
dz2
log
t∏
`=1
Qψ,zt (Y` | Y`−1)
]
=
t∑
`=1
−Ez
[
d2
dz2
logQψ,zt (Y` | Y`−1)
]
=
t∑
`=1
Ez
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Y` | Y`−1)
)2]
.
This completes the proof.
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Appendix B
Proofs from Chapter 3
B.1. Proof of Lemma 3.2.2
It is easy to check that for any p ∈ P and z ∈ Z, we have p∗(z) = 1/(2√z),
r′(p∗(z); z) = 0 and r′′(p; z) = −2z. These facts together imply that for any z ∈ Z,
r(p∗(z); z)− r(p; z) ≥ 1
2
inf
z∈Z
|r′′(p; z)| (p∗(z)− p)2 ≥ (1/3)(p∗(z)− p)2. (B.1)
Thus, to establish the inequality of Lemma 3.2.2, it suffices to establish a lower
bound on the mean squared error E[(p∗(Z) − Pt)2]. Recall that Pt = ψt(Yt−1) is
a function of the random variable Yt−1, or in other words, an estimator of the
unknown parameter z. Note also that the optimal price p∗(z) is an absolutely
continuous function of z. With this interpretation, we may appeal to a standard
result on the minimum mean-squared Bayes risk of an arbitrary estimator (van
Trees’ inequality, Theorem 2, Gill and Levit (1995)) to conclude that
E[(p∗(Z)− Pt+1)2] ≥
(
E[ d
dz
p∗(Z)]
)2
E
[(
d
dz
logQψ,Zt (Yt)
)2]
+ E
[(
d
dz
log λ(Z)
)2] , (B.2)
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To establish the desired inequality, we note that since d
dz
p∗(z) = −1/(4z3/2) ≤
−1/3 for all z ∈ [1/3, 2/3], we have (E [ d
dz
p∗(Z)
])2 ≥ 1/9. Also, it is easy to check
that
E
[(
d
dz
log λ(Z)
)2]
= 216pi2
∫ 2/3
1/3
sin(3pi(z − 1/2))2 dz = 36pi2.
Combining these estimates with (B.1) and (B.2) proves the lemma.
B.2. Proof of Lemma 3.2.3
To prove the inequality of Lemma 3.2.3, we will use Lemma A.5.2, which states
that
Ez0
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Yt)
∣∣
z=z0
)2]
=
t∑
`=1
Ez0
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Y`|Y`−1)
∣∣
z=z0
)2]
.
Using the chain rule, it suffices to show that for each 1 ≤ ` ≤ t, the instantaneous
regret satisfies
Ez0
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Y`|Y`−1)
∣∣
z=z0
)2]
≤ 30Ez0 [r(p∗(z0); z0)− r(P`; z0)] .
To establish this inequality, recall from the proof of Lemma 3.2.2 that for the
lower bound instance of Section 3.2, given by P = [√2/2,√3, 2], Z = [1/3, 2/3],
and d(p; z) =
√
z − pz, we have p∗(z) = 1/(2√z). Also, recall that for this lower
bound instance, we have by definition that for any 1 ≤ ` ≤ t,
Qψ,zt (y` = 1|y`−1) =
√
z − p`z and Qψ,zt (y` = 0|y`−1) = 1−
√
z + p`z ,
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where p` = ψ`(y`−1). Using these facts, fix an arbitrary 1 ≤ ` ≤ t and y`−1 ∈
{0, 1}`−1, and let p` = ψ`(y`−1). Then we have
Ez0
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Y`|Y`−1)
∣∣
z=z0
)2 ∣∣∣∣ Y`−1 = y`−1
]
=
∑
y`∈{0,1}
(
d
dz
Qψ,zt (y`|y`−1)
∣∣
z=z0
)2
Qψ,z0t (y`|y`−1)
=
(
d
dz
(
√
z − p`z)
∣∣
z=z0
)2
(
√
z0 − p`z0) +
(
d
dz
(1−√z + p`z)
∣∣
z=z0
)2
(1−√z0 + p`z0)
=
(
1
2
√
z0
− p`
)2(
1
(
√
z0 − p`z0)(1−√z0 + p`z0)
)
≤ 1
dmin(1− dmax)
(
1
2
√
z0
− p`
)2
,
where the first line follows from the definition of the conditional expectation, the
second line follows from the definition of the measure Qψ,zt ( · |y`−1), and the remain-
ing lines follow from simplification. Now using the fact that p∗(z0) = 1/(2
√
z0),
we have
1
dmin(1− dmax)
(
1
2
√
z0
− p`
)2
=
1
dmin(1− dmax)(p
∗(z0)− p`)2
≤ 3(5)(2) (r(p∗(z0); z0)− r(p`; z0))
= 30Ez0
[
r(p∗(z0); z0)− r(P`; z0)
∣∣∣∣ Y`−1 = y`−1] ,
where the second line follows from (B.1) and the fact that d(p, z) ∈ [1/5, 1/2] for
all (p, z) ∈ P × Z, and the third line follows from the fact that P` = ψ`(Y`−1).
Since the above inequality is true for all 1 ≤ ` ≤ t and all y`−1 ∈ {0, 1}`−1,
applying Ez0 [ · ] to both sides gives
Ez0
[(
d
dz
logQψ,zt (Y`|Y`−1)
∣∣
z=z0
)2]
≤ 30 Ez0 [r(p∗(z0); z0)− r(P`; z0)] ,
which is the desired result.
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B.3. Proof of Lemma 3.2.4
Since r′′(p; z) = −2z and Z = [1/3, 2/3], we have that
Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, 1, ψ)] ≥ 1
3
Eλ[(p1 − p∗(Z))2] = 1
3
∫ 2/3
1/3
(
p1 − 1
2
√
z
)2
λ(z) dz
Consider δ = 1/54. We know that (p1−1/(2
√
z))2 ≥ δ2 whenever |p1 − 1/(2
√
z)| ≥
δ. Since d
dz
1/(2
√
z) = −1/(4z3/2) ≤ −1/3 for all z ∈ [1/3, 2/3], we can conclude
that the set I(p1, δ) = {z ∈ [1/3, 2/3] : |p1 − 1/(2
√
z)| < δ} is an interval whose
length |I(p1, δ)| is bounded above by 6δ. So
1
3
∫ 2/3
1/3
(
p1 − 1
2
√
z
)2
λ(z) dz ≥ δ
2
3
∫
[1/3,2/3]\I(p1,δ)
λ(z) dz =
δ2
3
(
1−
∫
I(p1,δ)
λ(z) dz
)
≥ δ
2
3
(
1−
(
|I(p1, δ)| · sup
z∈[1/3,2/3]
λ(z)
))
≥ δ
2
3
(1− (6δ)6),
where we use the fact that λ(z) ≤ 6 for z ∈ [1/3, 2/3]. Since δ = 1/54, we have
Eλ[Regret(Z, CGenLB, 1, ψ)] ≥ 1
3(542)
(
1− 36
54
)
=
1
26244
.
B.4. Proof of Lemma 3.5.4
We will first establish that for any T ≥ 2 and any τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}, we have
Γ∗(τ, T ) ≥ τT 1/τ − τ + 1 ≥ τ(T 1/τ − 1).
We can lower bound Γ∗(τ, T ) by considering its continuous relaxation defined by:
Υ∗(τ, T ) = min
{
x1 +
τ∑
k=2
xk∑k−1
h=1 xh
∣∣∣ τ∑
h=1
xh = T and xk ∈ R+ ∀k
}
.
We will now show that Υ∗(τ, T ) = τT 1/τ − τ + 1. The structure of the objective
function associated with Υ∗(τ, T ) lends itself to a standard dynamic programming
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approach. So, for j = 2, . . . , τ , let Vj : [0, T ]→ R+ be defined by: for any s ∈ [0, T ],
Vj(s) = min
{
τ∑
k=j
xk
s+
∑k−1
h=j xh
∣∣∣ s+ τ∑
h=j
xh = T and (xj, xj+1, . . . , xτ ) ∈ Rτ−j+1+
}
.
By definition, we have that Vτ (s) = (T − s)/s = (T/s)− 1. By our construction,
V2(s) = min
{
τ∑
k=2
xk
s+
∑k−1
h=2 xh
∣∣∣ s+ τ∑
h=2
xh = T and (x2, x3, . . . , xτ ) ∈ Rτ−1+
}
,
and Υ∗(τ, T ) = minq∈[0,T ] {q + V2(q)}. By definition of Vj(·), it is easy to verify
that we have the following dynamic programming equation: for j < τ ,
Vj(s) = min
xj∈R+:s+xj≤T
{xj
s
+ Vj+1(s+ xj)
}
We will prove by induction that Vj(s) = (τ − j + 1)
((
T
s
)1/(τ−j+1) − 1) for all
j = 2, 3, . . . , τ . The result trivially holds in the base case because Vτ (s) = (T/s)−1,
which is the desired result. Suppose that the result is true for Vj+1(·), we will show
that it also holds for Vj(·). Note that
Vj(s) = min
xj∈R+:s+xj≤T
{xj
s
+ Vj+1(s+ xj)
}
= min
xj∈R+:s+xj≤T
{
xj
s
+ (τ − j)
((
T
s+ xj
)1/(τ−j)
− 1
)}
= min
xj∈R+:s+xj≤T
{
s+ xj
s
+ (τ − j)
(
T
s+ xj
)1/(τ−j)
− (τ − j + 1)
}
To solve the above problem, note that the minimizer of the following unconstrained
optimization problem is given by
arg min
q≥0
{
q
s
+ (τ − j)
(
T
q
)1/(τ−j)}
= s(τ−j)/(τ−j+1) · T 1/(τ−j+1) ,
which can be found by a simple analysis. Thus, the minimizer x∗j(s) for the above
dynamic programming equation is given by
x∗j(s) = s
(τ−j)/(τ−j+1) · T 1/(τ−j+1) − s ,
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which is a feasible solution. This implies that
Vj(s) =
(
T
s
)1/(τ−j+1)
+(τ−j)
(
T
s
)1/(τ−j+1)
−(τ−j+1) = (τ−j+1)
((
T
s
)1/(τ−j+1)
− 1
)
,
which completes the induction. It follows that
Υ∗(τ, T ) = min
q∈[0,T ]
{q + V2(q)} = min
s∈[0,T ]
{
q + (τ − 1)
((
T
q
)1/(τ−1)
− 1
)}
= τT 1/τ−τ+1 ,
where the last inequality follows from the same argument as before.
To finish the proof, note that for any T ≥ 2 and τ ∈ {1, . . . , dlog T e}, we have
T 1/τ = elog T/τ ≥ e1/2, so that (T 1/τ − 1) ≥ (1 − e−1/2)T 1/τ ≥ {T 1/τ}/3. It follows
that
Γ∗(τ, T ) ≥ τ(T 1/τ − 1) ≥ τT
1/τ
3
,
which is the desired result.
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Appendix C
Proofs from Chapter 4
C.1. Proof of Lemma 4.6.2
To prove the Lemma, we will use the following result from Garivier and Moulines
(2008).
Lemma C.1.1 (Theorem 18, Garivier and Moulines (2008)). Let {Vt : t ≥ 1} be a
sequence of i.i.d. random variables with common mean µ and with Vt ∈ [0, 1] with
probability one for all t ≥ 1. Let {Ft : t ≥ 1} be a filtration with σ(V1, . . . , Vt) ⊂ Ft
and Vt+1 independent from Ft for all t ≥ 1. Let {Bt : t ≥ 1} be a sequence of
Bernoulli random variables with Bt ∈ Ft−1 for all t. Let N(t) =
∑t
i=1 Bi. Then
Pr
{∣∣∣∣∣ 1N(t)
t∑
i=1
ViBi − µ >
√
δ
N(t)
∣∣∣∣∣
}
≤ 8dlog tee−1.99δ.
To apply this result, note that with probability one, 1 {Yi ≥ s}1 {Xi ≥ s} =
1 {Di ≥ s}1 {Xi ≥ s} . This means that with probability one, for any fixed i ∈ [n]
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and s ∈ [c], we have
F̂ t(i, s) =
1
N t(i, s)
∑
`∈N t(i,s)
1
{
Y `i ≥ s
}
=
1
N t(i, s)
t∑
j=1
1
{
Y ji ≥ s
}
1
{
Xji ≥ s
}
=
1
N t(i, s)
t∑
j=1
1
{
Dji ≥ s
}
1
{
Xji ≥ s
}
.
Applying Lemma C.1.1 with Vj = 1
{
Dji ≥ s
}
, Bj = 1
{
Xji ≥ s
}
, and Fj =
σ({Dji : i ∈ [n], j ∈ [t]}), and recalling that w(n, t) = 2
√
(log t)/n, we have
Pr
{∣∣∣F̂ t(i, s)− Pr{Di ≥ s}∣∣∣ ≥ w(N t(i, s), T )} ≤ 8dlog tee−1.99(4 log T ) ≤ 8dlog teT−7 ≤ T−3,
where the last inequality follows from the fact that 1 ≤ t ≤ T and T ≥ 2. Taking
the union bound over all t ∈ [T ], i ∈ [n], and s ∈ [c] proves the claim.
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